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1. Introduction 
This chapter introduces the thesis by providing background and motivation for the topic, 
explicating the objective and research questions for the empirical research, and outlining the 
scope and structure of the thesis. 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The ecosystem-centric approach stems from the insight that traditional industry or company 
focused strategies are not enough as whole systems may be dissolved or descend into intense 
competition (Moore, 1996). Companies thinking competition in terms of offers and markets 
face problems if they ignore their context, i.e. ecosystem and its success, demonstrated by 
threats to e.g. first-rate suppliers to collapsing retail chains (Moore, 1996). In rapidly chang-
ing environments, coevolution is the common denominator of some of the most successful 
companies in the world (Moore, 1996). They not only employ competition and cooperation 
to lead competitors and industries, but also “hasten the coming together of disparate business 
elements into new economic wholes from which new businesses, new rules of competition 
and cooperation, and new industries can emerge.” (Moore, 1996, p. 12).  These new eco-
nomic wholes are called ecosystems, and they demand a different approach to strategy mak-
ing as summarized in Table 1 (Moore, 1996). The approach is not alternative to traditional 
concepts of strategy such as corporate and competitive strategy, but one that can add value 
by shedding light on questions that prior concepts may not cover as well (Adner, 2017). 
Table 1. Premises of the Ecosystem strategy  (Moore, 1996, p. 56) 
From Company & Industry to Ecosystem 
Business boundaries – such as industry or 
nation – as given 
Business boundaries as an issue and to some 
extent a matter of choice 
Industry or the company is the primary 
unit of strategy-making 
The business ecosystem, or community of co-
evolving, innovating participants, is the pri-
mary unit of strategy-making 
Economic performance is a function of 
how well the company is managed inter-
nally – and how profitable, on average, is 
its industry 
Economic performance is very much a func-
tion of how the company manages its alli-
ances and relationships within the network 
that constitutes its business ecosystem 
Individual company growth is the central 
concern 
Development of the economic network as a 
whole is the central concern, as well as the 
position of the company within the network 
Cooperation among players is largely lim-
ited to direct suppliers and customers to 
improve traditional customer/supplier re-
lationships and/or maintain existing indus-
try or national boundaries 
Cooperation is expanded to include all play-
ers relevant to the search for ideas and unmet 
needs that can be innovatively combined into 
new communities of coevolving participants 
Competition seen as primarily between 
product and product or company and com-
pany 
Competition is also understood to be among 
business ecosystems – as well as for leader-
ship and centrality within particular ecosys-
tems 
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Not only is the ecosystem concept well motivated, practitioners are also adopting it. The 
prospectus of Alibaba in 2014 for the world’s largest IPO until 2018 lists 160 mentions of 
the word ecosystem (Jacobides, Cennamo, & Gawer, 2018). Even though ecosystems have 
generally been understood to be important in digital domains, the relationship of comple-
mentarity that underpins the concept can be found in more traditional industries, such as the 
insurance industry, airline industry, commercial banking industry, and even the metal stamp-
ing and powder metal industries (C.-H. Lee, Venkatraman, Tanriverdi, & Iyer, 2010). 
Even though the ecosystem concept was initially proposed by Moore in 1993 (Gomes, Facin, 
Salerno, & Ikenami, 2016), it has since then gained broadening interest of multiple other 
academics. There are many different characterizations and boundary conditions for ecosys-
tems proposed by scholars (Adner, 2017; Gomes et al., 2016).  However, the essence of the 
ecosystem construct can be distilled to characteristics of nongeneric complementarity and 
lack of hierarchical governance (Jacobides et al., 2018). Furthermore, ecosystems, especially 
in the digital domain, have platforms at their center and consist of platform innovator(s) and 
complementors (Teece, 2018). These roles are important in order to understand how firms 
act in an ecosystem, and they have various names in prior literature. 
The extant literature has focused mainly on the dominant firm or the ecosystem leader 
(Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017; Nambisan & Baron, 2013; Rickmann, Wenzel, & Fischbach, 
2014) and there have been calls for further research on the complementor point of view and 
strategies of complementors (Jacobides, Cennamo, & Gawer, 2015). Even though some ac-
ademics have shifted their focus to complementors (Ceccagnoli, Forman, Huang, & Wu, 
2012; Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017; Rickmann et al., 2014), the studies have mainly focused on 
performance, not the intentions of or strategies employed by the complementors with few 
notable exceptions, mainly in software ecosystems (e.g. Kude, Dibbern, & Heinzl, 2012; 
Rickmann et al., 2014). Therefore, the need to study complementors is evident (Jacobides et 
al., 2018; McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). 
There is much room for research in the area of ecosystems, and this thesis focuses especially 
on how complementors can find competitive advantage within ecosystems and across dif-
ferent ecosystems and platforms. After all, complementors represent a majority of firms in 
ecosystems and are critical contributors to value creation (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). 
Literature has mainly focused on complementors’ decisions that are deemed tactical 
(Jacobides et al., 2018), and  covered product complementors, such as developers for mobile 
apps (Bresnahan, Orsini, & Yin, 2015) or the video game industry (Cennamo, Ozalp, & 
Kretschmer, 2018). The focus of this thesis is on complementor strategies of service com-
plementors in the software industry that serve business customers. 
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1.2 Research objective and research questions 
In order to understand the strategies of complementors, the ecosystem construct was studied 
extensively, and thus one of the aims of this thesis is to provide an introduction to the main 
drivers of ecosystems and what differentiates ecosystems from other concepts.  
The focus of the thesis being on the complementors, the theoretical part of the thesis presents 
the main concepts important from the complementor point of view. The empirical focus is 
entirely on complementors, and the research questions are related to their strategic decisions 
regarding ecosystems. The general aim is to understand how complementors act in ecosys-
tems and why, and how they may be able to succeed in the future. 
As a premise for understanding complementors’ actions in ecosystems, there is a need to 
understand what decisions they make regarding participation in ecosystems. Do comple-
mentors participate in mainly one ecosystem, or do they participate in many? Furthermore, 
if they employ different ways to approach platform participation, what drives their deci-
sions? Therefore, the first research question for this thesis is:  
Research question 1: What decisions regarding ecosystem participation do complementors 
make, and what drives those decisions? 
Even though the first research question is interesting and helps understand the behavior of 
complementors, it is even more interesting in a strategic sense to understand how comple-
mentors can, and do, succeed in ecosystems. In order to understand the drivers of success of 
complementors, the second research question for the thesis is: 
Research question 2: What drives complementor success? 
Moving even further to the practical domain, while probing for answers on the behavior and 
key success drivers for complementors, the thesis also aims to provide some insight into how 
the complementors’ industry may develop, and how they may be able to respond success-
fully to changes in the operating environment. In order to shed some light on possible future 
development, the third research question is: 
Research question 3: What drivers affect the future of ecosystems and complementors and 
how will the complementors respond to changes? 
Altogether, the research questions aim to provide a comprehensive picture ranging from the 
past to the future. The research questions are somewhat interrelated, and the findings present 
a dynamic picture starting from initial participation decision, advancing to how complement-
ors’ organizations and processes are aligned with the participation decision and what the 
complementors consider their key success drivers to be now, and finally describing how 
complementors anticipate the environment to change, and how they have started, and in-
creasingly will, adapt to changes in order to succeed in the future. 
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1.3 Scope of the thesis 
The scope of the thesis is guided by the research objective and chosen methodology, and 
restricted by practical limitations in resources. The research objective guides the scoping in 
a sense that the focus is specifically aimed at understanding the actions of complementors, 
and the drivers behind those actions. As an inductive methodology is employed in order to 
explore how complementors act and why they act in such ways, deep understanding needs 
to be gained. In order to gain such a deep understanding on the complementors, multiple in-
depth interviews with multiple knowledgeable informants and a comprehensive analysis of 
the interview data are conducted. 
In order to put the limited resources to best use, all informants and case companies come 
from the same industry. This enables to capture as much variation within a similar set of 
boundary conditions stemming from a common ground. Furthermore, the case companies 
all mainly operate in the same geographical region, namely Finland, which helps in limiting 
other possible explanations to the actions of the firms. 
The case companies can all be described as complementors. A possibility to include inter-
views with platform leaders or customers was considered, but as the objective is to under-
stand the actions of complementors, the focus was limited to them. Allocating resources to 
studying multiple different roles in the same ecosystem may have provided more diverse 
insights, but may also have limited the variety of insights, if less complementors would have 
been interviewed. 
The industry of the interviewed complementors is the software industry. More specifically, 
all the case companies provide services, in contrast to products, to business customers. The 
sample logic is further explained in section 3.2, but in brief, the enterprise software industry 
has been deemed a suitable context for studying ecosystems and especially complementors 
(Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Rickmann et al., 2014). Furthermore, the sampling procedure aimed 
to reduce unwanted variation, as the focus was narrowed down to established companies, 
thus scoping out new entrants. 
The limited resources have been a restricting factor in the number of interviews conducted. 
As the analysis of the interview data required significant efforts in processing interview data 
as a whole and abstracting the data in a manner that takes into consideration the variation 
across cases, while remaining true to the data, eight interviews were conducted. Even though 
additional interviews may have presented more insights, a pragmatic degree of theoretical 
saturation was reached, as discussed in section 3.2. 
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1.4 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is divided into 6 chapters. This first chapter provides background on the topic, 
and motivation for the research, describes the research objective and the research questions 
that aim to tackle that objective, explains the scope of the thesis, and finally, in this section, 
provides the structure in which the thesis progresses. 
Chapter two, the literature review, is divided into two main sections. The first section, “Eco-
system as a construct”, lays the groundwork for understanding ecosystems. The section is 
structured in a manner that reflects the characteristics that define and distinguish ecosystems 
from other value systems. Building on the foundation set by the first section of the literature 
review, the second section, “The complementor point of view”, focuses specifically on aca-
demic literature that helps explain how complementors act in ecosystems.  
The third chapter elaborates on the methodology utilized in the empirical research for this 
thesis. The underlying fundaments for the decision to utilize an inductive approach are ex-
plained, and the corresponding aspects of the research strategy are discussed. The chapter 
ends with a discussion on the possible limitations to the approach chosen, thus assessing the 
quality of the research. 
The fourth chapter presents the findings of the empirical research. The section is structured 
to correspond to the research questions, and further divided into different themes that 
emerged from the data during the analysis. The concluding summary synthesizes the find-
ings related to the different research questions into a dynamic process, which connects the 
strategic decision first to aligning the company’s operations and finally to future opportuni-
ties enabled or restricted by the decision. 
The fifth chapter, following the logic of the chosen research methodology, aims to bind the 
findings of the inductive empirical study to prior theories and findings from academic liter-
ature. By comparing the findings to existing knowledge, the discussion chapter relates the 
new insights gained to what was already known or expected by the academic community. 
As such, it not only enables evaluation of the findings, but also shows how the new insights 
add to prior theories. 
The sixth chapter concludes the thesis by drawing implications to both practice and theory. 
The practical, or managerial, implications focus mainly on providing insight on strategizing 
in ecosystems to complementors. The theoretical contributions are discussed in the form of 
how the thesis can aid academics in understanding complementors in ecosystems. 
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2. Literature review 
The literature review of this thesis presents key theories and findings of prior academic lit-
erature relevant to the topic of complementor strategies in platform ecosystems. By combin-
ing academic literature from different streams, the literature review sets the theoretical foun-
dation needed to understand how complementors act in ecosystems and what drives their 
decision-making. 
First, the ecosystem construct, and the main characteristics that underpin ecosystems are 
presented. Complementarity is the underlying relationship that explains why and how dif-
ferent participants align their interests. Platforms, even though not strictly required for eco-
systems, are important constructs that enable complementarity and alignment. Furthermore, 
as the roles that firms take in ecosystems are distinct from other value systems, they, too, are 
discussed. 
Second, the literature review focuses on complementors as important actors in ecosystems 
and the focal actors for this thesis. Even though prior academic literature has mainly focused 
on platform leaders as actors, there is a growing body of literature that discusses comple-
mentors. The main themes regarding complementor strategies are specialization and multi-
homing. In addition to these themes, prior findings and theories relating to benefits of plat-
form participation, ways for complementors to cope with the asymmetric power relation with 
platform leaders, and future development of especially software ecosystems are discussed. 
2.1 Ecosystem as a construct 
The main reason for ecosystems to form and exist is that they can provide complex value 
propositions that build on multiple components to various customers (Adner, 2017; Adner 
& Kapoor, 2010; Dattée, Alexy, & Autio, 2017; Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2017; Kapoor & Lee, 
2013). The value proposition can be understood as the “benefit that the target of the effort is 
to receive, as opposed to what a firm is to deliver” (Adner, 2017, p. 43) and does not need 
to be viewed as a single product or service, but “a set of offerings for different user groups 
and uses” (Autio & Thomas, 2014, p. 208). A good example of an ecosystem value propo-
sition is a “seamless music experience that delight[s] customers” (Hannah & Eisenhardt, 
2017, p. 2). 
The success of ecosystems, or of any offerings that are a part of customer-facing solutions 
that consist of offerings of multiple firms, is not only dependent on the ability of any one 
firm to develop its own innovation (Adner, 2006). Successful ecosystems “allow firms to 
create value that no single firm could have created alone” (Adner, 2006, p. 100) as the cus-
tomer-facing solutions are combinations of individual offerings of multiple firms. The emer-
gence of a market for the most brilliant innovation, meeting or exceeding customer needs, is 
“determined as much by the firm’s partners as by its own performance” (Adner, 2006, p. 
100). In the case of ecosystems that are formed around platforms, “[t]he platform requires 
complementary innovations to be useful, and vice versa” (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008, p. 28) 
Arguably, offerings of firms are rarely isolated from other firms’ offerings. Jacobides et al. 
(2018) classify three distinct types of value systems, namely hierarchy-based value systems, 
market-based value systems, and ecosystem-based value systems.  
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Ecosystem-based value systems are set apart from hierarchy-based value systems, such as 
firm-supplier relationships, mainly due to the fact that in ecosystems, “final customers can 
choose among the components (or elements of offering) that are supplied by each partici-
pants, and can also, in some cases, choose how they are combined” (Jacobides et al., 2018, 
p. 6). In contrast, in hierarchy-based value systems the offering is provided “as is”, combined 
and offered to the customers by a single firm (Jacobides et al., 2018). 
Limiting the choice of customers and setting ecosystems apart from market-based value sys-
tems, there is need for significant coordination and “end customers choose from a set of 
producers or complementors who are bound together through some interdependencies” 
(Jacobides et al., 2018, p. 7) instead of buying the offerings separately from the market and 
combining them freely. 
The characteristics that make ecosystem distinct from the other types of value systems cap-
ture the essence of the ecosystem construct, and set the foundation to the definition of eco-
systems. Ecosystem-based value systems are distinct precisely due to the interdependent, yet 
unhierarchical, nature of the relationships between the products, services, and therefore pro-
ducers (Jacobides et al., 2018). Therefore, the definition employed in this thesis is: 
“An ecosystem is a set of actors with varying degrees of multilateral, non-
generic complementarities that are not fully hierarchically controlled” 
(Jacobides et al., 2018, p. 10). 
The notion that in ecosystems there are “multilateral, nongeneric complementarities” refers 
to the characteristic of the boundedness of components to each other via interdependence, or 
complementarity (Jacobides et al., 2018). The complementarity in ecosystems is specifically 
nongeneric, which means that the complementarities entail some degree of customization, 
and therefore require “the creation of a specific structure of relationships and alignment to 
create value” (Jacobides et al., 2018, p. 9). Complementarity is further discussed in section 
2.1.1. 
The notion that ecosystems are not “fully hierarchically controlled” refers to the character-
istic that sets ecosystems apart from hierarchy-based value systems, i.e. that “[n]o one party 
can unilaterally set terms for, as examples, prices and quantities” (Jacobides et al., 2018, p. 
12). Even though in supply chains there is negotiation for prices between the firm and its 
suppliers, the firm still decides “what it will procure, from whom, and at what cost” 
(Jacobides et al., 2018, p. 13). In ecosystems, the final customers can choose amongst dif-
ferent complements, and thus, the decision-making processes are distributed between the 
producers to some extent (Jacobides et al., 2018). On the other hand, in many ecosystems 
there is a hub that is responsible for setting the standards and rules for the ecosystem and 
wields significant power in comparison to complementors (Jacobides et al., 2018). The dif-
ferent roles in ecosystems, and how the different firms can affect the power they exercise in 
the distributed decision making that follows from a lack of full hierarchical control are dis-
cussed in section 2.1.2. 
2.1.1 Complementarity 
Complementarity in its essence, attributed to Edgeworth, can be economically noted as “the 
marginal value of a variable increases with another variable” (Teece, 2018, p. 1373). Even 
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though simple at the core, complementarity is a concept for which closure or agreement in 
academic literature has not been reached (Jacobides et al., 2018; Teece, 2018).  
Both Teece (2018) and Jacobides et al. (2018) clarify different types of complementarity, 
but neither claim to produce an exhaustive list. Both articles note that complementarity raises 
coordination issues (Jacobides et al., 2018; Teece, 2018), but Jacobides et al. (2018) further 
highlight that not all complementarity raises such coordination issues, referring to generic 
complementarity. According to them, specifically nongeneric complementarity underpins 
the ecosystem construct (Jacobides et al., 2018). Nongeneric complementarity is discussed 
further in section 2.1.1.i.  
According to Teece (2018, p. 1375) , “[c]omplementarity is the essence of platforms, and 
platforms help enable ecosystems”. Even though academic literature altogether is still unde-
cided on whether platforms should be included as defining element of ecosystems, they are 
important in most of the ecosystems studied, especially in the digital domain (Teece, 2018). 
The main function of platforms in ecosystems is to enable complementary offerings to be 
built on them (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; Teece, 2018). These complementary offerings 
that are strictly not the platform, and add value jointly with the platform are called comple-
ments (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008). A summary of platforms and complements in the context 
of ecosystems is presented in section 2.1.1.ii. 
2.1.1.i Nongeneric complementarity 
Nongeneric complementarity can be understood via the opposite of it, namely generic com-
plementarity. Generic complements are such complementary goods or services that are 
standardized to a degree that customers can buy them from markets and combine any of 
them on their own, without a need of coordination of investments on the producer side 
(Jacobides et al., 2018). Generic complements do not require alignment or interaction be-
tween the different producers in order for the ecosystem value propositions to materialize, 
and therefore do not need an ecosystem to create value (Adner, 2017; Jacobides et al., 2018)  
In contrast to generic complementarity, nongeneric, or unique complementarity does require 
coordination, alignment or customization of offerings (Jacobides et al., 2018). Unique com-
plementarity ranges from strict, where a good or service requires a certain complementary 
good or service, to specific, where a good or service requires a complementary good or ser-
vice that is customized to it (Jacobides et al., 2018). 
Nongeneric complementarity can be one- or two-way, meaning that the customization re-
quirement may apply to both of the complements, or only one of them (Jacobides et al., 
2018). The situation of two-way unique complementarity leads to a need for cospecializa-
tion, i.e. a need to customize both of the complementary offerings to each other, and the 
situation of one-way unique complementarity leads to a need for specialization, i.e. the need 
to customize applies to only one of the offerings (Jacobides et al., 2018). 
Cospecialization stems from the idea of strategic fit and can be “of one asset to another, or 
of strategy to structure, or of strategy of process” (Teece, 2007, p. 1337). Teece classifies 
cospecialized assets as a class within a larger group of complementary assets, defined as 
“assets where the value of an asset is a function of its use in conjunction with other particular 
assets” (Teece, 2007, p. 1338). Cospecialization increases the value of joint use, and leads 
to markets where the assets are idiosyncratic and cannot be easily be imitated by competitors 
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(Teece, 2007). Cospecialization, or customization, does however come at a cost. Perhaps 
most importantly, the cost and investments to customize to a certain complementary offering 
may not be fully fungible, i.e. the customized offering may not be readily compatible to other 
possibly complementary offerings (Jacobides et al., 2018).  
2.1.1.ii Platforms and complements 
Autio and Thomas (2014) include a platform or a focal firm, later discussed as a platform 
leader, to their definition of an ecosystem. Even though not all ecosystems necessarily have 
a platform at its core (Autio & Thomas, 2014), one example in prior literature being the 
residential solar industry (Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2017), Teece (2018) argues that ecosystems 
consist of platform innovator(s) and complementors. Teece notes that such a definition is 
preferential “for the purpose of examining issues relating to digital convergence” (Teece, 
2018, p. 1375), which implies that, at least in ecosystems where digital elements are im-
portant, platforms are an important enabler of ecosystems.  
The inclusion of a platform in the definition of ecosystems by some authors may also be a 
consequence of how ecosystems develop initially. The ecosystem construct emphasizes that 
the value is not created in isolation, but together with complementary offerings of players 
that “help fill out the full package of value for customers” (Moore, 1993, p. 76). According 
to Moore, during the birth stage of ecosystems, “entrepreneurs focus on defining what cus-
tomers want, that is, the value of a proposed new product or service and the best form for 
delivering it” (Moore, 1993, p. 76). 
The definition of a platform includes both a core value proposition and an ability for others 
to build on top of it. First, platforms perform “at least one essential function within what can 
be described as a “system of use” or solve an essential technological problem within an 
industry” (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008, p. 29). Second, they are “easy to connect to or build 
upon to expand the system of use as well as to allow new and even unintended end-uses” 
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2008, p. 29). 
Thomas et al. (2014, p. 200) refine the platform construct and describe it as “a system or 
architecture that supports a collection of complementary assets”. They note that the platform 
ecosystem builds on product family logic, described as “[p]latform as the stable center of a 
platform family leading to derivative products”, and its “modularity, standards, and product 
differentiation to product or service system” (Thomas et al., 2014, p. 205). The differentiat-
ing factor to product family platforms is that the focal product or service system is “broader 
than an internal or supply-chain-level” (Thomas et al., 2014, p. 205)  Furthermore, Thomas 
et al. (2014, p. 205), note the fact that the stream “explicitly recognizes the importance of 
the resulting industrial community and surrounding ecosystem to the platform”. As Gawer 
and Cusumano (2008, p. 28) put it, “[t]he platform requires complementary innovations to 
be useful, and vice versa”. 
A platform, different from the ecosystem platforms, often referred to as a multisided plat-
form, is described “as an intermediary between two or more market participants” (Thomas 
et al., 2014, p. 200). This stream is distinguishable from ecosystem platforms as the platform 
specifically highlights the intermediary nature facilitating interchange, i.e. exchange or trade 
(Thomas et al., 2014), whereas in the ecosystem literature the platform, even though acting 
also as a facilitator, specifically stimulates external complementary innovations (Gawer & 
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Cusumano, 2014). Multisided platforms are not necessarily ecosystems, if the complemen-
tarity between the complements and the platform is generic, i.e. if there is no coordination 
required in production (Jacobides et al., 2018). 
Ecosystem platforms do, however, have commonalities with, and owe theoretical debt to, 
multisided market platforms. Direct, or same-side, and indirect, or cross-side, network ef-
fects, and multihoming and switching costs, present in multisided platforms, are also im-
portant in many ecosystems (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). These effects and costs are espe-
cially crucial in ecosystem to ecosystem competition as they help explain the dynamics at 
play and the need to grow the ecosystem rapidly on both the supply and use side – although 
as discussed later, growth in pure numbers is not always favorable (Wareham, Fox, & Cano 
Giner, 2014).  
Gawer and Cusumano (2014, p. 417) define network effects as a phenomenon where “the 
more users who adopt the platform, the more valuable the platform becomes to the owner 
and to the users because of growing access to the network of users and often to a growing 
set of complementary innovations”. Essentially this means that “there are increasing incen-
tives for more firms and users to adopt a platform and join the ecosystem as more users and 
complementors join” (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014, p. 417). Direct network effects refers to 
the fact that more users attract more users, and indirect network effects refers to more users 
attracting more complementary innovations and vice versa (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). 
Complementary innovations can be called complements (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008). Even 
though any two complementary units can be complements to each other, in platform ecosys-
tems complements are specifically services or products that, jointly with the platform, or 
core product, create value to customers (Jacobides et al., 2018). Therefore, platforms are not 
complements, when utilizing this definition of a complement. 
As noted above, for the ecosystem construct complementarity alone is not enough, but there 
is a need for nongeneric complementarity, or customization to some extent (Jacobides et al., 
2018). In ecosystems with platforms, the unique complementarity is most likely to be one-
way, as the point of platforms is to offer a variety of complementors the opportunity to build 
on them (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). An example by Jacobides et al. (2018) illustrates this 
relation: 
[…] In the example of an OS platform/app ecosystem, the app and the 
platform have unique complementarity in the sense that the app does not 
function without the OS (unique complementarity, unidirectional, as the 
OS operates without most apps). (Jacobides et al., 2018, p. 9) 
Specialization or customization of only the complements can be explained by platform ar-
chitecture. In platform architecture, a system is divided into two distinct sets of components: 
those with low variety and high reusability, i.e. the platform; and those with high variety and 
low reusability, i.e. the complements. This combination of some fairly fixed component, i.e. 
platform, and components that can vary in the present and change over time, i.e. comple-
ments, makes the system evolvable and able to adapt at a lower cost. Due to the complements 
being allowed to vary, the whole system does not have to be invented or rebuilt completely 
to generate new solutions for heterogonous tastes, or to respond to changes in the external 
environment. (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009) 
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Therefore, complements are most likely to be specialized to certain platform, instead of co-
specialized with them. The degree of specialization of complements is an important decision 
for complementors, i.e. producers of complements, have to make. In the following section, 
complementors and platform leaders as roles that have different characteristics, duties, and 
opportunities or power are discussed. After discussing the different roles in ecosystems, the 
focus will be concentrated on the complementors, and relevant themes for them in platform 
ecosystems will be discussed.  
2.1.2 Roles, positions and power 
According to Jacobides et al. (2018, p. 4), “[i]t is broadly agreed that ecosystems require 
providers of complementary innovations, products, or services, who might belong to differ-
ent industries and need not be bound by contractual arrangements – but have significant 
interdependence nonetheless”. The lack of a need for contractual arrangements, or integrated 
hierarchies, whilst parties having significant interdependencies is what makes ecosystems 
distinct from “classical firm-supplier relationships, Porter’s (1980) value system, or a firm’s 
strategic networks” (Jacobides et al., 2018, p. 4). 
Complementarity helps explain why firms wish to align their offerings, but does not give 
insight on how such alignment occurs. Ecosystems do not emerge out of nowhere, but are a 
result of  deliberate efforts from multiple parties that wittingly or unwittingly form ecosys-
tems (Jacobides et al., 2018).  
According to Adner (2017) ecosystems are defined as the alignment structures that consist 
of sets of partners, which are multilaterally connected in a way that cannot be reduced to 
dyadic relationships, who must interact for that value proposition to materialize. The sets of 
partners, or sets of roles, are interdependent, and importantly the interdependencies tend to 
be standardized within each role (Jacobides et al., 2018). Even though there are various dif-
ferent descriptions of different roles in ecosystems, in essence, the division can be made to 
leaders and followers (Adner, 2017).  
In a similar manner that platforms are important enablers of ecosystems (Teece, 2018), even 
though there may be ecosystems without platforms, ecosystems usually, but not mandatorily, 
have leading firms that “take responsibility for leading the systems towards alignment” 
(Adner, 2017, p. 48).  
The leader role has been named in multiple ways. Moore (1993) writes about central eco-
logical contributors, Iansiti & Levien (2004) call leaders either keystones, or value or phys-
ical dominators, Gawer and Cusumano (2008) write about platform leaders, Teece (2018) 
about platform innovators and Jacobides et al. (2018) employ the terminology of a hub.  
Successful leadership is contingent to willing followership, i.e. deference to the vision of 
structure and roles of the leader (Adner, 2017). The followers in ecosystems (Adner, 2017) 
have been named niches (Iansiti & Levien, 2004), non-focal firms (Selander, Henfridsson, 
& Svahn, 2013), spokes (Jacobides et al., 2018) or complementors (Cennamo et al., 2018; 
Jacobides et al., 2018; Teece, 2018).  
In this thesis, the terminology of platform leaders and complementors is employed. Platform 
leader is deemed suitable, as the core offering on top of which other players build upon in 
most cases fits the definition of a platform, as discussed in section 2.1.1.ii. The terminology 
of a complementor, on the other hand, is deemed most suitable, as the relationship which 
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distincts the ecosystem construct, is complementarity, and in platform ecosystems, comple-
ments are distinguishable from the platform, as discussed in section 2.1.3. 
In the following subsections, the two different roles in ecosystems are defined. When dis-
cussing platform leaders in the following, some of their most important tasks are presented 
with a brief discussion on how they both need to lead the ecosystem and how they can benefit 
from their leadership. The definition of a complementor is provided, too, in this section, but 
their actions, motives, and opportunities are more deeply elaborated in the following section, 
section 2.2. 
2.1.2.i Platform leaders 
A platform leader is a firm that develops a core offering, or platforms, and enables others to 
build on it (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). The leader “sets, and 
often enforces, the governance rules, determines timing, and often reaps the lion’s share of 
gains after the ecosystem is aligned” (Adner, 2017, p. 48). The alignment process has been 
called orchestration in prior literature (Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Rickmann et al., 2014). As 
the coordination of an ecosystems is very complex with tensions in simultaneous collabora-
tion and competition, requiring design of technology and business logics that incentivize 
different parties to act coherently, there is a need for “one firm or a small group of firms to 
act as a platform leader” (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014, p. 422). 
The main mechanisms for platform leaders to create successful platform ecosystems are cor-
ing and tipping (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008). Coring refers to the creation of  “a new platform 
where none existed before” (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008, p. 32), and tipping to winning “plat-
form wars by building momentum” (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008, p. 32). In both coring and 
tipping, platform leaders must consider both technological and business actions (Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2008). 
In coring, or creating a new platform, platform leaders take technological actions to solve an 
essential business problem common to multiple customers. They do so by not only creating 
an own core solution, but also by facilitating external complements by complementors both 
technologically and in terms of business incentives to complementors. (Gawer & Cusumano, 
2008) 
In tipping, or succeeding in the platform to platform competition, they must be careful not 
to be enveloped by other platforms, and ensure to attract as many customers and comple-
mentors as possible. In platform envelopment, the enveloper captures market share and har-
nesses network effects by combining its own functionality with the target platform to a multi-
platform bundle (Eisenmann, Parker, & Van Alstyne, 2011). In order to attract as many cus-
tomers and complementors as possible, platform leaders need to ensure that their platform is 
more attractive than competing platforms to both, especially in the presence of network ef-
fects. (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008).  
At the same time as platform leaders need to keep in mind the attractiveness of the platform 
to complementors and customers, they also need to preserve their own revenues and profit. 
This simultaneous collaboration and competition makes ecosystems complex. (Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2014)  
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In platform ecosystems, the power of the platform leaders has been attributed to architectural 
advantage (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). Architectural advantage of a company in an ecosys-
tem stems from competition being ferocious in segments complementary to them, and not in 
the value adding process they themselves participate in (Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 
2006). Platform leaders, as crafters of rules in ecosystems, can facilitate entry and competi-
tion in the complementary assets without participating themselves in the complementary 
processes, and thus end up with the lion’s share of the benefits (Jacobides et al., 2006).  
The architectural advantage concept is very much related to bottlenecks, as Jacobides et al. 
(2006, p. 1209) define bottlenecks as “segments where mobility is limited and competition 
softened”. Essentially, bottlenecks are segments where the entry of producers is limited and 
at the same time other segments are characterized by high mobility in terms of switching 
costs and entry potential (Jacobides et al., 2006). High mobility essentially means that in the 
segment, where there is high mobility, “assets can be replaced by numerous equivalents at 
negligible cost” (Jacobides et al., 2006, p. 1206).  
Managing bottlenecks is about facilitating entry into complementary assets, thus enabling 
and encouraging “ferocious competition in the complementary assets rather than in their own 
segments” (Jacobides et al., 2006, p. 1210). The main way to increase mobility is to create 
standards that encourage competition in complementary activities (Jacobides et al., 2006). 
The critical factor to achieve such a position is to become the “guarantor of quality” 
(Jacobides et al., 2006, p. 1210) while standardizing other components. An illustrative ex-
ample of such positioning can be seen in the development of positions of IBM on the one 
hand and Microsoft and Intel on the other hand as the latter became “de facto signals of 
quality” and the “other PC components became standardized” (Jacobides et al., 2006, p. 
1210).  
The entry of multiple complementors to a platform can be beneficial to all parties, but there 
are also some limits to increasing attractiveness from increasing participation. As discussed 
in section 2.2.1.iii, platform dominance, or having more participants than other platforms is 
generally deemed as an attractive characteristic of a platform. On the other hand, platform 
leaders must carefully manage the openness of the platform, i.e. mobility, as too much com-
petition in the complements is also deemed unattractive by complementors, as discussed also 
in section 2.2.1.iii. 
Platform leaders, as the most powerful players in the ecosystem, do not only possess archi-
tectural advantage, but may also utilize their power to capture more and more of the created 
value by either integrating vertically or horizontally, or draining value by e.g. aggressively 
negotiating deals in their favor (Iansiti & Levien, 2004). 
Yoffie and Kwak (2006) specifically focus on relationships between firms that have com-
plementary offerings, and highlight the importance of power. They note that tensions may 
develop between the firms even though they share many goals (Yoffie & Kwak, 2006). Such 
tensions relate to pricing, technology, influence over customers, and “which one [of the com-
plementary firms] gets the bigger slice of the pie” (Yoffie & Kwak, 2006, p. 90). In order to 
influence the behavior of others, firms can employ tools that can be divided into hard power 
and soft power (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Yoffie & Kwak, 2006). Whereas hard power 
stems from direct actions or threats of the focal firm, in soft power other firms willingly 
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behave in ways that are beneficial to the focal actor as acting so is in the self-interest of the 
non-focal firm (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Yoffie & Kwak, 2006).  
According to Yoffie and Kwak (2006, p. 92), hard power stems from “traditional sources of 
strength, such as market share, brand equity, control of distribution channels, or cash” but 
also from other sources, such as entry to complementor markets, i.e. producing comple-
ments, and supporting other platforms. Exercising hard power means using these sources, or 
threatening to use these sources, to make others do, or not to do, something (Yoffie & Kwak, 
2006). A great example of utilizing hard power is how Microsoft threatened not to support 
Intel’s MMX (a microprocessor technology), unless they license it at no cost to other chip 
makers, therefore drawing on Intel’s dependence on Microsoft (Yoffie & Kwak, 2006). A 
counter-reaction by Intel to support Linux reducing Microsoft’s ability to exercise hard 
power (Yoffie & Kwak, 2006) can be seen as building hard power on the complementor 
side. 
As soft power depends on alignment of interests, wielding it builds on signaling commitment 
via sharing information, articulating a vision, fostering leadership, and contributing to the 
cause (Yoffie & Kwak, 2006). As such, soft power resembles the efforts of platform leaders 
to orchestrate ecosystems (Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Rickmann et al., 2014), or a balance of 
power and trust, where “[m]eaning is imposed on the weaker partner by the stronger one, 
but the weaker partner is quite happy to let this happen because doing so will result in sig-
nificant gains for the entire ecosystem” (Perrons, 2009, p. 1309).  
Even though they possess significant advantage in comparison to complementors, platform 
leaders benefit most from improving the ecosystem as a whole by also taking into account 
the health of other players (Iansiti & Levien, 2004). They do not do so due to altruistic rea-
sons, but due to the fact that they benefit from the growth and health of the ecosystem (Iansiti 
& Levien, 2004) and also due to platform to platform competition for complementors and 
customers (Teece, 2018). As Teece well puts it: 
When there is platform-to-platform competition, adoption and commercial 
success is likely a function of who can recruit the most (and the best) com-
plementors. Over time, the advantage belongs to the platform leaders that 
set the rules in the manner most likely to benefit the system as a whole and 
not just their own short-term interests. (Teece, 2018, p. 1376) 
2.1.2.ii Complementors 
The definition of a complementor derives from customer value as “[a] player is a comple-
mentor if customers value your product more when they have that player’s product than 
when they have your product alone” (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1997, p. 31). In ecosystem 
literature, complementors have specific role in defining the concept, as their existence as 
actors that are not suppliers or distributors, and their inputs, i.e. complementary inputs, rep-
resent a major and simple distinction to supply or value chains (Gomes et al., 2016; Iansiti 
& Levien, 2004). 
Defining the role of complementors via complementarity is not, however, enough. In a gen-
eral sense, both platform leaders and complementors have offerings that are complementary 
to each other. Followership, or conceding to another firm’s leadership is a way to distinct 
the role of a complementor from a leader (Adner, 2017). Another way to distinguish the roles 
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is to differentiate between the platform hub and spokes that provide complementary products 
or services to the platform (Adner, 2017; Jacobides et al., 2018). In terms of platform eco-
system terminology, a spoke seems to be an interchangeable term for a complementor 
(Huber, Kude, & Dibbern, 2010; Teece, 2018). In platform ecosystems, where complements 
can be defined as in section 2.1.1.ii, complementors can be defined as providers of those 
complements (Jacobides et al., 2018). Besides spokes, complementors have also been called 
“non-focal actors” (Selander et al., 2013). The definition of a non-focal actor, in contrast to 
a focal actor, gives a different perspective that adds more depth to the definition of a com-
plementor. 
Selander et al. (2013) define ‘non-focal’ actors as “ecosystem participant[s] who [are] at the 
periphery of the digital ecosystem” (Selander et al., 2013, p. 184). These actors have two 
specific characteristics: 1) the survival of the ecosystem is not dependent on the actor and 2) 
the survival of the actor is not dependent on the specific ecosystem (Selander et al., 2013). 
A distinction between a focal and a non-focal actor can be exemplified via a single actor, 
Google, which is a focal firm for the Android ecosystem, but a non-focal player in the Apple 
iOS ecosystem as a third-party developer (e.g. Google Voice) (Selander et al., 2013). As 
such, the focal actor definition resembles closely the definition of a platform leader. 
There is a problem with the terminology employed by Selander et al. (2013) that stems from 
the fact that a “focal actor” can also refer to “the actor from whose perspective the analysis 
is conducted” rather than determining focality “by power or traditional measures of network 
centrality” (Adner, 2017, p. 56). Therefore, in this thesis I refer to complementors, in contrast 
to non-focal actors, although the definition of a non-focal actor itself is useful. 
To summarize the complementor role, it is perhaps easier to define the role via relation to 
the platform leader role, while keeping in mind the essence of complementarity as a defining 
characteristic. Complementors are the firms that do not provide a core offering in the eco-
system, but provide products or services that add value jointly with it, i.e. complements. 
Their individual participation in the ecosystem is not mandatory for the ecosystem to be 
successful, but on the other hand as a set of actors, they are crucial for the ecosystem. Even 
though the survival of complementors generally may not be strictly dependent on a single 
ecosystem, some of the complementors may become quite dependent on specific ecosys-
tems, as discussed later on in section 2.2.2.iii.  
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2.2 The complementor point of view 
Complementors, as a set of actors are crucial to the ecosystem’s value creation, and, there-
fore, their perspective is very relevant to understanding ecosystems. The point of view of a 
complementor differs from platform leaders significantly, mainly due to the fact that they 
are not, as single firms, crucial for the survival of the ecosystem (Selander et al., 2013). Even 
though they have much less power than platform leaders, they are not, in theory, dependent 
on any single ecosystem (Selander et al., 2013). 
For complementors, platform partnerships can offer significant benefits. Platform partner-
ship, on a general level, increases sales and the likelihood of an initial public offering (IPO) 
of a complementor (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012). Prior literature has identified that the main 
reasons for complementors to partner with platforms can be categorized to benefitting from 
technological resources, market resources and social resources (Dellermann, Jud, & Reck, 
2017; Kude et al., 2012). 
In order to maximize the benefits from a specific ecosystems, especially in the case of com-
plex platforms, complementors specialize or align themselves with the platform (Cennamo 
et al., 2018; Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). The more specialized, or experienced with the plat-
form the complementors are, the more likely they are to reach superior performance in the 
ecosystem (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). Furthermore, the benefits offered by the platform 
leaders to complementors are usually linked to partnership status (Wareham et al., 2014), 
which most likely increase with specialization. 
There are, however, risks in specializing to a specific ecosystem. What makes complement-
ors successful in a specific ecosystem makes it more costly for them to change to another 
ecosystem, i.e. the superior performance configurations are platform specific (Cennamo et 
al., 2018) and costs of specialization or customization may not be fungible (Jacobides et al., 
2018). Therefore, complementors may become dependent on their ecosystem of choice. For 
this reason, it is important for complementors to assess the attractiveness of different eco-
systems when making the initial decision to join one. 
However, even though they may be able to choose a suitable ecosystem at a certain point of 
time, the situation may change. Complementors face the risk of being locked-in in a losing 
ecosystem, which they cannot control (Selander et al., 2013). Furthermore specializing into 
an ecosystem is asymmetric, and the dependence of complementors on a specific ecosystem 
increases the risk of opportunistic behavior from platform leaders. The most important way 
to mitigate the risks is to multihome, i.e. participate in multiple ecosystems (Cennamo et al., 
2018). Multihoming has also other benefits than reduction of dependence, most importantly 
the access to a wider customer base (Bresnahan et al., 2015). However, multihoming may 
be too costly for some complementors (Venkataraman, Ceccagnoli, & Forman, 2018). 
In the following sections, I discuss the choices complementors have to make in terms of 
platform participation, or in other words, specialization and multihoming that are somewhat 
contradictory behaviors, as themes. First, I discuss the benefits that complementors aim to 
attain from partnerships and the factors that affect platform attractiveness. Second, I discuss 
the benefits and logic of specialization and the risks that it entails. Third, I discuss multi-
homing and its benefits and costs, and other ways for complementors to cope with the asym-
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metric relationship they have with platform leaders. Fourth, and finally, I finish the comple-
mentor point of view by discussing the main drivers of change in the information systems 
industry, and how prior literature anticipates that the complementors react to the changes.  
2.2.1 Benefits of platform participation 
The participation of complementors in ecosystems essentially manifests as them producing 
complements, i.e. products or services that add jointly value with the platform to customers 
(Jacobides et al., 2018). Complementarity posits that the offering of the complementors is 
more valuable with the platform than without the platform (Jacobides et al., 2018), therefore 
already implying that there is generally a benefit from complements in customer value cre-
ation.  
From the point of view of the complementors, participation to ecosystems grants also direct 
benefits to them. Ceccagnoli et al. (2012) take the perspective of complementors, more spe-
cifically of independent software vendors that act in an environment where joining a plat-
form is not required. They find that in the enterprise software industry, participation in plat-
form ecosystems can provide significant benefits for complementors that join the platform 
ecosystem, manifested as improved sales and a higher likelihood of an IPO (Ceccagnoli et 
al., 2012).  
The benefits the complementors can receive from platform participation can be divided into 
technological, commercial and social capital. These different forms of capital help explain 
how exactly platform participation benefits complementors, and are discussed in the follow-
ing. 
2.2.1.i Technological capital 
By participating in ecosystems, and partnering with platform leaders, complementors gain 
access to various technological capital provided by the platforms. The technological capital 
includes the hub’s, or platform leader’s, capability to provide integrated systems, and its 
capability to innovate system architectures (Kude et al., 2012). This technological capital 
provided by platform leaders is a necessary condition for platform loyalty, or willingness for 
complementors to invest in an ecosystem (Dellermann et al., 2017) 
The platform leader’s capability to provide integrated systems is important for complement-
ors, as the complementor’s solutions are limited in ability to cover customer demand (Kude 
et al., 2012). As the solutions of complementors only cover a fraction of the comprehensive 
need of the customers, they are of little value without the platform that provides the under-
lying architecture and the ecosystem of components and modules surrounding it (Kude et 
al., 2012). Furthermore, complementors rely on the platform leaders’ technology-related 
know-how regarding the platforms, and platform partnership provides access to that know-
how (Kude et al., 2012). More specifically, platforms may provide resources such as 
knowledge, training and tools that help to develop offerings using platform technologies and 
integrate the offerings with platforms (Rickmann et al., 2014). These resources enable com-
plementors to integrate their offering more reliably and with less costs to the platform 
(Ceccagnoli et al., 2012). 
Whereas the ability to provide integrated systems enables complementors to “exploit the 
potential of their own solutions to contribute to the hub’s system” (Kude et al., 2012, p. 253) 
the platform leader’s capability to innovate systems architectures is important as systemic 
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innovation is required for the ecosystem as a whole to remain competitive (Kude et al., 
2012). Such a capability is actually an important driver for complementor decisions regard-
ing which platforms to participate in as developers are likely to be drawn to innovative plat-
forms that have a dominant position (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). 
2.2.1.ii Commercial and social capital 
If technological capital is an important prerequisite, or a necessary condition for platform 
participation, it alone is not a sufficient (Dellermann et al., 2017). Commercial and social 
capital provided by the platform leader are two other categoric benefits that induce platform 
loyalty (Dellermann et al., 2017). Commercial and social capital are deemed substitutable as 
benefits, which means that the effect on platform loyalty may only require either one of them 
to be present, not both (Dellermann et al., 2017). This may be a consequence of how they 
both achieve a similar effect in enabling improved access to customers. 
Commercial capital refers to the marketing capabilities, as well as service and distribution 
networks possessed by the platform leader (Dellermann et al., 2017). More generally, com-
mercial capital helps firms to commercialize new technologies and obtain rents from them 
(Ahuja, 2000). As complementors are generally smaller than the platform leader, they ben-
efit from the marketing and distribution capabilities of platform leaders that are usually 
global players (Kude et al., 2012). More specifically, the marketing support from platform 
leaders may range from acknowledging the partnership with the complementor publicly to 
recommending the complementor’s solutions to customers (Kude et al., 2012).  
Social capital refers to the information and status benefits that stem from a firm’s prior rela-
tionships with other firms (Ahuja, 2000). The benefits of social capital are related to in-
creases in legitimacy, quality and trustworthiness in the eyes of customers (Dellermann et 
al., 2017; Kude et al., 2012).  As small and recently founded firms “often face the challenge 
that they are unknown in the market and that potential customers are doubtful about the 
quality and reliability of their products and services” (Kude et al., 2012, p. 253) they may 
overcome these challenges by partnering with platform leaders (Bengtsson & Johansson, 
2014; Kude et al., 2012). More specifically, “positioning the brand name of a hub organiza-
tion within its own marketing efforts […] helps spoke organizations signal their trustworthi-
ness to potential customers” (Kude et al., 2012, p. 254).  
Both commercial and social capital can actually be distilled under the general benefit of 
customer access as they both increase the awareness of customers of the complementor so-
lution and the credibility of the solution, both increasing customer trust in the quality of the 
complementor offerings (Rickmann et al., 2014). Furthermore, customer access is related to 
the technological capital provided by platforms, as the demand is for the comprehensive 
solution instead of the standalone offering of the complementors, and therefore integration 
of the complementor offerings to the platform is a means of customer access (Rickmann et 
al., 2014, p. 8).  
In addition to goals, and enablers and instruments to achieve those goals, Rickmann et al. 
(2014) identify effects and influencers that affect the complementors intention to partner and 
continue the partnership. The perceived usefulness of the partnership is essentially assessed 
by “how well [the complementors] achieve their goals with the offered enablers and instru-
ments” (Rickmann et al., 2014, p. 9). This perceived usefulness determines how satisfied the 
complementors are with the partnership, and together with trust to platform success and the 
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possible existence of previous connections to the ecosystem, the satisfaction will influence 
whether the complementor will end the partnership or expand their business within the eco-
system (Rickmann et al., 2014). 
Kude et al. (2012) conducted a multiple-case study to explore the relevance and interaction 
between the input-oriented perspective, which posits that actors enter inter-firm arrange-
ments to access external resources and capabilities, and the output-oriented perspective, 
which posits that complementariness influences benefits obtained from such arrangements. 
They specifically study spoke organizations and find that the hub’s “reputation and its capa-
bility to provide integrated systems are generally important reasons for partnering” and that 
there is an interaction between the input- and output-oriented perspectives as the level of 
product complementarity affects how the hub’s innovativeness and commercial capital mo-
tivates spokes to participate (Kude et al., 2012, p. 250). More specifically, the resources and 
capabilities of the hub that motivate spokes to partner up with it are: 1) ability to provide 
integrated systems, 2) ability to innovate systems, 3) commercial capital, 4) reputation (Kude 
et al., 2012). Out of these four, two are apply generally: namely 1 and 4 (Kude et al., 2012).  
The effects of the other two abilities are moderated by the level of complementarity, i.e. how 
much the platform leaders’ solutions overlap with the core business of the partner, where a 
high overlap leads to lower complementarity (Kude et al., 2012). When overlap is high (com-
plementarity is low), the platform leader’s commercial capital may be highly beneficial for 
the complementor, but at the same time there is a higher threat for the platform leader to 
innovate in a way that renders the complementor’s solutions obsolete (Kude et al., 2012). In 
essence, therefore, some but not all platform leaders’ capabilities and resources are benefi-
cial for all complementors and therefore understanding complementarity and alignment is 
important for both platform leaders and complementors, especially in the enterprise applica-
tion software industry (Kude et al., 2012) 
2.2.1.iii Platform attractiveness 
As noted above, ecosystem participation offers benefits to complementors. However, as 
there are oftentimes multiple competing ecosystems, complementors not only choose be-
tween participation and non-participation, but also in which ecosystem to participate in (e.g. 
Moore, 1993). The main drivers of attractiveness are platform related factors, and competi-
tion within the ecosystems (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). 
The platform related factors that affect ecosystem attractiveness are platform dominance, 
and platform newness (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). Platform dominance is important as 
dominant platforms offer complementors a bigger market to offer their products and services 
to (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). Platform newness, on the other hand is important as new 
platforms are likely to offer improvements of basic functionalities due to being able to take 
advantage of newer technologies (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). 
The most important driver for platform dominance are positive feedback effects in networks 
(Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). Network effects not only lead to a larger market of buyers, but 
also minimize uncertainty of the future viability of the platform, as network effects are prone 
to positive feedback effects (Katz & Shapiro, 1994), therefore increasing the probability of 
the sustainability of the platform in the future, i.e. dominant platforms are likely to continue 
to be dominant. This is important as complementors need to be convinced that platform in-
vestments will yield adequate long-term returns (Wareham et al., 2014). 
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Platform newness is a characteristic that offers some counterbalance to platform dominance 
(Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). As platforms get older, complementors are less likely to par-
ticipate in them (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). This is due to the fact that newer platforms are 
likely to take advantage of improvements in technology, therefore offering significant im-
provements in the core platform (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). Dominant platforms may have 
difficulty to incorporate new features due to a phenomenon called “innovators dilemma” 
(Gawer & Cusumano, 2014). The same dominance that grants platform leaders advantage 
may tie it to the models it is successful in leading to the innovator’s dilemma (Gawer & 
Cusumano, 2014) therefore being at risk to be displaced by superior new platforms 
(Eisenmann et al., 2011) that make better use of improvements in technology (Venkatraman 
& Lee, 2004).  
Platform dominance is not only somewhat contradictory with platform newness, but also 
with the attractiveness of ecosystems that stems from a lower level of competition within the 
ecosystem. As network effects, and therefore an increasing number of not only buyers but 
also complementors drive platform dominance, dominance is most likely correlated with 
higher levels of competition between the complementors. In other words, growth in the num-
ber of complementors is not always beneficial as “excess supply of variable quality and 
overcrowding in complementor markets[,] negatively impact[s] partner profits” (Wareham 
et al., 2014, p. 1210). Whereas generativity, or increase in complements is helpful as it in-
creases platform value, excessive supply of competing complements, or plurality is prob-
lematic, as it may lead to downward price pressure reducing profitability or even leading to 
losses to complementors (Wareham et al., 2014). Therefore, “a sustainable value proposition 
is not only relevant for customers but also for complementors who self-select into business 
niches based on potential returns” (Wareham et al., 2014, p. 1210).  
As the different drivers of attractiveness are somewhat contradictory, it is important to assess 
the importance of the different drivers. According to Venkatraman and Lee (2004, p. 885) 
“the impact of platform dominance on developers’ platform choice was much stronger than 
the impact of competition within a platform”. Unfortunately, Venkatraman and Lee (2004) 
do not explicate the relative importance of newness to dominance. They do, however, that 
“developers are drawn to newer platforms, all other things being equal” (Venkatraman & 
Lee, 2004, p. 888) which may imply that it is somewhat a secondary attribute to dominance. 
On the other hand, the attractiveness of newness is an important counterbalance to domi-
nance, and explains that even dominant platforms may lose their attractiveness as “their 
functionality declines relative to that of newer platforms” (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004, p. 
879). 
To conclude, ecosystem attractiveness to complementors is fundamentally driven by plat-
form dominance and newness, but also by the competitive environment within the ecosys-
tem, i.e. crowding of complements. As dominance is somewhat contradictory with the other 
drivers of attractiveness, and dominance seems to be the most important driver, it seems that 
complementors are less worried about the within ecosystem competition than the ecosystem-
to-ecosystem competition, at least when considering which ecosystems to participate in. It 
is however noteworthy, that participating in a dominant platform implies tougher competi-
tion, and that dominance is not permanent. 
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2.2.2 Specialization 
As the benefits of platform participation and drivers for platform attractiveness have been 
discussed, I now turn to how complementors contribute to and succeed within the different 
ecosystems. The basic idea of complementarity has already been discussed earlier, and the 
very concept of a complementor relies on the fact that the offering of a complementor is 
more valuable due to the existence of the platform, and that the platform is more valuable 
due to the offerings of complementors (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1997). However, the 
complementarity alone is not enough, as it is the alignment of complements that underpins 
the concept ecosystems (Adner, 2017; Jacobides et al., 2018). In order for the ecosystem 
value proposition to materialize, the complementary offerings must be aligned (Adner, 
2017). Therefore, from the perspective of complementors, in order to create value in ecosys-
tems, they must ensure that their offerings are aligned with the platform (Kude et al., 2012). 
The concept of specialization in contrast to cospecialization, as discussed in section 2.1.1.ii, 
explains that in contrast to both the platform being customized to complements and vice 
versa, complementors mostly, if not only, are responsible of the customization. Specializa-
tion is important as it enables complementors to succeed in the competition amongst the 
different complementors (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017), but it is also required in order to reap 
maximum benefits from platform participation (Wareham et al., 2014). 
Specialization does however come at a cost. More specifically that cost is increasing lock-
in to a specific ecosystem. This is due to the fact that investments to specialization are not 
fully fungible or redeployable to other ecosystems (Jacobides et al., 2018). Successful align-
ment to platforms is platform specific, as is platform experience, both of which constitute to 
complementor performance (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). Furthermore, the achievements that 
translate to benefits relate to the specific ecosystem, as they are measured via e.g. platform 
certifications and sales brought to the platform (Wareham et al., 2014). 
In the following sections, I first introduce the concept of specialization and how it applies to 
complementors. Second, I discuss why specialization is both required from the complement-
ors, and why it is useful for them. Third, and finally, I discuss how specialization may lead 
to unfavorable dependency, and what risks follow from that dependency. 
2.2.2.i Specialization  
Cennamo et al. (2018, p. 3) note that “the more a complement design is tailored to the spe-
cific workings of a platform technology and its interfaces, the more the complement becomes 
specialized to that platform” and define the degree of such specialization complement co-
specialization. They note that complementors need to tailor their offerings “to a platform’s 
core technological functions and interface specifications to take full advantage of its perfor-
mance” (Cennamo et al., 2018, p. 1). 
In order to generate value for the customers, it is more or less necessary for the complement-
ors to ensure that their offering is aligned with the platform (Kude et al., 2012). Two different 
drivers increase the need to specialize. First, each complementor must deal with competition 
amongst complementors (Teece, 2018), which is amplified in dominant platforms, i.e. at-
tractive platforms, as they may be crowded with complementors, as noted earlier. If comple-
mentors align themselves successfully with respect to the ecosystem, they may reach supe-
rior performance configurations (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). Second, in order to grant com-
plementors access to the benefits of the platform partnership, as discussed earlier, platform 
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leaders require ecosystem specific investments and achievements from the complementor 
(Kude et al., 2012). These investments and achievements induce both alignment with and 
lock-in to the ecosystem. 
2.2.2.ii Benefits of specialization 
Kapoor & Agarwal (2017) study the performance of app developers in the two dominant 
smartphone ecosystems, Apple iOS and Google Android (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). Their 
idea of superior performance configuration is very much related to specialization. Superior 
performance configuration stems and consists of  “choices that complementors may make 
regarding their products, tasks, or organization with respect to the ecosystem” (Kapoor & 
Agarwal, 2017, p. 533). 
They specifically explore “how ecosystem-level interdependencies affect the extent to which 
complementors can sustain their value creation in an ecosystem” (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017, 
p. 547). According to them, the interdependencies are rooted in both structural and evolu-
tionary features of the ecosystem (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). Structural features are related 
to technological interdependencies between complementor products and other ecosystem 
components, and in their study they incorporate these features as the complexity faced by 
the complementor (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). They take into account the evolutionary fea-
tures via platform technology transitions and experience that accumulates to complementors 
in ecosystem over time. They specifically note that the experience-based advantages that 
they refer to are for a specific platform-based ecosystem (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017, p. 549)  
Their findings indicate that both complexity and ecosystem experience help firms sustain 
their superior performance, and that the positive impact of complexity is greater for firms 
with more ecosystem-specific experience (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). This essentially, as 
complexity represents level of interdependence, and as experience is platform-specific, in-
dicates, that within platforms firms that are deeply aligned and experienced with the specific 
platform are expected to be better off in the intra-platform complementor competition also 
in the future (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). As they measure superior performance by whether 
the apps are in the top 500 apps by revenue in either of the ecosystems (Kapoor & Agarwal, 
2017) the superior performance is related mainly to the competition between complement-
ors. 
The benefits of platform partnership have already been discussed in 2.2.1, but it is important 
to note that even though the categories of benefits may exist on some level for also lower 
levels of partnership status, they increase in the effect as partnership status increases 
(Wareham et al., 2014). That status may be measured via achievements within the ecosystem 
and certifications, but fundamentally higher status partners also create more value to the 
platform (Wareham et al., 2014). This value created is not only in revenues to the platform, 
but also in ways such as expanding the core offering or specialist competencies of the com-
plementors (Wareham et al., 2014).  
As partner status increases, the benefits increase. When it comes to technological capital 
afforded to the complementors, it may be limited to community technological support, or 
general development tools, but on the higher levels it may include priority real-time technical 
support (Wareham et al., 2014). The commercial or social capital at a minimum may be 
limited to general marketing and sales tools or access to the network, whereas, on the highest 
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levels of partnership status, it may manifest in higher levels of cobranding and dedicated 
account managers from the platform leader side (Wareham et al., 2014). 
All in all, specialization is required to some degree, as complementors must customize their 
offering to be compatible with the platform. However, a higher degree of specialization or 
alignment with the ecosystem can also increase the benefits that complementors reap from 
the ecosystem. Those benefits can relate to direct benefits afforded by the platform leader, 
but they also relate to the ability of the complementor to be successful in the within-ecosys-
tem competition against other complementors. If complementors align themselves success-
fully, they can reach superior performance configurations that are sustainable due to experi-
ence benefits.  
2.2.2.iii Costs of specialization 
Superior performance configurations, or alignment “may play a significant role in the com-
plementors’ ability to appropriate value over time” (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017, p. 547) but 
such superior performance is in comparison to other similar complementors within the same 
ecosystem, which represent only one competitive dimension in ecosystems (Teece, 2018). 
The other two dimensions, namely competition across ecosystems, and competition within 
the ecosystem between the platform leader and the complementor (Teece, 2018) may actu-
ally become more problematic due to specialization. The problems stem from lock-in, which 
is a consequence of specialization (Teece, 2007), and dependency, which stems from both 
lock-in, and the asymmetric nature of specialization (Jacobides et al., 2018). 
Lock-in stems from fungibility of investments in assets and relationships that firms need to 
make in order to operate in ecosystems (Jacobides et al., 2018). The fungibility of those 
assets and relationships is a measure of how easy it is to re-tool or re-customize, i.e. the cost 
to redeploy them in other settings (Jacobides et al., 2018). The more complementors invest 
into alignment to one ecosystem, the more they have to lose if they wish to switch to another 
(Kude et al., 2012). 
Jacobides et al. (2018) list different origins for costs for such redeployment: cost from pro-
duct/offering adjustments that require new investments, adjustments to the transaction rules 
of the ecosystem and membership, and coordination costs with other ecosystem participants. 
In essence what makes complementors successful in a specific ecosystem, i.e. superior per-
formance configuration, also locks it in the specific ecosystem (Jacobides et al., 2018). 
Lock-in is problematic, as the main driver of ecosystem attractiveness, i.e. dominance is not 
permanent, as noted earlier. Therefore a complementor that is deeply specialized into one 
ecosystem “risks becoming a witness of how an ecosystem, which it cannot control, loses its 
momentum” (Selander et al., 2013, p. 194). In addition to new platforms gaining ground, as 
they may leverage new technologies better, as discussed earlier, dominant platforms may 
also lose their position in the form of platform envelopment, where an adjacent, or even a 
somewhat unrelated platform manages to leverage its existing user base to attack another 
platform’s market (Eisenmann et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, as the specialization in the case of platforms and complementors, is mainly 
one-way, i.e. it is actually most often specialization of complementors to the ecosystems of 
platform leaders and the relationship is asymmetric in a way where each complementor is 
24 
 
dependent on the platform leader, but not vice versa. This dependence is risky for comple-
mentors, as platform leaders may leverage their position opportunistically, and the value 
distribution may be tilted in the favor of the platform leaders at the expense of compelement-
ors (Jacobides et al., 2018). 
As the fungibility, or dependence, is a powerful way to affect the behavior of actors, platform 
leaders have an incentive to increase the dependence of complementors. Therefore, “power-
ful firms (especially hubs, or hub contenders) craft rules and shape the process of ecosystem 
to tie in complements and make complementors abide to them” (Jacobides et al., 2018, p. 9) 
with an aim to “lock them in with non-fungible investments” (Jacobides et al., 2018, p. 9).  
More specifically, platform leaders encourage higher levels of dependence by relating the 
benefits from the partnership to a certain set of requirements from the complementors 
(Wareham et al., 2014). The requirements may manifest in a need for complementors to 
demonstrate various achievements related to the ecosystem, or the need to submit “greater 
levels of control over their processes and outputs” (Wareham et al., 2014, p. 1204). For the 
lowest levels of partnership status, there may be no other requirements than some sort of 
registration (Wareham et al., 2014). For the highest levels of partnership status, complement-
ors need to show verified, i.e. controlled, achievements in e.g. certifications of personnel, 
documented industry-level implementations of solutions, customer satisfaction, or volume 
of sales generated for the platform leader (Wareham et al., 2014). In terms of fungibility of 
these achievements, it is obvious that the achievements are ecosystem specific, and therefore 
not fungible to other ecosystems. Therefore, as benefits from a certain ecosystem increase 
with achievements within that ecosystem, they also tie complementors to the platform. 
In addition to the risk of being locked-in in a losing ecosystem, complementors also face the 
risk of platform leaders acting opportunistically and capitalizing on its power that stems from 
complementor dependence (Kude et al., 2012). Even though platform leaders’ motivations 
may not be merely opportunistic, as increasing dependence via less fungibility can promote 
the alignment of interest of complementors in seeing the common ecosystem succeed 
(Jacobides et al., 2018), the threat of opportunistic behavior of platform leaders increases if 
complementors are more tightly tied to the ecosystem (Kude et al., 2012). If the comple-
mentors are locked in, platform leaders do not have to worry as much about recruitment of 
complementors. Recruitment of most and best complementors is otherwise a controlling el-
ement of opportunism due to platform to platform competition (Teece, 2018), as discussed 
in section 2.1.2.i. 
One of the most fatal manifestations of opportunistic behavior of platform leaders from the 
complementor point of view is if the platform leader utilizes its dominant position to absorb 
critical knowledge from the complementor, and imitate the functionality of the comple-
mentor, thus jeopardizing the survival of the complementor (Kude et al., 2012). Furthermore, 
as the power imbalance increases, the platform leader may share less and less resources with 
the complementor, thus decreasing the benefits of the participation to the complementor 
(Kude et al., 2012), or demand a price for granting access to the platform (Huang, 
Ceccagnoli, Forman, & Wu, 2013).  
All in all, fungibility of investments into specialization is a major driver for lock-in that may 
be risky for complementors in ecosystems. In essence “[t]he degree to which a participant’s 
effort is tied to one ecosystem, and cannot be recoupled in any other setting, determines the 
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economic basis of their attachment to that ecosystem” (Jacobides et al., 2018, p. 11). The 
risks stem from the difficulty to utilize experience from and investments made into an eco-
system to other ecosystems should the ecosystem lose its momentum, and from the threat of 
opportunistic behavior from the platform leader. 
2.2.3 Coping with asymmetric power 
In this section, I discuss tactics and factors that reduce complementor dependence on indi-
vidual ecosystems on one hand and help them to mitigate the threat of opportunistic behavior 
of platform leaders on the other hand. Multihoming is the most important tactic or strategy 
discussed in prior literature, and it has also a benefit of broadening the adressable market of 
complementors apart from reducing dependence on specific platforms.  
2.2.3.i Multihoming of complementors  
As platform attractiveness seems to be non-permanent, and as experience in an ecosystem is 
deemed beneficial in competition within ecosystems, complementors may benefit from par-
ticipating in multiple ecosystems simultaneously. Such behavior is called multihoming, 
which is deemed generally beneficial for complementors (Cennamo et al., 2018; Selander et 
al., 2013). Multihoming is beneficial for complementors as it enables complementors to 
tackle a larger market (Cennamo et al., 2018). Furthermore, complementors may multihome 
in order to mitigate risks related to specific ecosystems in terms of the success of the eco-
system (Hagel, Brown, Davison, & Bartlett, 2008; Selander et al., 2013) and the risks of 
opportunistic behavior of the platform leader (Dellermann et al., 2017). Even though many 
studies of multihoming have assumed multihoming costs to be negligible, the need to spe-
cialize to each ecosystem makes multihoming quite costly, especially if the platforms are 
complex (Cennamo et al., 2018).  
The most widely discussed benefit of multihoming, according to Cennamo et al. (2018), is 
the benefit of increased market size. The logic is simple: if the costs to multihome are small 
enough compared to the expected demand for the complement on more than one platform, a 
complementor is expected to multihome in order to reach as many customers as possible 
(Bresnahan et al., 2015; Cennamo et al., 2018). 
Another major benefit of multihoming is that it allows for the complementor to spread its 
risks across several ecosystems (Hagel et al., 2008). This sort of pluralistic or balancing 
approach allows the complementor to avoid a situation where the ecosystem the comple-
mentor participates in loses momentum, which is important as individual complementors 
may have little influence on the success of the ecosystem (Selander et al., 2013). The risk 
balancing approach enabled by multihoming may be especially useful if a dominant platform 
has not yet emerged (Hagel et al., 2008), and since dominance of a platform is not permanent, 
as noted earlier, it may be helpful to consider multihoming even if the ecosystem in which 
the complementor participates is dominant at present. 
Multihoming can also be caused by the threat of opportunistic behavior of platform leaders 
(Dellermann et al., 2017). According to Dellerman et al. (2017), the uncertainty of platform 
leader behavior may even be more crucial for the decision to multihome than uncertainty 
related to market conditions or technology. Their finding implicates that the need to spread 
the risk across ecosystems due to the possible loss of momentum of a single ecosystem is 
lower than the need to spread risks due to the threat of opportunistic behavior (Dellermann 
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et al., 2017). On the other hand, they find that the risks related to ecosystems can be over-
come with a suitable level of benefits provided, as discussed earlier, by the platform leader, 
and therefore, their findings “support a notion of [complementor] loyalty to be driven by 
opportunity-seeking rather than risk-avoiding motives” (Dellermann et al., 2017, p. 525). 
This would imply that with a suitable set of rules regarding benefits, platform leaders should 
be able to prevent multihoming. 
Multihoming costs refer to the costs of developers to associate with more than one platform  
(Armstrong & Wright, 2007; Tiwana, Konsynski, & Bush, 2010). According to Tiwana et 
al. (2010, p. 681) “homing costs represent the aggregate of adoption, operating, and oppor-
tunity costs incurred by a developer to maintain affiliation with a platform”. The costs are 
not limited to each platform individually, but include also a coordination cost (Venkataraman 
et al., 2018). The coordination cost stems from the fact that focusing on one platform enables 
a clear strategic focus (Hagel et al., 2008), and requires less diversity in terms of human 
capital, and therefore comes with lower coordination costs (Venkataraman et al., 2018). 
The costs of multihoming relate to each platform individually, as complementors need to 
specialize to each platform to some degree, as noted earlier. The degree of specialization 
required, in addition to factors discussed above, depends also on the complexity of the plat-
form (Cennamo et al., 2018). Cennamo et al. (2018, p. 4) define platform complexity “as the 
number of interdependent components of the platform’s core technology interacting with the 
platform’s complements through specialized interfaces”. They note that ceteris paribus, mul-
tihoming will be easier on less complex platforms, and that complex platforms require more 
investments and customization to improve the fit to the platform (Cennamo et al., 2018). 
Complexity of a platform requires greater cospecialization, and simpler platform architec-
tures “increase fungibility of the complements across competing platforms” (Cennamo et al., 
2018, p. 14). 
Furthermore, in the case of complex platforms, an expectation of benefiting from being able 
to distribute development costs across platforms does not hold (Cennamo et al., 2018). On 
the contrary, adoption costs to new platforms remain high and the quality a multihoming 
complement is actually lower than one that is specialized to a specific platform (Cennamo 
et al., 2018). The findings of Cennamo et al. (2018) are, therefore, consistent with the idea 
of superior performance configurations and experience benefits, and their platform-specific 
nature and limited fungibility (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). 
The ability to multihome is not only related to platform characteristics, such as complexity 
and platform specific experience required, but also to the capabilities and task structure of 
complementors (Venkataraman et al., 2018). The capabilities required to multihome relate 
to human capital, and come with higher coordination costs (Venkataraman et al., 2018).  
Venkataraman et al. (2018) argue that multihoming requires a diversity of human capital as 
specialized firms “lack the abilities to grasp all elements of the new platform, namely tech-
nology, functionality and industry context and embed these elements in their organizational 
routine required to multihome” (Venkataraman et al., 2018, p. 31). They conclude that “there 
is a tradeoff between specializing in one form of human capital, thereby keeping coordina-
tion costs low, and strategically investing in multiple forms of human capital to enable mul-
tihoming” (Venkataraman et al., 2018, p. 31).  
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According to them, this gives a rise to a division of firms to generalist and specialist com-
plementors, where generalists are more fit to multihome (Venkataraman et al., 2018). They 
define specialists as firms “being above the 75th percentile on any one form of human capi-
tal” (Venkataraman et al., 2018, p. 25), namely technological, functional and industry, i.e. 
firms that are more focused on one form of human capital than others.  
Importantly, whereas they find that having high skills in any one form of human capital leads 
to less likelihood of multihoming, they also find that the interaction of the human capitals 
leads to a positive effect on multihoming (Venkataraman et al., 2018), therefore implying 
that having a skilled pool of employees with heterogeneous capabilities may enable and in-
crease the likelihood of multihoming. 
The tradeoff between the benefit of low coordination costs of specializing and investments 
required to multihome, according to Venkataraman et al. (2018), leads to different mixes of 
human capital, which forces complementors to choose early on whether they want to spe-
cialize or not. As firms adapt to the environment it chooses, there are path dependencies that 
stem from the fact that the “very decisions that helped a complementor to adapt to its initial 
environment makes it harder for it to respond to changes in the environment” (Venkataraman 
et al., 2018, p. 14). Venkataraman et al. (2018, p. 1), notably, define multihoming as “a 
strategy in which a complementor firm chooses to join multiple platforms rather than one”, 
explicating that the decision is strategic instead of tactical. 
2.2.3.ii Additional factors and tactics that mitigate asymmetric dependence 
Even though multihoming has been related to avoiding the threat of opportunism by platform 
leader (Dellermann et al., 2017), the exact mechanism how it mitigates opportunism has not 
been identified. There are, however, some other tactics and factors that may help comple-
mentors mitigate the risks of opportunistic platform leader behavior. The issue is not only 
important for complementors, but for platform leaders too, as the risk of opportunistic be-
havior affects platform loyalty, which on the aggregate level of complementors is vital to 
platform success (Dellermann et al., 2017) 
In order to mitigate the risks of opportunistic behavior from platform leaders, complement-
ors can benefit from intellectual property rights (IPR) and downstream capabilities (Huang 
et al., 2013). Complementors with a greater stock of IPR and with stronger downstream 
capabilities are more likely to join a platform as they can secure returns from their innova-
tions (Huang et al., 2013). Even though Huang et al. (2013) do not explicate how exactly do 
downstream capabilities aid complementors in appropriation, except for noting the difficulty 
for platform leader to imitate them,  they give examples of downstream capabilities, namely 
trademarks and consulting services (Huang et al., 2013). 
IPRs and/or downstream marketing or service capabilities in independent software vendors 
facilitate their value appropriation and thus indirectly increase value creation and the success 
of the platform as a whole (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012). The success stems from the virtuous 
circle that may be realized as the returns of innovative partners will draw in more partners, 
who will draw in more customers, etc. (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012) 
Even though not focused on complementors, Edelman‘s (2014) advise to suppliers in ways 
they can reduce dependence on platforms and the proposed 4 main solutions may be helpful 
to complementors. 1) “Exploit the need for completeness” (Edelman, 2014, p. 89) refers to 
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the fact that platforms need suppliers, and either by directly becoming important, and there-
fore gaining negotiation leverage, or indirectly via the fact that suppliers are needed for com-
pleteness of service, the negotiating power of platforms can be reduced (Edelman, 2014). 2) 
“Discredit discrimination” (Edelman, 2014, p. 89) refers to identifying possible cases of dis-
crimination by platform leaders and getting customers on board to induce public outcry and 
regulatory complaints that can provide protection from “intermediaries’ favoring their own 
services” (Edelman, 2014, p. 90). 3) “Create an alternative” (Edelman, 2014, p. 89) refers to 
the fact that competition among platforms improves suppliers’ position in relation to plat-
form leaders and suggests that suppliers may collaborate and try to create alternatives to the 
platform (Edelman, 2014). The interesting point here is that the idea of increased competi-
tion in platforms connects well to the idea of increased mobility, but unfortunately Edelman 
(2014) does not probe further into the theme and discuss the effect of switching to or multi-
homing at other platforms. 4) “Deal more directly” (Edelman, 2014, p. 89) refers to suppliers 
selling directly to the customers, without using the platform (Edelman, 2014), which for the 
case of complementors does not unfortunately apply, as the whole point is that the offering 
is more valuable when both the complement and platform are used together as a system.  
All in all, the fact that suppliers and complementors have different characteristics make Edel-
man’s (2014) advice less transferable to complementor strategies. Still the solutions may 
give some insight to complementors. Especially the 3rd solution modified to increasing plat-
form-to-platform competition actually provides a mechanism through which multihoming 
may enable complementors to – at least indirectly – counteract the platform leaders efforts 
to reduce mobility in their own segment, i.e. their efforts to increase the bottleneck nature of 
the platform.  
Complementors can also engage in Open Source activities, i.e. offer Open Source based 
products and services. Many of the motivations for firms to engage in Open Source activities 
are a direct counter-reaction to the problems that are the result of the power of large software 
companies, i.e. platform leaders (Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2006). These motivations include “be-
ing independent of the price and license policies of the large software companies” 
(Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2006, p. 48) and “thinking that software should not be a proprietary 
good (in order to reduce market power of the large software companies)” Bonaccorsi & 
Rossi, 2006, p. 48). Some other motivations, such as being able to hire good IT specialists, 
not only stem from a threat of powerful platform leaders but also relate to benefits of inde-
pendence (Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2006). As talented developers are critical to many software 
firms, attracting them is very important (Baskerville, Levine, Pries-Heje, & Slaughter, 2001). 
Developers not only attach importance to being free from the power of large software com-
panies, but also to learning, and on social factors, such as “living to code” or the fun to 
program that can be attained via Open Source projects (Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2006). In mo-
tivational theory embedded research, also extrinsic, in contrast to only intrinsic, motivational 
factors for developers include learning, reputation and career advancement (Battistella & 
Nonino, 2012), which are attached to Open Source activities, but can also be interpreted as 
more general motivations of developers. 
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2.2.4 Change, the future and implications for complementors 
In this section, some aspects that may affect the future of complementors are discussed. First, 
the way prior alignment or specialization affects reacting to change is discussed. Second, 
aspects relevant for complementors in the software, or information systems industry are pre-
sented, focusing on how the complementors need to adapt to the development in the industry. 
2.2.4.i Effects of specialization to adapting to change 
In addition to introducing the concept of superior performance configurations, Kapoor & 
Agarwal (2017) discuss the complementors ability to react to change. The change they in-
clude in their empirical models is platform technology transition, which according to them 
may “render[] strategic configurations of the high performing complementors from the pre-
vious platform generation less effective” (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017, p. 535). According to 
Kapoor & Agarwal (2017) these platform transitions are a way for platform leaders to com-
pete and create value by improving functionalities and adding new ones. They find that plat-
form transitions increase the likelihood of a previously superiorly performing complementor 
exiting that stratum by as much as 44% (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). Furthermore, they find 
that platform complexity increases the difficulty to maintain superior performance (Kapoor 
& Agarwal, 2017). They hypothesize that this is due to higher complexity of platform lead-
ing to transitions to require a greater degree of change (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017).  They 
also note that in lower complexity platforms, those complementors with superior perfor-
mance configurations before the transition are more likely to preserve their superior perfor-
mance after the transition as they “find it relatively easier to identify and to move to a high 
performance configuration in the new platform generation” (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017, p. 
536). 
The meaning of platform transition is interesting, as it is more radical than mere continuous 
technological development, even if rapid. However obvious, it is still good to note that “[i]n 
environments of rapid change, there is a need for continuous or at least semi-continuous 
realignment” (Teece, 2007, p. 1337). Perhaps such continuous realignment can be compared 
to transitions in low complexity, as the degree of change in low complexity transitions is 
lower in contrast to the “long jump” required in platform transitions of complex ecosystems 
(Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). In low complexity transitions, those firms that are already well 
aligned, or specialized to the platforms, have an advantage (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017) in the 
intra-platform competition between the complementors. 
Schmidt & Brown (2015, p. 499) study “the world’s largest enterprise vendor SAP and its 
strategic network” to fulfill a gap in empirical research of studying “long-term rigidities of 
cospecialization processes in interorganizational  arrangements” (Schmidt & Braun, 2015, 
p. 490). They find that cospecialization has long-term effects for the participating organiza-
tions as specific cospecialized assets dominate and shape the competence and rationality of 
the organization (Schmidt & Braun, 2015, p. 507). This is due to the positive feedback of 
asset complementarity that leads to increasing cospecialization, and, therefore, interorgani-
zational path dependence and rigidity (Schmidt & Braun, 2015).  
Levinthal (1997) provides a notion for understanding how complementors can explore and 
exploit new opportunities. According to him: “Tightly coupled organizations can not engage 
in exploration without foregoing the benefits of exploitation. For a tightly coupled organiza-
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tion, efforts at search and experimentation tend to negate the advantages and wisdom asso-
ciated with established policies and thereby place the organization at risk of failure. In con-
trast, more loosely coupled organizations can exploit the fruits of the past wisdom while 
exploiting alternative bases of future viability” (Levinthal, 1997, p. 949). 
2.2.4.ii Change in the software industry 
Schütz et al. (2013) study on the SaaS (Software as a Service) revolution and its impacts on 
existing on-premise vendors sheds light on the effects of a transitional, or radical, change in 
the software industry. Based on their empirical analysis, they provide insight on impacts on 
partner profiles, relationships, and ecosystems (Schütz et al., 2013). First, they find that due 
to shift towards SaaS, the partner models, formerly dominated by value added resellers 
(VARs), i.e. firms that extend direct sales channels of platforms, will shift to new players 
(Schütz et al., 2013). Namely, successful players in the SaaS model will be: independent 
software vendors (ISVs) that sell complementary products, original equipment manufactur-
ers (OEMs) that embed keystone, or platform leader, products, and business process out-
sourcers (BPOs) that are service providers that take responsibility of business processes such 
as payroll (Schütz et al., 2013). This is due to the fact that mere reselling is not enough, and 
partners need to create value and fill in segments that platforms do not wish to address them-
selves (Schütz et al., 2013). Furthermore, they suggest that “the most important assets are 
market access and expertise in the specific domain – other than cloud” as “customers do not 
buy cloud solutions, but a solution addressing a certain area – e.g. sales” (Schütz et al., 2013, 
p. 136). 
Regarding relationships, Schütz et al. (2013) suggest that system integrator business as pro-
ject-based business may no longer meet the needs of customers. Instead, customers increas-
ingly look for continued relationships and not having to carry the risks of implementation 
themselves (Schütz et al., 2013). When it comes to changes in the ecosystems, Schütz et al. 
(2013) suggest that competition between complementors is not expected to be fierce within 
ecosystems in short term due to the newness of the models and yet unoccupied niches, as 
firms have not yet adapted to the new model. In the long term, they expect differentiation to 
increase due to increased competition (Schütz et al., 2013). More importantly, they expect 
that differentiation will occur on the service level and in company branding instead of prod-
uct features, i.e. firms that gain experience and develop add-ons and industry-specific cus-
tomizations will prosper and be protected from competition due to differentiation (Schütz et 
al., 2013). Furthermore, they suggest that generalist strategies within ecosystems will strug-
gle as they fail to differentiate (Schütz et al., 2013).  
When it comes to platform leader to complementor competition, Schütz et al. (2013) find it 
likely that the power imbalance will increase as more responsibilities will be taken over by 
platform leaders regarding software e.g. in hosting and maintenance. However, they do not 
believe this to be a threat to complementors, especially those that focus on certain niches, as 
platform leaders will probably not be interested in competing with them (Schütz et al., 2013). 
As they quote one of their informants: “[i]f a partner creates a niche solution, we are receiv-
ing 30% for no effort. If we do it ourselves, we are receiving 70% for 100% effort. This is a 
simple business calculation.” (Schütz et al., 2013, p. 137). 
Not only are platform leaders unlikely to enter the competition with complementors in some 
niches, they are also unlikely to be able to cover all customer needs with their platforms. 
According to Schmidt & Braun (2015) SAP aimed to create a web-based software for SME 
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customers that would be purchased and implemented by the customers themselves, but was 
unsuccessful, as “in contrast to the plan of simple customer self-service, the software is de-
livered in processes that still demand consulting and customizing services by consultants” 
(Schmidt & Braun, 2015, p. 499). 
The position in serving customers in consulting activities or other downstream services is 
fairly sheltered, as not only is it economically attractive for platform leaders to let comple-
mentors take care of them, as noted above, but it may also be difficult for platform leaders 
to take over. This difficulty stems from the knowledge needed being embedded in business 
practices, and therefore it is difficult to codify (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012). 
From a more general perspective, the capabilities required from information systems profes-
sionals and critical information system activities are changing (D. Lee, Trauth, & Farwell, 
1995). Lee et al. (1995) identify changing technologies, changing business environment, and 
changing role of information systems as three key drivers for changes in the role of infor-
mation systems. In their study, they find that the portfolio of critical information system 
activities are changing in 3 main ways: 1) the importance of information system activities in 
organizations is growing, 2) the priority of application development and support is decreas-
ing, and 3) the priorities to align information systems with business problems and integration 
are increasing (D. Lee et al., 1995). More specifically, first, they suggest that the increasing 
importance of information system activities will lead to increase of attention paid and em-
phasis given by organizations to information systems (D. Lee et al., 1995). Second, they note 
that supporting existing applications and developing new applications in-house are becom-
ing less important (D. Lee et al., 1995). They note that this is related to technological devel-
opment that leads to packaged software for an increasing variety of business applications 
becoming available, and reduces the need for development of such centralized business sys-
tems and operational support for those systems from information systems staff  within com-
panies (D. Lee et al., 1995). Finally, third, the most important priority, according to infor-
mation system managers and consultants, will be aligning information systems with business 
goals (D. Lee et al., 1995). Therefore, the most important activity of information systems in 
the future will be analyzing business problems and information systems solutions (D. Lee et 
al., 1995). This means that not only do information systems professionals play an important 
role due to their technological skills, but also due to the customer firms’ needs to link differ-
ent business applications together (D. Lee et al., 1995). 
In their study, Lee et al. (1995) also find that the critical knowledge and skills of information 
systems professionals are changing. According to them, the most important skills will be in 
“selected areas of emerging technologies, together with a much broader set of 
knowledge/skill requirements” (D. Lee et al., 1995, p. 329). This broader set of skills and 
knowledge includes business functional knowledge, interpersonal/management skills, and 
knowledge of technology management (D. Lee et al., 1995). 
Interestingly, when comparing the skills and knowledge to the changes in critical activities, 
they notice two different patterns of knowledge and skill requirements (D. Lee et al., 1995). 
On one hand, the activities centering around effective application of information systems to 
meet business needs requires “in-depth knowledge of business as well as excellent interper-
sonal skills” (D. Lee et al., 1995, p. 331). On the other hand, for the activities centering 
around “the integration of the organization’s technological infrastructure” they find that 
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“technical competence is an absolute necessity” (D. Lee et al., 1995, p. 331), therefore im-
plying that technical competence is more important for these activities than for applying 
information systems to business needs. Ultimately, they note that both activities require 
“good technology management knowledge to effectively link technology with business and 
user needs” (D. Lee et al., 1995, p. 332), therefore highlighting the importance of business 
and user understanding to technology management. Even though Lee et al. (1995) relate 
these different patterns of applying information systems to business needs and integration of 
the technological infrastructure to different career tracks, it may be that the patterns are ap-
plicable to service providers on a firm level, as directions of specialization of the firms. 
More generally the importance of combining business understanding to understanding in the 
software domain responds to the rethinking of IT strategy from one that is subordinate to 
business strategy “to one that reflects a fusion between IT strategy and business strategy” 
(Bharadwaj, El Sawy, Pavlou, & Venkatraman, 2013, p. 471). There is also empirical sup-
port for the importance of business understanding in the software industry, namely as the 
results of Venkataraman et al. (2018, p. 27) “emphasize the importance of business processes 
and the industry to ERP systems in addition to technical knowledge”. 
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3. Methodology 
In this chapter, the methodology employed for the empirical research of this thesis is pre-
sented. First, motivation and reasoning for the research design is provided together with a 
description of the research process. Then sampling, data collection, and analysis are elabo-
rated on. Finally, the quality of the research is discussed by elaborating on possible problems 
of the approach and how those problems are tackled in the research. 
3.1 Research design and process 
Even though proliferate, the ecosystem research field is still nascent in theory, meaning that 
there is limited theory and evidence (Hannah & Eisenhardt, 2017) especially about firms that 
are not platform leaders (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017; Nambisan & Baron, 2013; Rickmann et 
al., 2014). Therefore, there is still much work to do in theory building. Furthermore, even 
though some notable articles discuss the capabilities that affect complementor abilities to 
succeed in ecosystems (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2013), and hypothesize entre-
preneurial capabilities that affect the decision-making process of the complementors 
(Nambisan & Baron, 2013) very few have explored how complementors act in ecosystems 
and why do they act so. The notable exception of Rickmann et al. (2014) merely focus on 
the decision on expanding on a platform, and as a singular exploratory paper, it has not been 
tested.  
In order to build theory, an inductive approach has been chosen. Eisenhardt et al. (2016, p. 
1113) define inductive methods as “those approaches through which researchers attempt to 
generate theory from data”. In contrast to deductive methods, where the research begins with 
hypotheses and tests those hypotheses with data, inductive research emphasizes the emer-
gence of theory from the data itself (Eisenhardt, Kathleen; Graebner, Melissa; Sonenshein, 
2016). 
Another option for this research would have been to set out to test the propositions of Rick-
mann et al. (2014). Should such an approach have been chosen, the logical way would have 
been to modify the propositions into hypotheses and test them with a suitable set of data – 
an approach for which they call for in their article (Rickmann et al., 2014). Such an approach 
would have been deductive, which is a mirror to inductive research (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007). However, as their research is pioneering and ultimately influenced by the subjective 
view of the researchers – a fact noted by themselves (Rickmann et al., 2014), there is still 
room for alternative theories and propositions. Furthermore, there is no empirical support 
for their theory, therefore justifying further theory building (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). 
In addition to the need to build theory in the topic, the topic is also a very contemporary, and 
embedded in a real life non-controllable context, therefore promoting employment of case-
study research (Yin, 2006). According to Yin (2006, p. 3) “case stud[ies] allow[] an investi-
gation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events”. Yin defines a 
case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not 
clearly evident” (Yin, 2006, p. 13). As the topic of this thesis is evidently contemporary, and 
as the aim to understand complementor actions is inherently contextual, incorporating logics 
of case studies is certainly warranted. 
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The approach, as motivated above, of this thesis is therefore to build theory with the use of 
cases. Such an approach has been identified as one of the most prominent approaches to 
inductive research (Eisenhardt, Kathleen; Graebner, Melissa; Sonenshein, 2016).  It can be 
described as an approach that “blends case study and grounded theory logics” (Eisenhardt, 
Kathleen; Graebner, Melissa; Sonenshein, 2016, p. 1114).  
The grounded theory logic essentially means that the method relies on a “grounded theory-
building process” (Eisenhardt, Kathleen; Graebner, Melissa; Sonenshein, 2016, p. 1114). 
The fundamental characteristics of the process are: 1) gathering raw data iteratively, 2) cod-
ing raw data into first-order concepts, 3) raising those concepts to higher levels of abstrac-
tion, such as second-order themes, 3) creating creative insights by constantly comparing data 
and the emergent theory, and 4) comparing prior literature to sharpen the themes and the 
relationships between them (Eisenhardt, Kathleen; Graebner, Melissa; Sonenshein, 2016). 
As inductive research has attracted critique especially in rigorness and systematicness 
(Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2013), I followed a systematic approach to build theory from 
the data. The approach combines advice from methodological articles of Gioia et al. (2013), 
Eisenhardt (1989), Yin (2006), Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) and Eisenhardt et al. (2016). 
The systematic process is described in Figure 1 and can be divided into 4 major stages. First, 
in the research preparation stage, I consulted literature in the domain of ecosystems to de-
velop the initial research problem and questions, and decided on the suitable research design. 
Second, in the data collection stage I chose suitable cases via theoretical sampling, collected 
data by interviewing informants, coded transcribed interviews, began the analysis with initial 
1st order concepts and 2nd order themes and comparison of the cases to each other, therefore 
enabling refinement of my theoretical sampling logic. Third, in the data analysis and theory 
articulation stage, I refined the data structure by distilling 2nd order themes analytically while 
comparing the emergent theory to raw interview data and aimed to identify more abstract 
dimensions, and also aimed to find relationships between the different emerging concepts to 
refine the data structure and emerging theory in an iterative manner. Finally, as the data 
structure and theory, both grounded in the data, were finished, I compared the emergent 
theoretical insights to prior literature, covering a broad set of literature from different do-
mains, to evaluate the findings and to draw parallels to prior theories and findings. 
 
Figure 1. Research process 
The process has been iterative in the different stages. Data collection could not have followed 
the logic of theoretical sampling without initial analysis of the data. Furthermore, articulating 
the theory required an iterative approach where the different level codes, themes and dimen-
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sions were modified as the theory emerged via making sense of the data and the relation-
ships. However, adhering to the inductive nature of the research, comparing the findings to 
other literature is not confused with the building the theory that was grounded in the data. 
The decision of not incorporating prior theories to the theory that is grounded in the data was 
based on the inductive logic nature of the research. Even though the initial consultation of 
literature, and my prior studies in relevant fields meant that I was most certainly not com-
pletely uninformed or ignorant of the topic, there was a conscious effort to sustain from 
fitting the data into prior frameworks, such as the one by Rickmann et al. (2014). The find-
ings chapter, therefore, aims to represent the theory without connections to prior work, as 
such articulation of the theory would have increased the confirmation bias or hypothesis 
bias, as noted by Gioia et al. (2013). 
In the following sections, I will discuss the most important steps of the research in more 
detail. First, I will discuss the sampling logic of the research, while highlighting the im-
portance of theoretical sampling. Second, I will describe the collection of data, where inter-
views are the primary source of data. Third, I will discuss the analysis in more detail and 
elaborate on the process of coding and articulation of theory via a data structure. Fourth and 
finally, I will discuss the quality of the research by tackling some reasonable concerns that 
are related to the way I chose to analyze the data, and by discussing the credibility of the 
research. 
3.2 Sampling  
The basic logic for sampling for the research builds on the core ideas of theoretical sampling. 
Initially, the sampling or decision on what kind of firms to interview was based on the un-
derstanding that the software industry specifically is a great example of a platform ecosystem 
and provides a great setting to study complementor strategies.  
The software industry, or enterprise software industry to be more precise, is characterized 
by the rise of platforms, where enterprise software vendors have introduced platform busi-
ness models (Rickmann et al., 2014). According to Kittlaus and Clough  (2009, p. 26), “[f]or 
software more than for other products, a well-oiled network machine of diverse partners is a 
significant prerequisite for long-term success in addition to the traditional direct sales chan-
nels” referring to ecosystem thinking. They identify various different roles complementors 
can take, but highlight their importance of value added resellers and consulting and service 
companies (Kittlaus & Clough, 2009). Value added resellers aid software vendors (note: or 
platform leaders) in reaching customers faster than with a direct sales force (Kittlaus & 
Clough, 2009). Even more importantly, the complexity and interdependence of software 
products, and customer interest not being in particular software products but solutions to 
their business problems and integration to their business processes, leads to customization 
and implementation needs by consulting and service companies (Kittlaus & Clough, 2009). 
Furthermore, as noted by Ceccagnoli et al. (2012) in the software industry, these comple-
mentors have an option not to join the ecosystem. According to them the industry is different 
from settings where complementors are required to join one platform or another, such as 
video game platforms (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012). This is an interesting feature for the research 
setting, as the option of not to join allows for a more deep understanding of complementor 
strategies in ecosystem, as the question is more broad than the question of which platform 
to complement, but also whether and how to participate in those platforms. 
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Regarding the unit of the sample, it seemed fit that one unit is one firm. For most firms in 
the final sample this turned out to be a very suitable choice, as the informants discussed firms 
as units that act in coherent and individual ways. However, one firm was somewhat prob-
lematic, as it consisted of three different businesses, only one of which was comparable to 
the other firms in the sample. The informant identified this dilemma, and asked from which 
angle to discuss the phenomenon. They were not requested to limit their discussion to any 
business unit, which turned out to be good, as later on during the interview, the differences 
became clear, and the business units turned out to be quite separate thus strengthening the 
scoping of the study. The business unit of interest in this case was focused on services, and 
the business units scoped out of the study were focused on two different products. 
The focus on service firms was not initially targeted, but emerged as multiple informants 
identified a stark separation of the logics of services and products in the software industry. 
According to the informants, the two businesses have different logics, and do not mix easily. 
A further consideration of such balance and the relationship between those businesses is out 
of scope of this research. However, it is important to note that the findings of this thesis stem 
from service complementors. 
The initial sample of possible informants was identified by looking for software companies 
in Finland with the help of the Orbis database. Firms were filtered based on their NAICS 
code, which was “5415 – Computer Systems Design and Related Services”. Furthermore, 
the filter was set to independent companies – in contrast to subsidiaries that may not have 
independent strategies, to year of incorporation being before 2013 – in order to find compa-
nies that would have been newly established, and to firms that had revenues of over USD 5 
million in the previous reporting year. In addition to the initial sample, two of the case com-
panies were added to the sample based on their characteristics. Even though their NAICS 
codes are different, they both provide services to business customers in the software indus-
try, have revenues over 5 million USD, are independent, and were incorporated before the 
year 2013.  
The year of incorporation and size of the company in terms of revenues were set at arbitrary 
threshold levels to limit the sample into companies that were fairly established, in contrast 
to new and less established. This decision was made as new and small companies would 
most likely have very different logics in their decisions, and their strategies would most 
likely be less mature – indicating that assessing the strategies and decision logics would be 
more difficult. Furthermore, a scope of more established companies allowed to rule out one 
variable, namely the ability to participate in different ecosystems. The logic for this is that 
newer and smaller firms may not be as experienced and skilled and perhaps less credible as 
participants, and thus may experience limitations in access to partnerships. 
Finally, the guiding principle was to choose firms that, based on their offering presented on 
their websites, do not identify themselves as platform leaders. Instead, they offer services to 
business customers in the software sector. 
After the initial sampling decisions, the contacting of the firms started. Not all firms agreed 
to interviews due to either time constraints or the firm representatives’ assessment of the 
topic not being applicable to them. The sampling did not, however, follow a purely conven-
ience sampling logic, although accessibility was naturally a factor (Morse, 2011). 
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Already during the first interview the possibility of two distinct categories of firms emerged, 
which was in contrast to the ex ante working hypothesis of a multitude of different ap-
proaches to balancing between ecosystems. The informant in the first interview partitioned 
firms in their operating environment into these two categories, namely those that are inde-
pendent, and those that partner up with a single platform leader. After this insight, the sam-
pling logic emerged, which was sampling firms that seemed independent based on not high-
lighting platform alliances on their websites and the researchers understanding of their busi-
ness from public information sources such as annual reports, and firms that seemed to be 
more closely allied with platform leaders, based on e.g. showing platform leader logos dom-
inantly on their websites. However, an open mind was kept all the way until the final inter-
view, which was expected to be different in a way that it would have a different logic than 
the two prior categories. Namely, it was expected that the firm interviewed last would have 
deeper alliances with multiple platform leaders. Should this have been the case, and the strat-
egy have differed from the firms with one deeper platform partnership, it would have been 
difficult to build compelling and unifying theory based on the data, and further sampling 
would have been required. However, it turned out that the firm was factually in a deeper 
partnership with only one platform leader, and had only secondary, less important other part-
ners. This was also consistent with firms that were expected to be single-partnering, due to 
labels proposed by other informants or clear focus on their website to one platform. Namely, 
some of them also turned out to have some secondary partnerships. This insight, in addition 
to consistencies found within categories and differences across categories, led to comfort in 
stopping further gathering of data. Of course, continuing sampling may have showed that 
other strategies to platform partnership also exist, but in terms of not ballooning the resources 
needed to conduct the research, theoretical saturation was assessed to have been reached.  
The assessment of theoretical saturation is in line with the proposed signals of theoretical 
saturation in methodological literature, as described by Suddaby (2006, p. 639) “[t]he signals 
of theoretical saturation, which include repetition of information and confirmation of exist-
ing conceptual categories, are inherently pragmatic and depend upon both the empirical con-
text and the researcher’s experience and expertise”. Even though the researcher in this case 
may not be that experienced, repetition of information and confirmation of conceptual cate-
gories certainly occurred, and the decision to discontinue sampling was based on the balance 
of reasonable confirmation and pragmatism. 
In this thesis, while gathering data, i.e. interviewing the informants, an interesting phenom-
enon occurred, as some of the interviewees spoke of other companies, even other companies 
in the sample. By referring to the other interviewees, they highlighted the difference between 
the two polarized strategies employed in the context. Even though this information is second 
hand, the data, named shadowed data has been deemed beneficial in sampling. 
1.  Exploring the use of the generalized self and the generalized other 
makes the domain and the various components of the phenomenon under-
standable more quickly so that analysis goes faster. Ethnographers use 
this technique all the time when interviewing their key informant(s). When 
researchers use grounded theory and other methods, it provides important 
information that may direct theoretical sampling and facilitate the organ-
ization of other types of sampling frames. One final adage, also from eth-
nography, is: When seeking shadowed data, use expert informants rather 
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then those who are new to the scene. Expert informants are able to provide 
the necessary generalizations on which to base subsequent work. 
2.  The perceptions from outside a certain group (i.e., the generalized 
other) may not coincide with how the people from within the group see 
themselves. Nevertheless, outsider’s perspectives may provide interesting 
alternative data. These data make the data set richer and more interesting. 
3.  These perceptions of others may easily be verified, both from within 
and outside the group concerned. Thus, not only may the researcher reach 
an understanding of the phenomenon more quickly, but saturation may 
also be achieved and the analysis validated more quickly and efficiently. 
(Morse, 2001b, pp. 291–292) 
The shadowed data turned out to be very beneficial in this thesis, as three of the informants 
pointed out that in the other firms, the firms essentially must choose one platform in order 
to be successful. Such insight could have been discovered by analyzing the interviews with 
the firms themselves, as their commentary supported strongly this insight, but the shadowed 
data led to a quicker realization of this phenomenon, and thus aided in sampling. 
When it comes to the specific informants from each firm in the sample, they were all knowl-
edgeable agents (Gioia et al., 2013). According to Morse (2011, p. 4) “[p]articipants must 
therefore be experts in the experience or the phenomena under investigation; they must be 
willing to participate, and have the time to share the necessary information; and they must 
be reflective, willing, and able to speak articulately about the experience”. Such interviewees 
were targeted by contacting the CEOs of the companies chosen for the sample of the re-
search, and by asking to interview either them, or someone in the company who:  
 knows about the firms operations and strategic development for a time period of sev-
eral years 
 has a good understanding on the reasoning why the firm’s offering has developed to 
be how it is currently 
 can describe the firm as an entity, and can assess the development of the firms offer-
ing comprehensively 
The interviewees mainly corresponded to the criteria, as all of the interviewees where either 
CEOs, or people very high up in the organization. Namely, six of the interviewees were 
CEOs, one interviewee was the CTO of the company, with responsibility of the firm’s of-
fering, and 1 interviewee was a senior partner in the company, with very long experience 
with the company. Generally, the people interviewed had a long history in being employed 
in the company, except for one interviewee, a CEO, who had not been active in the company 
for several years in between, but was one of the founders of the company. A second inform-
ant, who the CEO deemed suitable to support him in the interview, also attended and acted 
as an informant in that specific interview.  
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3.3 Data collection 
The primary data source for the research are semi-structured interviews conducted with the 
informants that allow for “both retrospective and real-time accounts by those people experi-
encing the phenomenon of theoretical interest” (Gioia et al., 2013, p. 19). However, as 
deemed helpful for qualitative research (Gioia et al., 2013), also multiple other data sources 
were employed  to get familiar with the topic. Those sources include market research reports 
from Gartner, identified by one of the informants as an important information source for 
both the firm and their customers. The approximately 20 reports from Gartner that were read 
allowed getting an understanding on the most current trends in the industry, including un-
derstanding how the service complementors are developing form an outside point of view 
and on a more general level. Furthermore, the websites and annual reports, when available, 
from the firms in the sample where consulted, which allowed for the interviewer to ask more 
specific questions, and even challenge some of the answers to interview questions by the 
informants during the interviews.  
Despite utilizing other data sources, the analysis is based on the data gathered in the inter-
views. Interviews with 8 Finnish companies that corresponded to the sampling criteria were 
conducted. In terms of revenues in 2016, five of the case companies had revenues between 
USD 5 million and USD 30 million (CC-2, CC-3, CC-5, CC-6 and CC-8), and three of the 
case companies had revenues between USD 30 million and USD 100 million (CC-1, CC-4 
and CC-7). The median revenue of the case companies was USD 18 million. Three of the 
case companies (CC-1, CC3 and CC-7) corresponded to the characteristics of platform in-
dependent complementors, and five case companies (CC-2, CC-4, CC-5, CC-6 and CC-8) 
corresponded to the characteristics of platform-focused complementors. 
After the eight interviews with the eight case companies, that lasted on average 1 hour, rang-
ing from 25 minutes to 1 hour 19 minutes, the interviews were transcribed. The one outlier, 
the 25-minute interview, was conducted via telephone, instead of in person as the other in-
terviews, and was not transcribed, but the interview notes were sent to the informant, who 
confirmed that they were accurate. 
The interview structure is shown in Appendix I. In general, the three main areas of interest 
for the interviews were 1) the firm’s platform strategy, 2) the firm’s offering(s) related to 
different ecosystems, 3) development of the industry and ecosystems. Even though there are 
multiple, more specific questions, they were not followed in detail, but instead questions 
were adjusted during the interviews to probe for insights related to the research questions. 
Utilizing a basic structure common for the interviews, but allowing for flexibility in exact 
questions asked, allowed to “follow wherever the informants lead [the researcher] in the 
investigation of [the] guiding research question[s]” (Gioia et al., 2013, p. 20). In the inter-
views the advice to give voice to the knowledgeable agents and not imposing any prior con-
structs or theories on them was kept in mind and applied (Gioia et al., 2013) 
3.4 Analysis 
It should be noted that the analysis commenced before the final interview was conducted, 
and therefore the analysis and data gathering were conducted as parallel processes – a pre-
requisite for being able to adhere to the logic of theoretical sampling and to identify theoret-
ical saturation as noted in section 3.2. The analysis was conducted in a similar manner as 
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described by Gioia et al. (2013). Namely, first a large amount and variety of informant cen-
tric 1st-order concepts were distilled from the interview transcripts. The amount of these 1st-
order concepts amounted to some 800 unique codes that were almost direct quotations from 
the data, although abbreviated and anonymized. Second, those informant centric terms, or 
concepts were analyzed, and grouped to more abstract level 2nd-order themes. At this point, 
the goal was to understand what is actually going on at a more theoretical level (Gioia et al., 
2013). During the first iteration, the 2nd-order themes amounted to approximately 70 differ-
ent emerging themes, to which most of the 1st-order concepts were grouped to. Not all orig-
inal first order themes received even an initial 2nd-order theme, as some of the themes dis-
cussed by informants were not relevant to the research questions.  
After the initial 2nd-order theoretical themes had been assigned to the 1st-order concepts, the 
analysis turned even more theoretical, and the aim was to explain the phenomena that was 
being observed. The 2nd-order categories were iterated together with interview data in order 
to distill final 2nd-order themes and also to group them into aggregate dimensions. Finally, 
with the 1st-order concepts, 2nd-order themes and aggregate dimensions identified, the data 
structure started to emerge. The data structure forced me to “thinking about the data theoret-
ically, not just methodologically” (Gioia et al., 2013, pp. 20–21) and showing it provides “a 
graphic representation of how [I] progressed from raw data to terms and themes in conduct-
ing the analyses”(Gioia et al., 2013, p. 20). The final data structure consists of 22 2nd-order 
categories and seven 3rd-order dimensions, as shown in Figure 2 in Section 4, 
With the data structure in place, the analysis continued with an aim to “show[] the dynamic 
relationship among the emergent concepts that describe or explain the phenomenon of inter-
est and one that makes clear all relevant data-to-theory connections” (Gioia et al., 2013, p. 
22). Therefore, the focus turned to understanding the dynamic interrelationships between the 
different concepts, themes, and dimensions (Gioia et al., 2013, p. 22). To do this, diagrams 
describing the causal-loops for each case firm were drawn, and the different firms were com-
pared to each other, adhering to the logic of constant comparison and accounting for different 
patterns and variations (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). The emerging model, shown in Figure 9 
in section 4.4, was built not only upon the data structure, but also upon the data itself, as I 
continuously kept the original data in mind and kept checking that the model was true to the 
original narratives. Even though there is a need for some conceptual leap, for which there is 
room in the methodology (Gioia et al., 2013), a multitude of original quotations is showcased 
for each finding that support the emergent model that aims to account for the dynamic rela-
tionships. 
3.5 Quality of the research 
As the analysis, and main body of the findings chapter is structured with the help of a data 
structure described by Gioia et al. (2013), and there has been some critique on the applica-
bility of such a structure (Eisenhardt, Kathleen; Graebner, Melissa; Sonenshein, 2016), those 
challenges not only validate, but call for a short response. As the problems of the approach 
have been tackled as well as possible, the research is able to leverage the benefits of the 
approach, constituting to the validity of the theory generated. 
According to Eisenhardt et al. (2016) the usefulness of data structure figures, as advised by 
Gioia et al. (2013) is modest as “a data structure displays names such as for categories or 
concepts and themes or constructs, but often lacks actual data” (Eisenhardt, Kathleen; 
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Graebner, Melissa; Sonenshein, 2016, p. 1119). In this thesis, this problem is tackled with 
both a comprehensive display of multiple first order themes, that are very informant centric 
and open, and with a rich display of direct quotes from informants. 
Furthermore, Eisenhardt et al. (2016, p. 1119) note that “such an approach [using data struc-
ture] makes it harder for researchers to observe patterns of interdependent actions”. In this 
thesis, it seems that the contrary actually occurred. Due to the efforts to incorporate the dif-
ferences in the cases – that certainly were present as two quite opposing strategies for firms 
emerged – the data structure actually forced the researcher to look past those differences and 
see what it all means on a more abstract level. 
The two emerging categories not only helped in understanding the logic for theoretical sam-
pling, but also provided a means to aim for more comprehensive theory that, via the unifying 
data structure, must accommodate variation. As the two categories were quite consistent 
within them and quite different across, the theory development incorporated both those 
views. This is very much in line with the main sources of validity, strength and powerfulness 
of the grounded theory approach. 
While remaining focused on the concept, the grounded theorist’s deliber-
ate listing of all data characteristics, comparing and contrasting, coding 
and verifying, and the purposeful seeking and saturation of negative case 
sampling ensures rich, dense, comprehensive results. If conducted well, 
grounded theory is valid, strong and powerful.  
Paradoxically, variation in the sample ensures that bias, while used as a 
sampling technique, is removed from the final product. The completed the-
ory is presented as a balanced and well-rounded explanatory description 
of the topic. Note that the active seeking of variation and incorporating it 
into a model ensures validity. This is one of the major and most important 
strengths of the method. (Morse, 2001a, p. 11) 
Therefore, in fact, the use of data structure, supported by open coding in the first place, and 
a rich incorporation of illustrative quotations resulted in strong theory, that rests on the three 
fundamental criteria proposed by Eisenhardt et al. (2016). These three criteria are: 1) internal 
coherence and parsimony resulting in strong theory, 2) constructs or themes convincingly 
grounded in compelling data, and 3) providing rich and unexpected insights (Eisenhardt, 
Kathleen; Graebner, Melissa; Sonenshein, 2016).  
First, internal coherence according to Eisenhardt et al. (2016, p. 1120) stems from “well-
defined concepts, relationships between constructs, and underlying logical arguments that 
support these relationships”. This problem is tackled with not only a process diagram that 
ties all findings together, but logical arguments that tie them together, summarized in section 
4.4. The strength also stems from discussing boundary conditions to which the emergent 
theory applies to (Eisenhardt, Kathleen; Graebner, Melissa; Sonenshein, 2016), which is es-
sentially tackled by acknowledging and noticing that the theory may not apply to industries 
with different dynamics, especially contrasting to product complements. The parsimony 
means that “the emergent theory should be as parsimonious (simple) as possible yet still 
remain true to the core insights” (Eisenhardt, Kathleen; Graebner, Melissa; Sonenshein, 
2016, p. 1120). The findings of the thesis were iterated multiple times, with the aim for as 
much simplicity as possible while still, very importantly, remaining true to the insights that 
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emerged in the data collection. Of course, more simplicity may have been obtained if the 
research was conducted by some other, perhaps more experienced researcher – but as an 
underlying goal for this research was for the researcher to practice their research skills, out-
sourcing the fundamental and core process would have diminished that goal. Furthermore, 
further simplification would most likely have required further exclusion of insights from 
interviews. Perhaps not all the insights that have been included in the theory are core, but at 
least the analysis remains true to data. 
Remaining true to data is also related to the second fundamental criteria presented by Eisen-
hardt et al. (2016), namely the groundedness of constructs and themes in compelling data 
via showing the chain of evidence and reporting informants interpretations faithfully. As 
noted above, the data is shown not only in a broad collection of informant centric and open 
codes, but the chain of evidence is further supported by illustrative quotations that are not 
limited to single sentences, but include the interpretations of informants to a great degree. 
Finally, the third criteria calls for providing rich and unexpected insights by contributing to 
a specific research conversation by providing fresh insights (Eisenhardt, Kathleen; Graebner, 
Melissa; Sonenshein, 2016). This call is answered by focusing in on the complementor view 
in ecosystems, and relating the findings to that domain using prior related literature. Due to 
the dispersion and newness of the research in the domain, this thesis is an important step to 
unify the literature, drawing connections between somewhat distinct streams within the 
emerging domain. Furthermore, the practical implications of section 6.1 should not only be 
of interest to the case companies and their peers, both established and new, but to firms 
operating in other environments where platform dynamics are emerging. 
All in all, the approach chosen for this research may have its limitations, but as those have 
been tackled, the theory can instead leverage the benefits of the approach.  
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4. Findings 
The findings of the inductive case research are presented in this chapter. The structure of the 
findings follows the data structure that emerged during the collection and analysis of the 
data. The 2nd-order categories structure the topics covered, which are grouped into subsec-
tions that are structured to match the 3rd-order dimensions. The highest-level sections of this 
chapter reflect the research questions of the research, and the subsections of 3rd order dimen-
sions that cover the research questions are grouped accordingly under each section. The 
complete data structure is presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Data structure of the findings 
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In order to show the logic of how the different categories emerged, and how the data structure 
was formed, each subsection includes examples of the informant-centric first order concepts 
that contribute to the second-order category. The first-order concepts presented provide a 
non-exhaustive list of the interview data that contributed to the emergent category, and col-
lectively they provide compelling evidence that can easily be assessed by the reader. The 
first order concepts that the 2nd-order categories stem from are presented under relevant 3rd-
order subsections. Furthermore, in addition to the first-order concepts, in order to describe 
the underlying data that the findings are grounded on, extensive illustrative quotations are 
presented. These illustrative quotations for part show that the first-order concepts are indeed 
informant-centric, and help to illustrate how the different concepts relate to each other. Of 
course, I as a researcher play a part in interpreting the data, especially when raising the find-
ings to more abstract levels, and therefore the findings represent my interpretations of what 
was being said by the informants collectively. 
The findings are structured as follows. First, the decision to participate in different ecosys-
tems is presented as a fundamental and binary decision for complementors. Due to a tradeoff 
between market access, i.e. benefits from platform participation, and lock-in, i.e. only being 
able to receive those benefits by focusing in one platform, the decision seems to be binary, 
and all firms in the sample can be categorized as platform-focused or platform independent. 
Second, the findings related to drivers of success for the complementors are presented. The 
fundamental driver for success seems to be alignment to the chosen participation decision 
regarding ecosystem. This means that the key resources of firms differ depending on whether 
they are platform-focused or platform independent. Furthermore, the firms’ offerings differ, 
too, and each firm’s offering is interrelated to the platform participation decision and key 
resources, as the firms are fit and able to tackle a certain kind of customer need due to the 
partnership decision and key resources they focus on. All in all, the complementors’ key 
resources and offering would mismatch the other platform participation decision, i.e. plat-
form-focused firms would not likely succeed well if they were platform independent and 
vice versa. 
Third, the findings related to power, and the directions to which the two different types of 
complementors are developing are presented. Power essentially refers to the relationship 
between the complementors and the platform leaders in ecosystems. The power in relation 
to platform leaders complementors have is affected by their platform participation decision. 
The flexibility they have and the degree of their dependence from specific platforms affects 
how complementors can respond to technological development and development of cus-
tomer needs. Therefore, even though sharing some characteristics in development, platform-
focused and platform independent complementors seem to differ in which way they are cur-
rently developing their strategies. 
Fourth, and finally, all of the findings are brought together to describe the interrelated nature 
of complementor strategies in ecosystems. The summary concludes the main findings of the 
research and relates them to each other. 
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4.1 Binary ecosystem participation decision due to tradeoff between market 
access and lock-in 
The first research question for this thesis aimed to understand platform participation from 
the perspective of complementors. This section addresses the research question, formulated 
as below. 
What decisions regarding ecosystem participation do complementors have, and what drives 
those decisions? 
As complementors, in contrast to platform leaders, do not own a platform, they can and must 
choose whether to join platforms. Even though some of them become tied to a single plat-
form, they are fundamentally free to choose which platform that is, and whether to partici-
pate in the first place. The platform participation decision is primarily driven by a tradeoff 
between market access and lock-in. Due to this tradeoff between market access and lock-in, 
firms have either chosen to remain independent from alliances or chosen to partner up with 
some specific platform leader. It seems that firms do not effectively participate in more than 
one main platform, or ecosystem, if they wish to receive the benefits from platform focus, 
and therefore the decision is binary. Furthermore, independence suffers if complementors 
identify as partners to any, even if multiple, platforms, and therefore, independent firms are 
better off without signaling any dependence. 
The decision’s binarity is generally supported by the interviewees, where especially platform 
independent complementors assess that platform partnership is accompanied with a choice 
of one single platform. The way platform leaders assess complementors and award benefits 
to them makes it difficult for platform-focused firms to receive benefits from more than one 
platform, and require them to focus their efforts to only one. The benefits, together with 
knowledge and experience accumulated in the ecosystem dynamics lock complementors in 
their platform of choice. As platform-focused complementors are locked in their platform of 
choice, their growth and profitability prospects are affected by the platform success and 
competition within the ecosystem amongst complementors. However, on one hand, quickly 
growing and popular ecosystems can accommodate many profitable complementors, and on 
the other hand less popular ecosystems can be profitable for successful complementors as 
no more complementors enter and some exit the ecosystem.  
The more detailed findings are presented in the following sections. First, the tradeoff be-
tween market access and lock-in is discussed by elaborating on the findings related to the 
four second-order categories that support it. These findings altogether support the binarity 
of the platform decision, which is discussed thereafter. Some of the most important 1st-order 
concepts that led to the 2nd-order categories are presented in Figure 3 below. 
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Figure 3. Data structure supporting the binarity of the ecosystem participation decision 
4.1.1 Tradeoff between market access and lock-in 
The main benefit from partnerships with platform leaders to complementors is the possibility 
to gain business with the help of platform leaders. The market access that platform leaders 
provide to the complementors comes in forms of leads and even joint sales cases. In order to 
get the benefits, a certain level of commitment to the platform leader is required, and firms 
have to give up independence if they wish to get the market access. However, the market 
access is limited, as it does not cover customers in other ecosystems. 
For platform independent complementors, the ability to serve all clients is an important 
driver for not focusing on one platform. For those firms that give up their independence, the 
decision may lock them in the ecosystem of choice. Platform leader’s incentive models to 
complementors are an important driver of lock in. As the firms become locked in, their 
growth and profitability are increasingly tied to the platform. On the level of all comple-
mentors in the ecosystem, this may not be that bad as platforms that grow rapidly can ac-
commodate many profitable complementors, and those platforms that fade in demand may 
sustain a number of profitable complementors, given that the supply decreases. 
The most important reason for firms to enter a partnership with one platform leader seems 
to stem from the will to easily access the market. Furthermore, the reason to stay independent 
stems from the desire to keep the customer base as wide as possible. However, other issues 
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play also an important role in explaining why firms choose independence or focus to a spe-
cific platform and remain on that path. These factors, namely key resources and offering 
being tied to and aligned with the platform participation decision cannot, however, be iden-
tified as actual antecedents for the decision. Instead, the key resources and offering of the 
firms are interrelated with the platform participation decision via a more evolutionary pro-
cess of strengthening alignment of the firm with its participation decision. The evolutionary 
and interdependent alignment of platform participation to other important strategic decisions 
is discussed in more depth in section 4.2. 
4.1.1.i Easy access to market via platform leader partnership 
The main benefit from partnering seems to be easier access to the market of the platform 
ecosystem. Market access means that the partnering firms get support in obtaining customers 
in the ecosystem via leads and joint sales cases.  
 […] And we saw that by focusing in one, we could get support from the 
ecosystem, which in practice means new leads, customer cases and sup-
port. (CC-4) 
Partnering up with a platform leader can be especially beneficial for getting the company 
started and getting customers in the first years. 
[…] I always said to them: “why do you want to create a new platform 
and compete with [platform leaders], when you could complement the 
platform and get the audience immediately from there”. (CC-5) 
The customer access from platforms continues throughout the partnership. Those firms that 
chose to remain independent, too, note the attraction of partnering with platform leaders 
mainly due to the access to customers.  
One concrete disadvantage [from not partnering] is that when we conduct 
business, there is always a lead that a customer would need something. It 
seems like that the platform leaders like ecosystem complementors, who 
are only focused on them. They usually give customer leads to those who 
only use their technology. (CC-1) 
The access to customers is also the main difference between secondary platforms, or sup-
portive platforms that may be utilized on the side by platform partnering firms, and their 
primary platform partnerships. This, as further elaborated in section 4.1.1.iii, is what leads 
to the acceptance of being able to partner mainly with one partner. 
We do not get leads from [the firm’s secondary platform]. With [the main 
platform] we have joined sales cases, we get leads, and look together how 
we can win cases. (CC-8) 
4.1.1.ii Platform choice may rule out customers in other ecosystems 
Even though partnering up with a platform leader certainly helps to get access to customers 
in a specific ecosystem, it also somewhat limits the clientele to that specific ecosystem. This 
limitation was the primary cause for firms that chose a platform independent strategy.  
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Our strategy is that we want to serve all large corporations in Finland, 
and if we focus in only one platform, we limit our business opportunities 
too much. (CC-1)  
Those firms that have chosen a one-platform focus also note this issue. 
[…]If we are limited to one actor [platform leader], do we limit our pos-
sibilities to serve customers? If customers then say that they do not want 
have only one platform, and the provider must be capable also in others, 
then we limit our possibilities to gain business with our focus. (CC-4) 
As customers already have systems in place, not all technologies fit those environments 
equally well. This reflects into available clientele as firms with a platform focus are generally 
ruled out from cases where their technology is not fitting. Allying with one platform leader 
can also prohibit firms from winning cases where the customer has settled into a different 
ecosystem. 
The bad thing [about platform focus] is that when there are cases, where 
the client has already – they already have a certain environment with 
things X and Y and they have a strong opinion that this and that technology 
should be used in order to fit their environment. Well, then you are out of 
that case, if you are entering with a wrong technology. (CC-7) 
The first question regarding platform strategy is, that one needs to assess 
whether focusing on one platform leader limits the clientele too much. If 
customers say that they do not only want one technology but you have to 
have capabilities in many, then our focus limits our opportunity to get 
enough business in. (CC-4) 
Companies that have selected a platform independent strategy note that limiting out some 
customers is problematic especially in a smaller market such as Finland. 
If you look at houses that are dependent on a single platform […] they 
never do things with other technologies than [platform leader] technol-
ogy, and that has a certain limitation of growth in e.g. Finland. (CC-3) 
4.1.1.iii Incentive models from platform leaders to complementors induce lock-in 
The most important external driver for focusing only on one platform and not switching that 
focus is the way the platform leaders structure their incentives to complementors. As dis-
cussed earlier these benefits are mainly customer leads, or access to customers on a more 
abstract level. Such benefits seem to be directed only at those firms that bring in significant 
business for the platform leader. 
It comes from the fact that platform leaders measure success via license 
sales. If you sell platform leader licenses for only one platform, the license 
sum is much larger for that platform, and you are perceived as a better 
partner. If you look at the partner correspondents or such [in platform 
leader firms], they are primarily incentivized by partner license sales. And 
if the license sales are distributed to three places, then it amounts to a 
third on average. (CC-8) 
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This incentive structure not only forces complementors to focus their efforts into one eco-
system, but it also locks them in the chosen ecosystem, as they have a lot of incentives to 
lose if they were to aim to switch to another ecosystem. 
And as we are a large [partner] there, we are hooked. In contrast, if we 
think about taking some business to another platform, we would then re-
ceive smaller incentives. (CC-4) 
As will be discussed later, the lock in is also a result from firms needing to align to their 
chosen platform strategies, and for firms with one focus platform it means accumulating 
capabilities that match the platform of focus. In addition to the alignment of offering and 
capabilities and resources to the platform of focus, which are discussed in more depth later, 
platform focused firms also accumulate relational resources within the ecosystem. These 
relational resources not only mean personal relationships with platform leader staff, but also 
other knowledge specific to the platform. One informant describes this well: 
It is a long road to grow into a new ecosystem. Building the capabilities, 
building the ecosystem relationships – in the ecosystem you know the plat-
form leader, but you also know the competition and their behavior. In a 
tender, you know who is probably attending, and even which employees 
they may offer for certain things, and therefore you know your position in 
the competition, and how to price and what to offer. (CC-8) 
4.1.1.iv Ecosystem focus dictates growth and profitability 
For those companies that have chosen to focus on one ecosystem, growth and profitability 
is affected by the growth of the ecosystem, and by the competition within it. Even though 
platform leaders most probably would welcome all qualified and skilled software firms, the 
thorough alignment required to succeed as a platform-focused player sets up barriers of entry 
and switching costs, in addition to the lost incentives from switching, as without focus, part-
ners are unlikely to succeed in the within ecosystem complementor competition. 
Platform decisions may have a direct effect on profitability, as platform focused comple-
mentor competitive dynamics are dictated by ecosystem characteristics. According to the 
interviews, growth of platform on one hand and softness of competition on the other hand 
can be beneficial for complementors. 
Platforms that are growing rapidly may accommodate a multitude of complementors. Even 
though some complementors may not be top complementors in an ecosystem, they can still 
do very well when compared with companies in other industries. For ecosystems that have 
lately been more popular in terms of demand and media coverage, the competition is tougher, 
but as one interviewee pointed out, it may very well be that an ecosystem is so successful 
that all complementors do well in it – even if competition within the ecosystem is tough. 
[…] Within platforms, firms that do similar things must compete with each 
other a lot. But still, the expected payoffs for everyone are so incredibly 
high that even though you are very successful compared to an average 
firm from another industry, you are not necessarily a winner [within the 
platform competition] (CC-5) 
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On the other hand, complementors in ecosystems that are strong in older technologies may 
benefit from the softened competition. As less complementors or no complementors at all, 
wish to enter the ecosystem, their position can be very favorable. 
The market in [platform leader technology] is in a certain way closed, 
there is a certain number of players in it. […] There are no more entrants 
(CC-8) 
No informants highlight the importance of softer competition in the decision to join an eco-
system. Therefore, the lack of competition is mostly a benefit for those that already are in 
ecosystems that decrease in popularity, thus offsetting a negative effect of gradually decreas-
ing demand. The effect of intense competition may be more relevant in the case of a plat-
form, where supply is high and demand starts to fade. In such a case, a complementor may 
find itself in a difficult situation, as they may not be able to transfer easily to another eco-
system. None of the interviewed firms assessed their own firm to be in such a situation, but 
one informant from a platform independent firm noted the possible threat to platform focused 
firms. 
It is difficult to say which is better [platform focus or independence]. But 
you have to be careful not to be in an area where [one platform] is cur-
rently. An area where they have a “pig cycle”, where there is many new 
players and plenty of capacity, and suddenly demand starts to fade. (CC-
1) 
Furthermore, even for successful platforms, there are still some limitations to growth as the 
clientele is limited to firms that are already in the ecosystem of the platform leader, or willing 
to use the platform technology. It may very well be the reason for some of the platform-
focused firms to have chosen to expand geographically. An interviewee in a platform inde-
pendent firm sees it as a direct consequence, with its own problems: 
[As the platform focused strategy] has growth limits in Finland, it has led 
to them having to have a stronger internationalization strategy, which in 
[the case of a firm] has driven them into problems. (CC-3) 
4.1.2 Binary platform participation decision 
Driven by the tradeoff between gaining the benefits of market access and avoiding lock in, 
the decision to become a platform-focused complementor or a platform independent com-
plementor seems binary. The decision to partner with a platform leader essentially means 
that the complementor focuses its efforts into one ecosystem, therefore becoming platform-
focused. Partnering firms have either been founded on top of the chosen platform, based on 
founder experience, or chosen the ecosystem they join based on competitiveness of the eco-
system in their target market. Conversely, firms that have chosen to remain platform inde-
pendent have also very knowingly made that decision, with emphasis on independence, in-
stead of having a multiple platform focus strategy. They may utilize different platforms, but 
identify themselves as independent, and do not market their affiliation with the platforms. 
The tradeoff between market access and limitations to potential clientele being a driver for 
the decision, firms must assess whether they benefit more from the easy access to a certain 
market, or being unbound and able to offer their services to all customers. As, due to the 
incentive models of the platform leaders, as discussed above, firms manage to only get the 
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market benefits from one primary ecosystem, they must also choose which ecosystem to 
join. 
Three of the interviewed companies were founded on the idea of belonging to a selected 
ecosystem. Some of the founders of the companies had previous experience in the platform 
technology of the chosen ecosystem and founded a company specializing in that ecosystem. 
For at least one of the companies, the role as a complementor, i.e. benefiting from the plat-
form success and adding value to it, was also clear from the beginning. When it comes to 
the choice of which platform to partner up with, three of the four platform-focused firms did 
not really consider or compare the different ecosystems, but the decision was mainly driven 
by founder experiences.  
We had already chosen – I personally used to work for [the platform 
leader] – that [platform leader] is our platform, with which we do things. 
And on top of which we develop our company. (CC-5) 
We have for a long time done business in the [platform], I personally have 
a background in working in the [platform], and we have many employees 
from [the platform], so capabilities in [the platform] have been very 
strong, and that was where we started from. (CC-8) 
One of the interviewed firms noted that the decision was guided by platform strength in the 
customer segment the firm was already operating in. 
It was a strategic choice that, as we saw that in the market we operate in, 
i.e. B-to-B market, which are the strong players in there, and where we 
can get support from (CC-4) 
In a similar vein, the decision to remain independent has been strategic. All the firms that 
describe themselves as independent highlight some form of fundamental decision of remain-
ing independent in contrast to partnering with some platform leader. 
The second principle for the company [the first being the decision to be a 
purely service company], was to be first and foremost technology inde-
pendent. […] The third thing, which is related to the previous one, is that 
we principally do not exclusively ally with anyone and go into license 
sales. (CC-1) 
When we started, we took an exceptional strategy for the time by starting 
off as platform agnostic. […] Other companies at that time threw them-
selves into for example the Microsoft camp. […] But that is not our story; 
it is a different story (CC-3) 
[…] For us – I cannot of course speak for others, it was a very intentional 
choice not to do so [partner up with a platform leader] (CC-7) 
On the other hand, those firms that have chosen to be independent still utilize platform tech-
nologies and are partners with many platform leaders. As such, they are not separated or 
isolated from platforms. The main distinction is that they do not exclusively partner with any 
of the platform leaders, and they do not market partnerships with platform leaders. 
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I do not know what to call it, but yes we do have all kinds of cooperation 
agreements with different actors […] In practice we do not handle all the 
world’s technologies […]. (CC-7)  
We could conduct an analysis of what technologies we use and publish it 
on our website […] but it would not be beneficial to us, but do more harm, 
as we would be seen as a firm who only does on those [technologies]. (CC-
7)  
Platform independent complementors also identify themselves as belonging to (multiple) 
ecosystems (CC-1), even though not as deeply as platform focused complementors (CC-3), 
and “have all kinds of partnerships” with many different platform leaders (CC-7). 
The interview data also supports the binarity of the decision directly as interviewees from 
platform independent firms describe the trade-off that leads to having to make a choice be-
tween a partnership with one platform and platform independence. 
If you take the technology dependent path, then you should choose one, as 
then you actually receive the benefits from the partner. If you have five, 
you do not actually get any benefits. (CC-7) 
[For companies that chose to ally with a platform leader] the sales chan-
nels and everything were united with those platforms – you were either in 
the IBM camp or Oracle camp, but never in both. (CC-3) 
Such a binary decision between choosing one specific platform leader is not highlighted by 
some of the platform-focused firms. According to them, they may also use different plat-
forms, but when asked to describe ways other platforms are utilized, they seemed always 
secondary or complementary and connected to the same ecosystem. As noted above, plat-
form leaders’ incentive models seem to be structured in a way that discourages focus into 
multiple platforms, as the benefits come only with significant sales in the ecosystem. 
Besides firms that commit to one platform, and those that do not commit to any platforms, 
there may be also firms that balance between these two approaches and commit to more than 
one, or those that switch their platform of choice. The notion that the interviewed firms all 
fit into two different categories of platform independent firms and firms that have one main 
platform partner, and some of the informants point out a binarity of choices, does not mean 
that these are the two only alternative ecosystem strategies. There is, however, evidence 
implying that these two alternative strategies are exhaustive to some degree for the specific 
context of mid-sized software service firms. First, no firms with divergent from these two 
categories were present in the sample, and as discussed in regards of sampling, such firms 
were sought for. Second, in addition to the sample, an out-of-sample firm was referred to by 
an interviewee as “one with 50% revenues from one ecosystem, and the rest from others” 
(CC-5), indicating that some firms may have a slightly more balanced approach. Still, having 
50% of sales from one platform ecosystem indicates that there is a main platform and the 
others are somewhat secondary.  
All in all, the choice of partnering up with a platform leader or remaining independent is 
binary in a sense that you cannot have both platform independence and the main benefits 
platform leaders offer as incentives from platform partnership. In the following sections, we 
53 
 
will see that not only is the decision of platform participation binary, it has effects on what 
drives success for the firms, and therefore the two different decision are reinforced as firms 
align themselves to the decision. The decision is strategic, as for one, especially for the plat-
form-focused firms the competitive environment is set by the decision, and for second, the 
drivers of competitive advantage are different depending on the decision, as discussed fur-
ther in the following sections. 
4.2 Drivers of success dependent on platform participation decision 
The second research question for this thesis aimed to understand how complementors can 
succeed in ecosystems, or what the informants identify as most important drivers of success 
in their business. This section addresses the research question, formulated as below: 
What drives complementor success? 
Even though the case firms all operate in a very similar segment, i.e. provide business-to-
business services in the software industry, the drivers of success seem to differ depending 
on the platform participation decision. Platform independent complementors attribute their 
success almost solely to top talent employees. Platform-focused firms, on the other hand, do 
not, consistently throughout the different case companies, talk about top talent, at least as a 
key to their success. Instead, they mention replicability, or intellectual property (IP) as a key 
competitive driver, as these assets not only allows them to win cases, but also allow them to 
conduct projects profitably. These capabilities are homogenic in the sense of employee 
technological capabilities being focused on a single platform and IP being platform specific. 
The alignment of capabilities with the platform allows platform-focused complementors to 
benefit from systematic capability development and platform training materials, but the re-
sources are tied mostly to a specific platform. 
The key drivers of success can be labeled as key resources to the companies. In order to 
understand fully why the key resources, or drivers of success, differ in the two different types 
of complementors, it is helpful to discuss the offerings of the firms. The offerings of the 
firms, even though both related to platforms, differ fundamentally, and therefore help explain 
why the key drivers of success are different. The offerings are related not only to the key 
drivers of success, but ultimately they relate to how the firms have chosen to partner with 
the platforms, making the three (platform participation type, key resources and offering) 
interdependent. 
As platform focused complementors have chosen to partner up with platform leaders, they 
do not have to attract top talent as they can train their employees with materials provided by 
platform leaders. They do, however, have to align their offering with the platform leader and 
add value in the specific way the platform leader does not want to or cannot easily provide. 
The competition between similar complementors in the ecosystem leads to them having to 
be able to provide the solutions to customers efficiently, requiring them to develop replicable 
solutions to business problems. Furthermore, they are aided by customer references, from 
applying those solutions, in their sales. As their accumulated replicable solutions and re-
sources that provide the basis of their offering are related to the specific platform in order to 
be competitive, their strategic configurations become more specialized, and as they become 
more successful in their ecosystems, they also become locked in them. 
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On the other hand, platform independent companies do not benefit from an easy access to 
ecosystem customers. However, they have been able to attract top talent from a pool of pro-
fessionals that are very much competed for. In order to be attractive to these employees they 
must offer interesting technologies and projects, and autonomy. Interesting technologies and 
projects are in line with their offering, as creating differentiating solutions means creating 
something new that does not exist elsewhere. Creating new and differentiating solutions is 
interdependent with the freedom to use any technology autonomously, as it is not only ap-
preciated by self-driven top talent, but also required to create best possible solutions. As the 
solutions rely on most suitable technologies for the specific solution, the firms are better off 
not being tied to a single platform technology. 
4.2.1 Key resources aligned with platform participation 
The key resources that the firms view to contribute most to their success differ depending 
on their approach to platform partnerships. The interviewees in platform independent firms 
highlight top talent employees as almost their sole source of competitive advantage. Inform-
ants in firms that have a single-platform focus do not mention top talent as a key driver for 
their success. Instead, they highlight the importance of replication and IP as drivers of suc-
cess in winning customer cases and executing them profitably. 
For platform independent complementors, top talent is the most important driver of success, 
according to the informants. Being able to recruit and keep top talent is the basis of their 
sustained performance. Therefore, the companies are aligned to be attractive employers. This 
alignment is a dynamic equation, as providing autonomy, and enabling the use and learning 
of most attractive technologies both makes the firm attractive as an employer and enables it 
to benefit from the top talent as autonomous experts develop themselves in a variety of tech-
nologies thus enabling a broad capability base and innovation. 
For platform-focused complementors, top talent is not a key resource. A platform-focused 
strategy, namely partnering with a platform, can also be a way to work around problems in 
recruiting by enabling hiring people that are not already top talent – or employees that may 
even be less likely to ever achieve such status. The firms manage to circumvent the problem 
of limited supply of capable software professionals by systematic capability development. 
Therefore, the ability to develop capabilities in a systematic way is a benefit to and strategy 
employed by the platform-focused firms. They do not have to compete for top talent, as they 
are able, with the help of training materials from platform leaders, to train people with little 
to no prior experience to become capable professionals. As there is no significant bottleneck 
in employees for them, the key resource for competitive advantage is intellectual property 
(IP), or replicable solutions. These replicable solutions enable platform-focused comple-
mentors to win customer cases, and to execute projects profitably. Both systematic capability 
development and IP are, however, platform specific. This may make it difficult to transfer 
capabilities and assets to other platforms. 
The more detailed findings, and supportive illustrative quotations related to the alignment of 
key resources to the platform participation decision are presented in the following subsec-
tions. The data structure supporting the findings is presented in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4. Data structure supporting alignment of key resources with platform participation decision 
4.2.1.i Capable employees are important for success and in high demand 
According to the data, a very important issue for software companies, especially the platform 
independent complementors, is having capable employees. Top talent was highlighted in the 
interviews as almost the sole driver of success and competitive advantage for the platform 
independent companies. 
The business is competency-driven. Without belittling sales or customer-
ships, if you are in the hottest capability areas, then the one who has the 
doers has the business. You do not need to sell much if you have the right 
people on board. (CC-1) 
We have invested a lot into being a good place to work at, in order to get 
[the top talent]. This work what we do is brainwork, and productivity dif-
ferences are insane, easily tenfold. […] The whole thing starts from trying 
to lure in the top talent, and if we manage that, then everything is much 
easier from thereon. And if you do not succeed in that, then it is fairly 
difficult […] even if everything else was as [good as possible] (CC-7) 
Platform-focused complementors also note that recruiting is not easy in the industry.  
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The problem is that there is an increase in employee turnover. It is a very 
tough competition that capable employees are headhunted with very high 
salary offers. (CC-6) 
However, it seems that for them, top talent, or recruiting capable employees is not such a top 
priority or key resource. For them employee turnover may be problematic, and they need to 
consider recruitment and be somewhat attractive employers, but there is a significant differ-
ence to platform independent complementors in how valuable top talent is. Whereas platform 
independent complementors highlight employees as a key resource, platform focused firms 
do not. The insight is partially based on what was not being said, and is supported more by 
how the firms focus on systematic capability development, as elaborated later on in section 
4.2.1.iii. 
4.2.1.ii Encouraging top talent autonomy as strategy 
Due to top talent being extremely important for platform independent complementors, and 
as they identify it as a key resource, their corporate culture supports the attraction and reten-
tion of top talent. The culture is highlighted by autonomy, which not only enables the com-
panies to be attractive employers but also enables them to manage the diversity of different 
technologies that is required to be independent. Autonomy of top talent is, therefore, directly 
interdependent with the decision to remain independent from platforms. 
Nowadays we do not aim to affect [technology choices] of our employees, 
but to recruit as capable people as possible and facilitate their enthusi-
asm. It has not been a single point in time when it occurred. The world has 
changed; it has become more complex and diverse in terms of technologies 
and ecosystems. And we have the people, as we have continuously aimed 
to recruit top talent, who have been very strong in their own points of 
views, and we have just let them do. It would be nice to be able to say one 
point in time when we made such a strategic choice, but it is difficult to 
point out. We have just learned it, and it is good for business and employee 
satisfaction to operate in this way. (CC-3) 
Platform independent companies actually embrace the diversity of different technologies, 
and have a culture of autonomy, where individual experts and project teams are allowed and 
encouraged to make their own technology choices. Granting autonomy to employees does 
not mean that employees can use any obscure technology of his or her choice. Even though 
firms do not dictate what technologies to use, or employ hierarchical decision-making, they 
are interested in conducting a profitable business. At least one of the platform independent 
firms note that their by incentive models for employees act as a simple guidance. As incen-
tives are tied to billing, people are encouraged to learn and utilize technologies for which 
there is demand and use cases. 
[…] In the end it is simple. Our compensation model is tied to billing, and 
if you happen to know such technologies, for which there is no demand, it 
will start to show in your salary. (CC-7) 
The encouragement of autonomy is a fundamental driver of capability development, as in-
dividual employees, i.e. top talent, make their decisions regarding technologies inde-
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pendently. This means that multiple, highly knowledgeable people develop the firm’s capa-
bilities in a distributed manner. Furthermore, some may also proactively drive new offerings 
that may become a part of the firm’s core offering. 
[When new technologies come] it requires an entrepreneurial minded per-
son, who says that this is good – I will use it and it will work – it is a big 
bet for them to invest their time. And then it either flies and they are a 
Guru, or it doesn’t and they wasted their time. (CC-1) 
[…]We had a few employees who thought that [the general point of view 
that a technology cannot be applied in a certain way] was false, and con-
vinced a few clients that it is possible. And the outcome is that it [the so-
lution] is one of our major service areas. (CC-3) 
4.2.1.iii Systematic capability development in one platform technology as strategy 
Instead of having to recruit already proficient top talent, platform-focused firms employ sys-
tematic capability development strategies enabled by having a one-platform focus. Those 
firms that choose to commit to one platform benefit from the focus, as it is easier to coordi-
nate a less diverse capability pool. The ability to manage the capability pool is not only an 
added benefit from the partnership, but in some cases a reason to commit to a single platform. 
[…] In that stage of growth of the company we saw the benefit of being 
able focus in one area, and as a consequence have a more homogenic 
capability pool to advance. (CC-4) 
With our size, [over 200] employees, it is already difficult to know and do 
everything, if we would have [two other platform leaders] also, it would 
not work out. We would have internal silos with different capabilities 
fighting with each other, and different priorities. (CC-8) 
Platform leaders facilitate capability management and development of platform-focused 
firms. Namely, they provide training materials and the possibility for people to gain certifi-
cations in their technologies, which give significant benefits for two reasons: 1) capability 
training can be very expensive, if conducted by senior experts in the company 2) recruiting 
is easier, as the firm can hire people with little to no experience and train them with the 
available materials. 
As a rough estimate, we do have more people coming in that do not know 
[the platform technology], than those that already know it. (CC-5) 
Yes, [capability management has changed] as we can and do hire young 
people as the training material is available. […] In especially application 
training we do not need that many senior experts involvement – the people 
who earn most in the company. (CC-6) 
On the other hand, a homogenic capability implies that the capabilities are homogenic also 
in the negative sense, i.e. in only one platform technology. As employees are trained with 
platform leader materials, these materials are likely to increase the capabilities in specifically 
that platform technology, therefore making these skills less transferable to other platforms. 
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4.2.1.iv Systematic capability development and top talent autonomy contradictory 
As the firms with different platform participation strategies differ in their ways of tackling 
the business critical employee issue, it is noteworthy that these choices seem to be contra-
dictory. One cannot have autonomy and a systematic capability development strategy at the 
same time. Furthermore, top talent may prefer platform independent companies specifically 
because they give them autonomy, and freedom of choice in technologies. Freedom of choice 
enables employees to use technologies that excite them and ensures that all employees feel 
like they are using and learning things that they want to develop themselves in. Informants 
in both types of the companies deemed these factors important. 
It is important for employees to feel like home somewhere. When it comes 
to corporate strategy, it means that the person deeply identifies with it. Is 
the company supporting a technology that I know and want to know? It is 
very important for employees and reflects to customers. If a person feels 
that they can develop themselves in where he is capable in, it of course 
reflects to the customer side. That you are a happy expert who truly lives 
and breathe the technology. (CC-6) 
[What drives our technology choices] is demand and the interestingness 
of the technology. Even if there was a huge demand, if no-one is interested 
or excited, it sets off quite difficultly. However, these two things usually 
go hand in hand. (CC-1) 
As platform-focused companies are tied to one technology, such alignment of employees 
with the technologies they use may not exist with the most attractive talent, or supply of 
labor. As the comment below illustrates, the platform-focused firms acknowledge the possi-
ble difficulty in recruiting, and note the importance of platform technological attractiveness 
to experts, even though they do not see it as a limiting factor. 
A good question is then, as the market has a good pull, and you probably 
acknowledge that recruiting is not always that easy, is that would it be 
easier to attract people if we had a wider array of technologies – a ques-
tion of how attractive [platform leader] technology is. It is a good ques-
tion, but these platforms are not that different, and it is not a limiting fac-
tor. (CC-4) 
From the perspective of platform independent firms, they may get some of the benefits avail-
able to platform-focused firms. Namely, they can also utilize training materials provided by 
platform leaders. The actual rules and pricing for training materials from platform leaders 
was not explored in depth in the interviews, but platform independent firms, too, can and do 
use them. 
For example, for [cloud platform], when we started expanding services 
related to it, we had big internal trainings, to which everyone was wel-
come to attend to. Some 30 people attended and about half of them re-
ceived a certification. (CC-3) 
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There is certainly some level of systematic capability development also by platform inde-
pendent firms, but the approach is different, as it is more facilitative and enabling, and op-
tional for employees. The difference is illustrated well by the quote below, as platform com-
plementors view themselves more of enablers for top talent to autonomously fulfill “their 
own mission”.  
When there is an internal will and individual people drive the excitement, 
management merely checks that it fits our big picture, and facilitates it by 
offering e.g. marketing for the top talent as a service. They get to fulfill 
their own mission with the support of the firms marketing and sales, and 
the firm gets business. (CC-3) 
Therefore, even though both of the capability development styles are systematic in their own 
sense, the platform-focused firms’ way of hiring people and training them in platform leader 
technologies is definitely more structured and standardized. The way platform independent 
complementors approach capability development is nonstandardized and enabling, and 
grants the right to make decisions to the employees in a more bottom-up manner. Instead of 
training employees to a specific platform technology with available materials, the platform 
independent complementors rely on autonomous efforts and motivation of the top talent. 
Even though platform independent firms are not specialized in their employees’ capabilities 
to any single platform, it is fair to claim them to be specialized in their own way. As they 
rely on their ability to attract top talent and retain it, they, too, have limited options. More 
specifically, in the context of their platform participation decision, they are locked in their 
decision to remain independent. The option to choose one single platform and configure 
capabilities to that ecosystem is not attractive for platform independent complementors, as 
they would most likely lose at least some of their top talent. As their ability to attract top 
talent relies, at least partly, on the autonomy of their employees in technology choices and 
ability to develop capabilities to the direction employees themselves choose, taking away 
that autonomy may be very harmful.  
4.2.1.v Replicable customizability key resource for platform-focused companies 
Instead of highlighting employees as the most valuable resource for the firm, platform-fo-
cused firms value most their accumulated experience in customer projects. This accumulated 
experience can be referred to as intellectual property (IP), or assets that allow replicating 
processes and solutions that have been learned in earlier projects to other customers. All the 
experience or IP that the firm has accumulated amounts to the unique resources of the plat-
form-focused firms, which at least some of the interviewees see as core to the firm. 
IP, in these conversations is usually reflected in what the unique capabil-
ities of the player are, or the asset on which they base their operations and 
value creation in the ecosystem. What the core is. (CC-4) 
IP can be seen as many things, but essentially it helps firms to replicate their processes and 
solutions, ranging from offerings to project management. 
Examples of IP [in the context of ecosystems] include having a concept 
how you do things, customer references, marketing materials, code assets, 
and concepts how you go through projects – a replicable implementation 
model. All these, can be referred to as IP, and any asset, capability, or 
60 
 
feature that helps you in a replicable way of doing things can be seen as 
IP. (CC-4) 
As noted, the experience accumulates from prior projects. The value of the experience stems 
also from the customer reference, i.e. that the next customer can see that the solution has 
worked before and that the service provider has successfully conducted a similar project 
before. 
One can think that we have a product portfolio, for which we have a trade-
mark or a software asset – that is quite clear IP. We can have a concept 
that we have done with a customer and which we can utilize in a similar 
manner, when we go and talk to another customer. The other customer 
sees that we have done it to someone else, who is satisfied, and we as a 
service provider know how to solve the problem. We have a framework, 
which allows for quicker time to market, we have less risk – and that is 
why customers should work with us. In that case, we see that we have a 
certain asset that helps us in conducting business. (CC-4)  
The IP is not only valuable in terms of winning projects, but it enables the platform-focused 
firms to provide solutions more quickly, efficiently, and with lower risk and higher quality. 
In the future, if we have an efficient concept and way of delivering, that IP 
is valuable for us as we can produce that service or solution efficiently to 
customers. Also, the quality is probably higher, and the risk is lower, it 
[IP] helps in that, too. (CC-4) 
The replicability and experience, therefore, not only has an effect on the ability to sell pro-
jects, but also conduct them more profitably. 
[…] You start focusing on certain firms [as customers], as you have prior 
experience, and it is easier to sell when you do the same thing again. It is 
always the aim and important to get to replicate things, as if you cannot 
replicate, it takes always as much work. If you have to start from the be-
ginning and you have to study the customer as much as the first time, you 
cannot reach improved profitability. (CC-6) 
It is not only you having the capability that you replicate, but also on the 
software side, the way you set things up, the way you set the parameters 
for the standard software. Plus if you have a specialized component, which 
you have done before – i.e. you have customized already the standard soft-
ware, you can reuse it. Otherwise it is always a couple of dozens days 
more work to each customer, and then you cannot reach better profitabil-
ity in this industry. (CC-6) 
It seems logical that the replicable solutions go hand in hand with the systematic capability 
development strategy of the platform-focused firms. Both replicable solutions and having a 
structured training for new employees via training materials favor standardization and doing 
things in a replicable and cost-efficient manner. On the other hand, the IP that the platform-
focused complementors accumulate is tied to the platform of choice. The scalable and repli-
cable solutions or frameworks are likely to be platform-specific. 
61 
 
4.2.2 Offering aligned with platform participation and key resources 
The offering of the complementor firms is thoroughly aligned with the firms’ platform par-
ticipation decision and key resources. Even though platform-focused complementors’ offer-
ings fundamentally differ from the offerings of platform independent firms, both still take 
platforms into consideration. The offering of platform-focused firms is essentially aligned 
with the offering of the platform leader, and is focused on ways to efficiently add value to 
that offering. For platform independent complementors, the offering is specifically different 
from the platform offering, as they focus on offering something that those platforms cannot 
offer, i.e. differentiation. 
The offerings are fundamentally aligned with the firms’ key resources, as platform-focused 
complementors leverage the replicable solutions in order for their offering to be competitive, 
as tailoring solutions from scratch to each individual firms needs would not be efficient and 
would not allow for profitable business. Platform independent firms would likely not fare 
well in competition against the platform-focused complementors, and their offerings do not 
aim to compete against neither platforms nor platform-focused complementors. 
Furthermore, it is likely that the top talent, employed by the platform independent 
complementors, appreciates being able to work on projects that aim to differentiation instead 
of replication. 
The data structure supporting the alignment of offerings with the platform participation 
decision and the key resources of the complementors is presented in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5. Data structure supporting the alignment of offerings of the complementors to the platform participation decision 
and the key resources 
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4.2.2.i Platform-focused complementor offering adds value to platform offering 
As the offering of platform-focused complementors is built around the idea of adding value 
to the platform, there are two predicaments for the offering. First, the areas in which they 
provide services and solutions need to cover a significant part of the platforms offering. 
Second, the services and solutions must be such that the platforms do not cover those needs 
on their own. Therefore, the offering development of platform-focused firms is aligned to 
their ecosystem of choice. 
The first predicament stems from not only the fact that customers value firms that can serve 
them comprehensively, but also the will of complementors to protect those customerships. 
According to the informants, the firms are not only able to expand their offering as the plat-
form increases in functions, but they also have to do so, in order to protect their position as 
the customers’ service provider. The need to protect the position stems from the fact that if 
some other complementor would take over one of the functions of the platform, they may 
threaten also the other businesses or functions related to the platform formerly served by the 
focal complementor. As one of the interviewees puts it: 
I do want that we protect our position in the customership. If someone else 
came in and took one corner, then they suddenly take another corner and 
maybe a third and expand their position in the customer. That is why we 
need to offer comprehensive solutions [within the platform] and know all 
of them [platform functionalities] (CC-5) 
The need to provide comprehensive services in regards to platform technologies is also re-
lated to the fact that the benefits of the platform stem from a comprehensive coverage of 
functionalities. The platforms are becoming wall-to-wall comprehensive systems and that 
affects also the platform-focused firms interviewed. 
The platform is becoming a system that encompasses the whole [customer] 
firm, where you can handle processes wall-to-wall, and that is one thing 
that has driven what we do. (CC-5) 
The second predicament, the value added, most importantly, stems from providing services 
that the platform leader cannot or does not want to offer. It originates from the difference of 
product and service businesses, and from the fact that a scalable product cannot be custom-
ized to each customer’s needs. The platforms provided by platform leaders are not custom-
ized to each customer’s needs, and instead of providing such customization as a service 
themselves, the platform leaders rely on a network of partners, or complementors to do that. 
Instead of having to have large organizations in each geographical region, the platform lead-
ers can rely on the large complementor networks for customization. 
[The platform leader] does not sell anything on their own, or maybe they 
have some large clients in which they are involved for a while. But it is 
always the partner network. And the partner network has [more than 100 
times] the employees compared to the platform leader here in Finland – 
[more than 100 times more] people employed by partner firms that are 
only focused on [platform leader]. (CC-6) 
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What the partners, or complementors, provide is specifically customer specific solutions. 
They get to know the customer and their processes, and assist them in configuring the plat-
form solutions to their business.  
It always needs that experience in order to get the software configured to 
the clients industry in a way that the business processes run as the cus-
tomer wants […] you can actually configure those business processes 
quite much, as the functionalities are deep – and that is why you need the 
consultant and the experience. (CC-6) 
The key thing to our offering is that it starts from the customer. (CC-4) 
4.2.2.ii Replicable solutions needed to be competitive in offering customization 
As noted in the section 4.2.1.v, platform-focused complementors identify IP and replicability 
as perhaps their most important drivers of success. This is directly interrelated to their offer-
ing, as even though they customize platform technologies to specific customer needs, they 
have to do it cost-efficiently, quickly and with low risk. This relates to both winning projects 
in the first place, and reaching profitability in those projects. 
In order to win cases and projects, platform-focused firms compete against other comple-
mentors. Without replicability, the costs of having to start from scratch may prohibit a com-
petitive offer. Therefore, replicability is not only key to profitability, but also to winning 
projects in the first place. 
There is always an aim for replicability, and it is very important to be able 
to replicate things. If you cannot replicate things, it is always as labor-
intensive. And you can never reach better profitability, because you al-
ways have to start from scratch, and study the client as much as the first 
client. […] You cannot actually even do a proper proposition to win the 
case with [without replicability]. (CC-6)  
IP, as noted, builds up from prior customer projects, and stems from a broad clientele that 
faces similar problems. In terms of offering, IP is not necessarily a product, but more of a 
solution that is replicable to multiple customers.  
[…] And this is our primary way of working, as now when we look at the 
world, it has gone to a direction where multiple basic capabilities availa-
ble. Say we look at analytics, machine learning, AI or IOT, in order for 
them to get traction, there has to be a clear context and problem to solve. 
[When solving a problem with a customer] we have e.g. IOT-frameworks 
and technologies to use for the problem type, and then we can also find a 
solution that we can replicate to others. (CC-4) 
Therefore, by solving customer problems, the platform-focused firms actually accumulate 
replicable solutions, which become part of their offering in following cases. They benefit 
not only in being able to win cases via credibility due to customer references, and ability to 
propose a lower price, but they can also conduct those projects efficiently and earn a profit 
– even though they are providing a customizing service, which solves a customer specific 
problem, in contrast to stand-alone platform products. These accumulated replicable solu-
tions, as noted earlier, are a key resource for the platform-focused firms. 
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The replicable solutions, as a result from prior customer projects, are most likely applicable 
mostly in projects that utilize similar technologies. They may not be transferable to other 
platforms, as platforms require not only customization to them, but understanding of the 
functionalities of the platform. It is unlikely that the benefits of replicability could be 
achieved with a multiple platform focus, as customizing the solutions to multiple platforms 
would be costly, and would also require having a broad capability base in all the different 
platforms supported. Coordination of systematic capability development across multiple 
platform technologies would likely increase costs – perhaps in a nonlinear manner due to 
increased coordination costs. 
Furthermore, the experience and replicable solutions would quite evidently not be transfer-
able to the business logic of platform independent firms, as is shown in the following section. 
4.2.2.iii Independent companies’ offering contradictory with replicability of platforms 
The firms that highlight their independence from platforms also seem to take platforms into 
consideration with their offering. It is difficult to assess the exact cause and effect relation 
between the two characteristics, i.e. did the offering lead to independence or independence 
to the offering, but there is certainly a relation. The platform independent firms namely high-
light that they offer their customers with solutions that are differentiating and aimed for a 
different need than packaged software or platforms. 
No one of us [independent firms] do SAP configurations, what interests us 
are the features that SAP does not have. (CC-1) 
The platform independent complementors note that their offering is distinctively different 
from that what platforms can offer. The use cases of platform technologies and the use cases 
for which the platform independent companies offer their services are distinct from each 
other. There is also a clear understanding that independent companies are not fit to serve the 
customer need that platforms serve. 
We are called up when there is a need for differentiation, not for commod-
ity like things such as ERP – no one buys that from us, but take it as a 
packaged software. (CC-7) 
If you seek operational efficiency, but do not want differentiation, then the 
only right solution is to take an existing platform. […] The worst option, 
chosen by many [customer firms] is to buy from a small software company 
that does not have a finished product. Then you pay for their product de-
velopment. (CC-1)  
Furthermore, the independent firms are confident that their services cannot be taken over by 
platforms, as they specifically address the need to differentiate. According to the informants, 
even though platforms can become broader in functionalities, they can never offer differen-
tiation or competitive advantage to the customer firms, as in the best case they offer customer 
firms the ability to be as good as the best of their competitors. 
[…] By implementing software products, you can at maximum reach the 
same level as others […] We are those that can be near the customer de-
veloping tailored solutions with which customers seek competitive ad-
vantage. (CC-3) 
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But you cannot get any competitive advantage as everyone uses the same 
SAP. Our business is to make something differentiating on top of it. (CC-
7) 
On the other hand, the offerings are still related to platforms, as platforms provide the basis 
on top of which platform independent complementors build their own offering, as also illus-
trated by the quote above. Even though platform independent complementors do not provide 
services in configuring the platform technologies, the data, essential to the solutions, is 
stored platform technology solutions. Therefore, platform independent complementors must 
know how to connect their solutions to various platforms. 
[The platform technology] is not interesting to us in a configuration sense, 
but it is interesting as these [platforms] are not changed every year, or 
even every decade. The data is there […] and when we develop new solu-
tions, we must be able to penetrate the platform and integrate to it. […] 
We have to be able to get data in and out of the platform. (CC-1) 
Overall, the offering of independent firms varies greatly from the offering of platforms, but 
it can also be concluded that it differs greatly from the offering of firms that partner with 
platforms, i.e. platform-focused complementors.  
As one of the main drivers of competition between platform-focused complementors is to be 
efficient in their customization, and therefore their key resources are the IP that enables rep-
licable customization, their capabilities would certainly not transfer to projects aimed at dif-
ferentiation. Replication and differentiation are polar opposites – selling best practices uti-
lized by others does not constitute to differentiating competitive advantage, but does well 
answer the need for operational excellence.  
On the other hand, firms that create differentiating software, i.e. platform independent com-
plementors, would not fare well in competing against platform-focused complementors, as 
they certainly would not be able to win many tenders due to the high cost of starting the 
project without any replicable elements, or due to a lack in customer references in imple-
menting platform configurations. Platform-focused complementors have likely accumulated 
much more IP relevant to their platform of choice than platform independent complement-
ors, as they focus their efforts in one ecosystem.  
Furthermore, if platform independent complementors for some reason would choose to part-
ner with a specific platform, and even if they managed to keep an adequate proportion of 
their top talent that value the current differentiating projects, they would be many years be-
hind the top platform specific complementors. Therefore, it is likely that they would not 
reach success in that competition for many years, if ever, as the platform-focused comple-
mentors can keep adjusting their operations with much more experience.  
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4.3 Power and future options affected by participation decision 
The third research question for this thesis aimed to understand how the operating environ-
ment of the complementors is developing, while seeking to understand what drivers of 
change are most important. Furthermore, possible responses of the firms to their anticipated 
future environment were sought for. This section addresses the research question, formulated 
as below: 
What drivers affect the future of ecosystems and complementors and how will the comple-
mentors respond to changes? 
The most important drivers of change in the industry seem to be technological development 
and development of customer needs. Cloud technology is the single most important techno-
logical driver. Platforms expand in functionalities and can take on more of the technological 
responsibilities in projects directly. An increasing number and variety of functionalities in 
platforms, and concurrently the increasing number of different platforms makes understand-
ing them more complex, and customers need advisors on platform choices. This is due to the 
increase of options in variety, driven by number of platforms available, and due to the in-
creasing complexity, depth and breadth of each platform. Therefore, customers need, more 
than earlier, consultants that can advise on platform decisions, and that can help them in 
understanding what is possible within each platform ecosystem.  
At the same time, programming is commoditizing, and customer value stems not from the 
software itself but its business applications. In addition to the vast opportunities provided by 
platforms, customers must think about platforms strategically, as they must balance between 
the tradeoff of embeddedness and flexibility that is inherent in choices they make regarding 
utilizing platform technologies. There are both benefits and risks for customers in embed-
ding their processes in solutions offered by an ecosystem of a specific platform leader. Being 
able to utilize the benefits of ecosystems to full extent may require such embeddedness that 
options regarding transferring to different platforms close, and negotiation power against 
platform leaders diminishes. 
Changes in technologies and the interrelated changes in customer needs provide business 
opportunities for complementors. The business opportunities relate to providing services that 
incorporate business logic more tightly to software than before, and advising customers in 
their platform strategies. The incorporation of business logic to software is not, however, 
only an opportunity, but it is also a necessity, as some former business opportunities are 
taken over by platform leaders, or become less profitable and commoditized. Commoditiza-
tion is occurring especially in programming capabilities without the inclusion of business 
logic. Furthermore, providing software that incorporates business logic can be expanded to 
being actually partial in the development of business logic and strategy by taking into con-
sideration the possibilities of software. 
These changes in the industry require responses from the complementors. The responses 
differ between platform-focused complementors and platform independent complementors, 
affected by how they operate currently, and by their platform decision, and the independence 
or dependence that follows. 
Power is discussed in this section, as it is a consequence of the platform participation deci-
sion, and importantly affects how complementors can respond to changes in their operating 
67 
 
environment. Power between platform leaders and complementors is asymmetric, as com-
plementors are affected by platform leader actions, but complementors do not affect platform 
leader actions, at least directly. Advising customers, and therefore influencing demand, is 
the most important way to affect platform leaders’ strategies indirectly. Platform-focused 
complementors, not being free to choose which platform to utilize, are affected more by the 
platform leader in their ecosystem, and may have pressure to utilize inferior solutions, not 
only to them but to their customers, although they can fight this pressure by not recommend-
ing those solutions to customers. Platform independent complementors are free to use any 
technology, thus enabling them to use the most suitable technology for each customer case. 
This, importantly, makes them credible advisors to the customers, importance of which will 
increase in the future. 
To sum up the future directions of the different types of complementors, the platform-fo-
cused complementors can build on their experience to sustain their position in the ecosystem. 
They may wish to focus on some industries, but more importantly, they must address needs 
of the customers that the platform leader cannot efficiently serve. Even though being able to 
diversify their ecosystem risk would be very welcome, it does not seem very easy at this 
point, as they have become quite specialized in their own ecosystems, and the competition 
in ecosystems that may seem more attractive in terms of growth is likely to be fiercer with 
existing competitors that have an experience advantage. Furthermore, the platform leaders’ 
incentive models combined with their current successful configuration will make a decision 
to transfer to another ecosystem very difficult. 
It seems that, at least for the firms interviewed, that the prior experience of platform-focused 
complementors has been suitable, or at least adaptable, for the transition that is occurring. 
Their prior customer cases and the solutions they have created seem to be an advantage the 
firms build on. As such, it seems that the transition to cloud, even though radical and fatal 
to those companies that have focused only on license sales, has not been as negative to the 
case companies interviewed for this thesis. 
As platform-focused complementors further adapt to new business models in the platform, 
it may further strengthen the degree of their lock in, but also provide them with advantage 
and enable them to become experts in their platform of choice. Furthermore, as the complex-
ity increases, customers will probably still need advisors on configuring their systems, even 
in the new models enabled by cloud. It seems unlikely that platform leaders will be able to 
take over those services with scalable online materials, at least in the near future. 
Platform independent complementors, on the other hand, are very much free to utilize any 
platform, at least with current rules of the ecosystems. They are not, however completely 
free as they would face problems should they wish to aim to focus on a single platform and 
reap the benefits in customer access. As noted earlier, their most important resources, i.e. 
top talent, would most likely be harder to retain in a case where they would choose such a 
path. 
What platform independent complementors are, instead, doing is expanding to other profes-
sional services – an expansion that has started already multiple years ago in the domains of 
design and service design. The most recent expansion to management consulting is an addi-
tion that firms have taken onto in various degrees. The first movers already have significant 
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consulting power with multiple employees, as the followers are thinking about making such 
moves.  
According to the findings, such moves towards adjacent professional services are enabled 
by customer demand. Customers need advisers that can respond to their strategic problems 
that stem from IT and business strategies becoming more intertwined, complexity increasing 
in the different platforms, and the need to think about platform choices more strategically. 
They turn to platform independent complementors to assist them in the decisions, as they 
are credible advisers. 
Furthermore, the platform independent firms seem to be well aligned to respond to custom-
ers’ needs, provided that they manage to include business knowledge in their offering, either 
via cooperation with business consulting firms or by integrating such skills into their own 
organization. The credibility that they build on stems from impartialness and a broad range 
of top capabilities in the software domain. 
4.3.1 Technology development and customer needs as drivers of change 
When looking at how the business-to-business software industry is developing, two im-
portant categoric themes that drive change can be identified from the interviews. Namely, 
technology development, generally and in platforms, and the development of customer 
needs. These themes are interdependent, as technology at the same time allows more things 
to be done more easily, in terms of platforms being able to take more responsibilities and the 
commoditization of programming, technological development also makes it more difficult 
for customers to understand the wide range of options and what they essentially mean to 
them. These both themes affect both what is expected from the complementors and what 
they could and do offer to customers. The changes, therefore, affect the offering of the firms, 
mediated by the key resources, and power relation with platforms. The quote below summa-
rizes and illustrates the development well. 
In our case, as the core ecosystem can create more finished services di-
rectly from cloud as a service, then these [key resources] I mentioned ear-
lier, are relevant for our ability to create added value. […] [The key re-
sources] with which we have been able to create added value with, and 
which have developed in an evolutionary manner, and which we have been 
aiming to strengthen continuously, as those are the areas where we see 
ourselves creating added value in the future with. And I would say that in 
an ecosystem like ours, the power relations change continuously as the 
market develops and the technology develops rapidly. (CC-4) 
The findings related to technology development and customer needs as drivers of change are 
presented below. Figure 6 presents the data structure that supports the findings, including 
most important 1-st order concepts that led to the emergence of the 2nd-order categories. 
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Figure 6. Data structure supporting technology development and customer needs as drivers of change in the industry 
4.3.1.i Platform cloud technology renders some technical & resell services obsolete 
The main and most direct driver for change in the industry seems to be the development of 
cloud technologies. As platform leaders are driving adoption of cloud based platforms, the 
extent to which they can take over services grows. This change was described as radical and 
disruptive to especially the platform-focused complementors, indicating a big risk and need 
for rapid adaption. 
In this cloud model, the biggest risk is how fast it comes into effect, and 
whether partners can adapt as quickly as needed. For example, licensing 
partnerships, i.e. transforming to [platform technology] license sales to 
selling a cloud service model, it requires a different type of capability form 
the complementor. And this has been a large disruption for license retail-
ers, a business that has been large everywhere in the world, and in the 
Nordics. (CC-4) 
Even though none of the firms interviewed are mere license resellers, the cloud model still 
has major effects on their business. Not only do cloud platforms take away opportunities in 
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selling licenses, they also expand the ability of platforms to take care of many technical 
problems of customers, previously served by complementors.  
It affects our services, as service models are very different in cloud, as 
some of our business practically disappears. For example, earlier we sup-
ported ERPs as on premise solution, which means that we were responsi-
ble for the system […]. In that case we provided services in maintenance 
breaks, installing batches, and taking the responsibility of the updates and 
usability. We also took care of customer support by seeking for fixes from 
the platform portal. All this management and maintenance work disap-
pears completely in cloud. (CC-8)  
The development is accelerated by the will and ability to take care of the technical side by 
the platform leaders, as they already not only help customers with technical issues, but also 
act as technical experts to platform-focused complementors. This not only takes care of some 
problems complementors had to deal earlier by themselves, but also takes away business 
opportunities from complementors and forces them to adapt and find other ways to add value 
– especially in the business and industry contexts, as discussed in section 4.3.3.i. 
 We do not usually sell to technically challenging solutions to customers, 
which require a high degree of technical proficiency regarding the plat-
form without the help of [platform leader]. We can ask, and receive auto-
matically, such help and for free. Also, in customer problem situations, 
where the system is e.g. slow in some functions, we can ask for help from 
[the platform leader] that comes with a price tag, which the customer pays 
for. (CC-6)  
Platform technology development not only affects the platform-focused firms, but it is also 
a driver for platform independent firms’ development, as platforms can provide an increas-
ing number of new functionalities as packaged software. 
Different kinds of ecosystems are reaching a new level of maturity, if you 
think about what e.g. AWS offers in data analytics […] There is an enor-
mous diversity of possibilities [in different components], and ecosystems 
and platforms with their own services. (CC-3) 
4.3.1.ii Programming commoditizes and application value stems from business logic 
The most important driver for change for platform independent complementors seems to be 
the fact that the software development without understanding the business context is com-
moditizing and becoming less valuable for the customers. Therefore, something else needs 
to be offered, such as more refined understanding in data science, business processes or 
software architecture. 
Basic programming, or parts of it, will commoditize and you have to go to 
areas like data science, business process understanding or architectural 
understanding. The value added moves higher in the hierarchy, so to say, 
and in that sense there will definitely be change (CC-7) 
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The informants noted that the main driver for this is that customers’ software solutions in-
creasingly need to, and do, incorporate business logic in order for the solutions to be valua-
ble. This relates to the opportunities provided by platforms and available technologies, but 
also to conventional ways of their way to offer differentiated software via tailored solutions.  
Customers have a variety of options to further develop it [their business, 
as there are more and more possibilities in technologies]. It is a much 
broader task than just developing some software or a single service in an 
agile manner, sprint by sprint. It [such software development] does not 
give actual competitive advantage to our clients. (CC-3) 
Therefore, software firms must evolve, in order to avoid becoming trapped into price com-
petition. The willingness to pay for services of the customers stems from inventing new 
business logics enabled by software, and actually building that software is only a natural 
extension to that offering. 
The benefit for the customer does not come from whoever can program at 
lowest cost, but from someone inventing a new business logic for them. 
That is what the customer is willing to pay for, if you invent that, and then 
programming comes as a natural extension that you will then do for the 
customer. (CC-7) 
4.3.1.iii Complexity and variety in platforms provide opportunities to serve customers 
The technological development not only takes away business or commoditizes prior ser-
vices, but it also creates new customer needs, which the complementors can tackle. Due to 
the rapidly increasing diversity and complexity of available solutions in technologies and 
platforms, customers have a hard time understanding their options on their own. 
There is a huge amount of platforms […]. And how different players build 
their digital presence will live on. It is a certain kind of puzzle. (CC-3) 
The decisions regarding different platforms and technologies are not only very complex, but 
also crucial for the customers. The decisions ultimately determine, whether the customers 
can obtain competitive advantage compared to their competitors or not. 
It is about utilizing tailored software, and making right ecosystem choices, 
and utilizing the services provided by that frame in a best possible manner 
that leads to the customer either gaining or not gaining competitive ad-
vantage in relation to their competitors. And it is an enormously compli-
cated picture. (CC-3) 
The complexity and diversity of platform options is not only problematic in terms of choos-
ing which platforms and technologies are used, but also in terms of how to utilize chosen 
platforms in the most suitable way. As the platforms continuously, due to inter-platform 
competition among other reasons, develop their features, customers have a hard time keeping 
up with what features they can and should use. Therefore, such development in customer 
needs also guides the offerings of the platform-focused complementors. 
It is like a beauty pageant. When one [platform] develops a feature and 
gets traction for it, then others too develop that feature [and vice versa] 
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[…] In a continuous manner new features are developed as the market is 
developed. And for the most part – one could say that it would be great if 
customers would utilize 50% of the features available in the solutions. The 
key would be for customers to understand what their real problem is, and 
what they want solved, and then utilize these solutions in a right way. (CC-
5) 
There are thousands of e.g. CRM solutions and they are all slightly differ-
ent. And if some customer uses one CRM, it may be in a completely differ-
ent manner than some other customer uses it. (CC-6) 
4.3.1.iv Customer value from both embeddedness and flexibility 
In addition to having a diversity of complex platforms and technologies to choose from, 
customer firms must also assess their own platform choices from a strategic perspective. 
Namely, they have to balance between the benefits of diving deep into an ecosystem, i.e. 
becoming embedded in an ecosystem, and flexibility, i.e. keeping their options open for the 
future. 
The main driver for the tradeoff between embeddedness and flexibility stems actually from 
the very nature of platforms as a structure to allow for complementors build and offer their 
products and services on. Embeddedness is a consequence of customers utilizing the increas-
ing amount of complements available via platforms. 
Merely transferring from data warehouses to cloud does not tie up cus-
tomers. But when you start resorting to those services available [in plat-
forms] or especially to services by third parties offered to that technology, 
you dive deep and also get many contractual ties. This is also perhaps 
what they [platform leaders] aim at. Otherwise, it is most often possible 
to move solutions from say Azure to AWS, but when you start having APIs 
to the other ecosystem, then it may not be possible anymore. (CC-3) 
The embeddedness does have significant benefits for the customer, but the benefits may 
come at a cost. The benefits are mainly related to being able to easily utilize different services 
easily and scale them up or down. However, utilizing complements via the platform build 
up to stronger linkages with the platform. As the linkages accrue, the customer becomes 
more embedded, and may not be able to switch to another platform, and they lose their ne-
gotiation power towards the platform. The main benefit from not becoming too deeply linked 
is therefore the strategic option and ability to make own choices in the future. 
You definitely have to be alert and think if it creates customer value for 
them to link more strongly, or if it is value adding to keep it clean, so to 
say. […] There is definitely upside in linking. The whole thematic and idea 
is that you can cross-utilize the services, and dynamically take into use 
new services and scale them up and down etc. You do not get the benefits 
if you keep your distance from the ecosystem. Both have their pros and 
cons. (CC-3)  
In the context of B-to-B, you should think, as CIO, about where you can 
receive the cheapest and best service, but you also have to think about the 
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strategic angle – do you want to have all your eggs in one basket. And 
then you think what you want to do in the future, and what will your nego-
tiation leverage be, and sometimes you may be willing to pay for not hav-
ing all the eggs in one basket. […] You do not want to be in a leash and 
you have an incentive and added value for paying for this kind of strategic 
option and ability. (CC-4) 
Due to the threat of lock-in, customer firms may be willing to pay more to keep their options 
open. This may mean utilizing multiple platforms for different things, even though it may 
come with a higher price tag. It also means that platform leaders need to consider the cus-
tomer point of view in the way they structure their platform. As customers have different 
options that may be good enough, they may favor those platforms that allow for higher flex-
ibility. This may be the main reason for platforms actually allowing at least some degree of 
openness in platforms. 
[…] The interfaces are becoming more open in cloud technology. Cus-
tomer solutions are more distributed, and it is going into the direction 
where you take one good product and integrate. (CC-8) 
Objectively, I see that [the platform leader] controlling tools – i.e. how 
you manage things, they practically support [other platforms] directly. 
[The platform leader] – even though they may not highlight it publicly, 
they have already accepted that customer firms will have multiple [plat-
forms], and they want to offer their services and sustain in the world with 
multiple platforms. (CC-4) 
Technology development and customer preferences most certainly affect the ways comple-
mentors will conduct their business in the future. For some parts, it will mean that they will 
need to shift their offering, as platforms take over more responsibilities – a development 
which is not likely to reverse. There may, however be also some positive development due 
to customer needs that allow complementors to serve their customers in new ways – some 
of which may give the firms a more central position when it comes to platforms. However, 
in order for that to happen firms must develop new capabilities. Furthermore, the relationship 
with platform leaders and the power platform leaders have on the complementors affect the 
options complementors have in the future. 
4.3.2 Power depends on platform participation and affects options 
The power relationship between platform leaders and complementors is asymmetric, as com-
plementors do not wield much power against platform leaders, but platform leader actions 
influence complementors. Platform leader actions are driven and affected mostly by compe-
tition between platform leaders, and ultimately controlled by customer demand. For plat-
form-focused complementors, platform leader actions may be quite unfavourable, but they 
must accept the moves without direct negotiation. Platform-focused complementors have 
some indirect power via advising customers in technology choices within the platform, thus 
recommending, or not recommending, different new solutions offered by platform leaders.  
Platform independent complementors are affected less by a power asymmetry, as they are 
free to use any technology and are not limited to any single ecosystem. The decisions plat-
form independent complementors make regarding platforms are limited only by customer 
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preferences and the autonomous choices of employees and project teams. Such independ-
ence and flexibility also makes them impartial and credible in advising customers in their 
platform technology choices. Due to being able to influence customer decisions, they, too, 
indirectly, wield some power against platform leaders, but the more important factor is that 
they are free to use any technology, thus being less affected by possibly harmful strategies 
of individual platform leaders. 
The findings related to how power depends on platform participation, and how platform 
participation affects options or flexibility of complementors are presented below. Figure 7 
presents the data structure for the findings, including the most important 1st-order concepts. 
 
Figure 7. Data structure supporting the finding that power depends on platform participation and affects options 
4.3.2.i Complementor power low, inter-platform competition most influential 
In the interviews, I aimed to carefully probe, and even directly asked, for ways in which 
complementors would have been able to negotiate with the platform leader, about e.g. how 
the revenues are split between the two in projects. However, it became quite clear that the 
complementors do not see themselves and the platform leaders as players who would nego-
tiate with each other. Instead, platform pricing comes as a given, a fact that is generally 
known and accepted. 
[When asked about the distribution of value in projects where platform 
technology is used] Oh you mean monetary-wise? Well in these things it 
comes as very much a given. (CC-3) 
Complementors are willing, or forced, to accept that the division of value is developing into 
a direction more beneficial to the platform leader, because the ecosystem needs to provide 
realistic business opportunities for the platform leader in order for it to remain sustainable. 
The ultimate driver is the competition between different ecosystems. 
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Earlier you could think as a rule of thumb that [a platform leader] would 
say that 1 euro to the [platform leader] meant 7, 8 or even 9 euros for the 
partner. Now they say that 1 euro to [the platform leader] may be 5 or 6 
euros to the partner. These are established truths in a way, and will remain 
so, as all parties know that without a realistic business opportunity, the 
ecosystem is not sustainable in the future. (CC-4) 
The power setting changes constantly in these ecosystems. As the market 
and technologies develop, even if we told [platform leader] that they can-
not come and eat our business, they reply that they have to as their com-
petitors take certain actions. (CC-4) 
Even though communication of a collaborative approach is possible on a higher level, those 
ideas do not always transfer to the practical level. Perhaps due to the unbalanced power 
relation, platform leader firms are in practice most concerned what sales that partners bring 
in.  
We are just as good in their eyes as we were today or during the last month 
– if there is another partner that does something well, they may gravitate 
to that direction. They are mainly interested in where the dollar can be 
found […] [Regarding the degree of competition] Well it depends on 
which level we think about it. A single salesperson there, who gets a pro-
vision this month – maybe a little crude, but that is what they are interested 
in – they are not interested in individual partners. They are interested in 
the business we bring in, but that is ok, that is what they are compensated 
for […] On a regional level, they may think about it on a more general 
level. Therefore, I would say that these frame agreements between the 
platform and the partners, in the end, do not really matter, but the work 
between people is decisive. (CC-5) 
The power is not, however limited to prices, but also to what should be offered to the cus-
tomers. The main driver for those decisions is the strategy the platform leader pursues. Even 
if the complementor, and even the customer, may be worse off with a new solution, platform 
leaders may drive it. 
When you immediately know that this does not make sense – the customer 
gets an inferior solution, while having already a working one, and on the 
other hand we have a good thing rolling. Then how do you tell the platform 
leader that we are now taking the customer into an inferior solution and 
cannibalizing our own sales with the solution – it is sort of a balancing 
act. (CC-6) 
In these cases, complementors cannot directly argue with the platform leader, but they may 
be able to affect the situation more indirectly. If platform-focused complementors consider 
a solution not to be optimal to the customer, they can recommend customers to utilize other 
solutions within the platform, thus counteracting platform leader actions. 
[One opportunity to counteract platform leader urge to new models, when 
the model is not optimal for the customer and the complementor] is to not 
to recommend the solution to the client. Saying: “in our opinion you may 
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not want to implement cloud in this case, as you will not receive the ben-
efits, and your current solutions is good for you – let’s update to a newer 
version of the on-premise solution”. (CC-8) 
In some cases, such recommendations may have a significant effect, and platform leaders 
may have to accommodate solutions that may not completely fit their strategy. Naturally, it 
is not an outcome of single complementor actions, but collectively, with the help of customer 
demand, complementors do wield some power. 
[The platform leader] has tried to stop support [for a solution] but has 
now continued it to far in the future. (CC-8) 
It is quite clear that neither of the types of firms have direct ways to affect the platform 
leaders – as even though the positioning of the firms in relation to the platforms may differ, 
platform leaders’ choices are not guided by complementor actions, but by platform to plat-
form competition and customer demand. When it comes to prices, both types of comple-
mentors must accept what the market between platform leaders determines, but platform 
independent complementors do not have to resort to a specific platform in all solutions, thus 
being free in what they offer to their customers. Platform independent complementors are, 
therefore, free from the risk of having to accept models from platform leaders that are not 
favorable to them or the customers, given that there are multiple platforms that they can 
utilize instead of a specific platform. 
4.3.2.ii Impartial companies can and do utilize any technology that fits best 
Platform independent companies can and do freely choose which technologies to use for 
customer cases, not only due to the lack of alliances but also due to the talented employees 
making those decisions. The freedom to choose which technology to utilize is not only evi-
dent on the firm level, but also even on an individual employee level, as employees have 
autonomy in their work. 
The lack of lock in due to focused partnerships with platform leaders is important in deciding 
technologies, as different technologies match different needs.  
We do not care which technology we use, but if we are free to choose, then 
we use those technologies that best fit the purpose. (CC-7) 
The ability to use any technologies is not only important for being able to use the most suit-
able technologies, but also in remaining at the cutting edge of technologies. What this means 
is that when the firm is not tied to a certain platform, they can take into use any new platform 
or ecosystem.  
As we can use any technology, it fits our story better – we can tell the story 
of full customer value, and we never become relics as we continuously 
search for the new. If some new platforms or ecosystems come, we are free 
to take them into use. (CC-3) 
As the previous comment also indicates, the main benefit in the end may, however, come 
from the fact that not having to resort always to some specific technologies, independent 
companies are free to use the most beneficial alternative for the client. Not only is it good 
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for the image towards customers, it can also be more deeply connected to the values of the 
company, and thus relates to an attractive value proposition to the employees 
[Platform dependence] would be against our values, as any technology 
would not most likely be best alternative for all use cases. (CC-3) 
As we are not forced to a tunnel vision, we have been continuously able to 
aim for best customer and employee value in all the decisions we have 
made. […] As we can use any technologies, it fits our story better, and we 
can tell the story of full customer value. (CC-3) 
Furthermore, the management may also actively make sure that a broad understanding is 
maintained, as noted by one of the informants. Such active management participation in 
decision making of the experts still relies on the internal motivation of the experts and there-
fore supports the culture and capability management strategy of autonomy.  
When it comes to cloud platforms, we have noted that the excitement [of 
employees] has originally been directed at AWS technologies. Due to such 
development, we are careful not to camp too much with it. From a man-
agement point of view, we seek to see, whether e.g. Azure would be good, 
too. We can find employees that drive it, and get to know it and a counter 
force forms. We actively seek to maintain a balance in our portfolio. (CC-
3) 
Platform-focused companies, on the other hand do not have the freedom to utilize any tech-
nology, as they are bound to a specific platform by capabilities and necessity to generate 
enough sales. There may even be pressure to offer solutions within the platform that may 
not always be the most beneficial alternative for the customer, as noted in section 4.3.2.i. 
4.3.2.iii Impartialness increases credibility in advising on platform & technology 
choices 
As noted in the previous subsection, the platform independent complementors can, and do, 
always search for the most suitable technologies for the customers’ needs. Due to their broad 
capabilities in different technologies, and impartialness that stems from not representing 
only one platform, platform independent companies are credible advisers in those choices 
for their customers. For them the image of impartialness is important.  
The limitation in clientele for platform-focused complementors, as discussed in section 
4.1.1.ii, is, therefore, not limited to those clients that already utilize some other platform 
technology, but also in the fact that those clients that have not chosen a specific technology 
are more likely turn to firms that are impartial. Customers turn to independent companies 
for advice on what technologies fit their needs, as platform-focused firms are not credible 
advisors.  
The client calls us in such cases – as they know we are technology inde-
pendent – where they want guidance on what technology is suitable for 
their use case. You cannot – it would be quite stupid to call [a platform 
dependent company] and ask what they think is suitable, as it is quite ob-
vious what they would reply. (CC-7) 
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Furthermore, due to impartialness, independent companies cannot only affect those choices 
when the client is undecided, but also when they disagree with the client’s original opinion. 
Of course we give recommendations, and it is not that uncommon that the 
client has an opinion on what technology to use, and we think that the 
technology is bad and tell the client that. We advise them that they should 
use this or that, and we are credible to tell them so, because we do not 
have any – everyone knows that we do not have any ties to anyone. (CC-
7) 
Giving up the power to utilize any platforms, and the freedom to recommend any technolo-
gies to clients is against the identity of some independent companies. They abhor giving up 
that power, as it would mean that they would have hidden agendas when consulting custom-
ers. This implies not only that the decision regarding platform participation affects the power 
relationship towards platform leaders, but also that losing the power to make own choices 
may affect the decision of platform participation in the first place. 
Our choice has been that we have technology capabilities, but we have 
never succeeded in creating added value to these IBM, Oracle or Mi-
crosoft due to the fact that we have not wanted to go to the customer with 
a hidden agenda. (CC-3). 
The decision of giving up power to choose freely which platform technology to use and 
recommend, or not giving up that power, has clearly affected the way the companies operate. 
Furthermore, it also has an effect on how the firms can operate in the future. The ability to 
advise customers credibly in their decisions becomes more and more important as platforms 
can take on more responsibilities on the technical side, and as customers’ technology choices 
and the ways to utilize software develop. 
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4.3.3 Software firms’ strategies adapt to and exploit changes 
This section is an effort to describe what is currently happening in terms of development in 
the firms interviewed and why, and what the future may hold. In order to build a more com-
prehensive view, blurring of what has happened and what is going to happen next is ac-
cepted, and the change is viewed as a whole, not dependent on the exact timing, as the firms 
are in different stages of development. The section is divided into two sub-sections, where 
the first one focuses on the platform-focused firms, and the second one focuses on platform 
independent firms. The data structure and the most important 1st-order concepts that provide 
evidence for the findings are presented in Figure 8 below. 
 
Figure 8. Data structure supporting the findings related to how the different types of complementors adapt to and exploit 
changes in their operating environment 
4.3.3.i Platform-focused companies adapt with industry & business knowledge 
Platform-focused complementors, i.e. those that are closely partnered with one platform 
leader, generally have an urgency to develop their offering, as platform technologies develop 
and most importantly move to cloud technologies. There is, therefore, a need to adapt to the 
platform leader strategy, which is more a necessity than a choice. 
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As a platform leader changes its business model and logic, the partners’ roles change. Those 
who are stuck in a model that is no longer needed may not be able to sustain their business. 
Now, as we are going to the cloud more strongly, the models change. […] 
The business model and logic changes. And – as the business and revenue 
model and pricing changes –  also the role of partners changes. [Value 
added resellers] who received their share of licensing revenue, in this 
model, their value creation in the traditional manner has weakened or 
even completely vanished. The change is radical […] (CC-4) 
Furthermore, the setting is not balanced between the complementor and the platform leader, 
as noted already in the section 4.3.2.i. Platform leaders, sometimes justifying their behavior 
by competing platforms’ development, have expanded and seem to continue expanding their 
offering and developing their model in ways that directly reduce some of the complement-
ors’ business opportunities. Even though platform leaders may appear to take a cooperative 
stance in their wordings, the actual relationship seems to be such that the platform leader 
takes what it can, and the partners must deal with the actions of platform leaders. Therefore, 
the setting is actually quite competitive, and partners must constantly adapt to the actions of 
platform leaders.  
They claim that they have to do so [competitive actions towards comple-
mentors] in order to remain competitive [against other platforms], and 
then we want to help you as partners – go this way, here you can be com-
petitive, and together we can be more competitive. This is how it goes on 
the high level, but in practice, it is challenging. In this case, it practically 
goes so that the dominant player eats away value from others constantly, 
and others must adapt and create new value. (CC-4) 
Furthermore, the adaption must be proactive, as not only is the change radical, as noted 
above, the platform leaders do not give exact guidance and answers on how the firms should 
adapt. They, or at least some of them, have either not thought about it, or have chosen not to 
share their vision on how partners should adapt to their new models. Platform focused com-
plementors, therefore, have to be alert and adapt quickly to changes, without much guidance 
from the platform leaders 
You have to be very alert, and we have received very little support from 
the platform leader on what it means in practice. Even though [platform 
leader] has talked about cloud and such, we have not received any instruc-
tions on what it means to our business. […] It is quite difficult, when mak-
ing the first proposition in a new model, to figure out what it means for 
e.g. maintenance and how to price it. Many components are left out, and 
the policies are new and the problems are somewhat different. There is a 
lot to learn. (CC-8) 
Platform focused complementors must, therefore, find new ways to add value to the plat-
form. The adaption has in general moved increasingly from technical implementation to-
wards highlighting the importance of understanding the customer’s business. 
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As tools are no longer bottlenecks […] the things that are the bottleneck 
are such where the customer and business understanding is more critical 
than technological understanding. (CC-4) 
As a more recent direction, the platform-focused complementors have started to focus on 
specific industries. This development has been either a choice or a realization of a fact that 
the company has developed capabilities more in some industries than in others. This focus 
has also received support from platform leaders, as it can increase the added value comple-
mentors bring in. 
As we have analyzed where we are strong in and have customers in, we 
have chosen a few focus area [regarding industries]. […] After making 
that strategic decision of focus areas, we have gotten traction. We have 
been able to get new customers there, and here we see that our strategy is 
also shared with [the platform leader]. [The platform leader] sees that it 
is in these areas that the partner can fulfill the [platform leader] ecosys-
tem, and we have also received a lot of support from [the platform leader]. 
[…] It is a great example of the fact that when we have been able to create 
added value for the customer in the ecosystem, then [the platform leader] 
has a strong incentive to support us. (CC-4)  
I guess we have just realized that maybe we do actually have industry re-
lated capabilities. (CC-5) 
Industry focus – I believe we will have an increasing need to think about 
it and tighten it. […] When you focus on something, are good in something, 
it helps us [grow]. (CC-4) 
Industry focus not only enables firms to add value to the ecosystem, but it also helps in being 
able to replicate things – and, as noted earlier, such IP is a key resource for the platform-
focused firms. 
Gradually you start focusing on certain firms, as you have experience in 
it [the industry] and it is easier to sell when you replicate the same thing. 
And that is always the goal […] There is always the aim to find an indus-
try, and as the competition is tough, many firms try to find such specific 
industries so that it helps them in replication. (CC-6) 
Even though platform-focused complementors need to adapt to platform leader actions, it is 
not a hopeless situation for them. Even if they cannot independently decide their own direc-
tion, they can succeed if they adapt and align themselves correctly. As noted earlier, a suc-
cessful ecosystem can be profitable to complementors. In addition, by specializing in one 
ecosystem, they can become experts in all the technologies available in it, and advice com-
panies in choices within that ecosystem, especially as these choices become increasingly 
complex. 
Even though they [platform leader] have partially taken over customer 
sourcing with training materials, and in principle, customers can directly 
order applications from the cloud and watch YouTube-videos, not many 
do that. There is a long way from having a non-configured system and 
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watching a video to having a fully operational system. It takes experience 
to configure it in a way that the customer process runs as the customer 
wants. [With different platform technologies within the ecosystem] you 
can configure those business processes a lot, and as they have deep func-
tionalities, it takes the consultant and many years of experience. (CC-6) 
4.3.3.ii Independent companies expand into advisory fields to adapt and exploit 
For platform independent firms, development of business capabilities is also an important 
theme. The approach differs, however, somewhat from the approach of platform-focused 
firms, and is quite coherent with the approach to capability development in programming. 
Instead of accumulating replicable assets, such as frameworks or solutions, they either have 
hired, or are thinking about hiring, management consultants that are already proficient in 
their line of work, and can, perhaps, be considered top talent. Although one firm was only 
thinking about the option of taking such an approach, the two other informants were quite 
confident that it is the right choice for them. 
The latest [expansion in professional services] has been management con-
sulting, and we have currently [x] persons in that unit. (CC-3) 
Even the firm that has not yet chosen to go into management consulting views expanding 
capabilities in business consulting as an option. They note that such an expansion or shift 
could allow them to avoid competition in pricing, and therefore reach better profitability. 
This draws a direct connection between technology development and the need or want to 
change the offering, as it supports the notion of programming commoditizing – a theme 
discussed in the section 4.3.1.ii. 
In order to be able to incorporate value based pricing, you would have to 
go into the business process, and that is a different business. […] Instead 
of developing some process for the customer, you would drive that process 
– and it is a leap – but a strategic option. 
[…] 
It is difficult [to raise prices] as the price for the work rather decreases, 
as you get more and more and easier and easier it from abroad. […] The 
customer can always switch to another supplier and take an offer for 
hourly priced work. It is difficult to get more from there. (CC-1) 
One way to respond to the need to incorporate business knowledge is to cooperate with firms 
specialized in business consulting. A firm that has employed such tactics, is, however, aim-
ing to also build own capabilities in the domain. 
In a case [where the firm created a new business logic for the customer 
with a mobile application], as we did not have such [business consulting] 
business, we used a partner. (CC-7) 
The main driver for the development does not, however, at least directly, seem to have been 
necessity or threat, in contrast to platform-focused complementors who have urgency to 
adapt to platform leader business models. Instead, platform independent complementors 
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seem to be driven more by an opportunity to provide new services to customers, stemming 
from customer demand. 
It starts from having a customer demand, and then we hire a few, and then 
more come, and at some point it is business as usual. (CC-7) 
The reason for such demand, most likely, stems from the customer related changes discussed 
in section 4.3.1, i.e. value of solutions stemming from business logic, complexity and variety 
increasing in platforms and the need to think strategically about platforms. In general, these 
challenges can be summed up to digitalization challenges. As these challenges span the 
whole company, and are not about developing single digital services, they require a broad 
variety of services. 
[…] The world has changed in a way, where now all firms more or less 
face digitalization challenges, and they simply do not have the understand-
ing that is required. And they need a partner who has that understanding. 
And that does not mean programming, but someone telling them what they 
should do in their business, and the programming is just an extension. 
(CC-7) 
[To the way the world is changing] relates also cultural changes – in a 
digital change, when you think about an organization that used to produce 
a service with more manual processes. It is not so, that they can make a 
digital service, and then they have reached their goal in digitalization. In 
practice, it means a comprehensive change in those organizations, cultur-
ally and structurally. The organizations are very different after they have 
transformed into digital service providers. (CC-3) 
To those digitalization challenges, the independent firms aim to respond with a comprehen-
sive offering in professional services. 
We aim to help [the customers] in that comprehensive transformation, and 
it includes certainly cultural change, strategic thinking, and business ori-
ented service design and all that. (CC-3) 
The independent firms have not only seen an opportunity, but they are also well aligned to 
answer those customer challenges due to their gradual expansion in professional services. 
The process in expanding in professional services has already started some years ago, as 
platform independent firms expanded to design, after which came service design, and now 
as a latest addition the management consulting. Furthermore, it seems that at least for some 
companies, it has been due to a coherent will to help customers in a more comprehensive 
manner. 
It has not happened suddenly, but as we started with programming, and 
then came the design side, and the service design, and now business con-
sulting. (CC-7) 
The firm has changed throughout the years. At first, we were a software 
house, developing code for customers […] but by the side, in the past ten 
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years, we have built a more consultative approach […] project manage-
ment, strategic design and service design. […] It has been going on for 
the previous five six or seven years, cannot really remember, but we have 
had a clear will to help our customers comprehensively, and not just re-
main implementers. (CC-3) 
Consequently, the firms have turned into generalists, originating from software develop-
ment. The generalist approach with wide capabilities enables the firms to serve their cus-
tomers well in some areas, perhaps even better than firms specialized in the other profes-
sional service areas. 
The rest of our business comes from different professional services: man-
agement consulting, service design, other design, outsourced project man-
agement, architectural design, etc. And for that combination it fits well 
that we are general consultants looking to drive best possible solutions for 
the customers. (CC-3) 
We can provide better customer value in each of the areas, although we 
do not have hidden agendas [in serving our own services], as we under-
stand the comprehensive need, and can enrich our services from our own 
organization throughout the needs. I do think that we are more fit to serve 
customers, than if they bought from a purely service design focused firm. 
(CC-3) 
More fundamentally, the ability to serve that need stems all the way from the platform inde-
pendence choice, and not being allied with a single platform leader. It is also linked to the 
power relation, as platform independent firms are able to advise customers credibly in their 
choices due to their impartialness. 
When you think about cloud platforms, we noticed that our excitement was 
directed in AWS technologies. We are, however very careful not to camp 
too much with them. From a management perspective, we seek to find out 
whether Azure would be just as good. […] We see it as having to also have 
the other […] which comes from very deep. It starts from the true will to 
help the customer. And we are very careful in our management consulting 
that our consultants cannot have a hidden agenda and try to sell the im-
plementation project for us. […] It is a horrible thought that we would 
operate in that way – very much like we do not want to always sell one 
cloud solution to customers. It is against our basic thinking. (CC-3)  
Furthermore, an important factor that favors the platform independent complementors is that 
the firms have capabilities in the best technologies, and importantly, in many different of 
them in different platforms, enabled by autonomous individual development of such skills 
by employees, as noted in section 4.3.2.ii. Furthermore, as noted in the same section, man-
agement may actively seek to keep a balance in the technology skills portfolio. This is also 
important as it provides credibility and ability to serve customers in their technology choices. 
Even though the main driver for the expansion has been customer demand and the ability to 
exploit a business opportunity, it may also become a necessity for those firms that wish to 
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remain as independent generalists. This is due to the fact that platform independent compa-
nies are competing with each other, and as some develop their offering, others must, too. 
Customers have so multifaceted options to drive their business […] It is a 
much more complicated and vast span [of opportunities] and I believe that 
we are multiple steps ahead of our competition in the understanding. We 
have seniority, consulting power, and a broad understanding – much 
broader than other digitalization consultants. (CC-3) 
[Expanding to other professional services] is not something that we have 
invented, but it is more a trend in our industry. And when I think about it, 
our competitors have mainly taken a similar path as us. […] If I think 
about our competitors […] who compete directly with us […] They have 
had exactly the same path that they have started from programming, and 
then the design and then – i.e. in a way we have neared the origin of the 
process. (CC-7) 
The competition is probably not about merely being able to maintain a position in terms of 
revenue, but more importantly, it is about maintaining the key resources, i.e. top talented 
developers. Maintaining top talent requires, among other factors such as autonomy as dis-
cussed above, interesting projects for those employees. As some competitors are able to offer 
more comprehensive services, they become more competitive exactly in those interesting 
projects; consequently, not expanding in line with the competition would lead to ultimately 
losing the most important resource of the company, i.e. top talent. 
[The expansion in other professional services] has been mainly in order 
to remain competitive. Even if we did not seek for growth, I think we should 
still go there, exactly due to our employees, which indirectly leads to our 
competitiveness. In order for us to be able to keep our people, we have to 
have interesting projects, and we could not have that without the consult-
ing side. Of course, those interesting projects would not stop immediately, 
but little by little, those cases would come less frequently. And that is why 
it is important. (CC-7) 
It is not, however, enough for the platform independent firms to expand into management 
consulting. As their advantage partially stems from the ability to be credible advisers on 
platform decisions, they must also know those platforms well. 
We as consultants, especially generalist consultants, have to maintain a 
broad understanding in what these platforms and ecosystems have to offer 
in order to be able to recommend the best possible option for the customer. 
(CC-3) 
Having to maintain such a broad understanding on the platform technology and ecosystem 
options is not an easy task, and will become harder and harder as complexity and variety is 
increasing. On one hand, the culture of autonomy for top talent, and their interest alignment 
for their own professional development helps. On the other, it may be that platform-focused 
companies will have the upper hand in their own ecosystems, due to their specialization and 
accrued experience within the specific ecosystems. 
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4.4 Summary of the findings 
A fundamental decision that complementors have to make regarding their platform strategy 
is whether to partner up with a platform leader or not. In contrast to a working hypothesis 
guiding this research, firms do not in reality balance between different ecosystems, but they 
have to choose whether to partner up and which platform leader to partner up with. The 
benefits of partnering only come, when the firm commits to and focuses on only one plat-
form. In contrast, those firms that do not wish to partner with some specific platform are 
better off remaining completely independent, or more practically not declaring alliance with 
any partners at all.  
Even though some firms indicate alliance with more than one platform leader, they de facto 
have one main partner and possibly use some other secondary platforms. Conversely, firms 
highlighting independence may utilize any platforms, but in reality due to practical con-
straints only use a subset. They are to some extent partners with platform leaders, but the 
effects of highlighting and marketing those alliances would be more negative than positive, 
as only via focused commitment can complementors reap benefits from the alliances. The 
independent and impartial image has its own, significant benefits in terms of being able to 
serve a broader clientele credibly. 
The decision to partner is even more intertwined with how the companies look like than 
anticipated. Firms that are independent from platforms look surprisingly much alike, even 
though there are some differences, especially in the degree of expansion to management 
consulting services. These platform independent complementors are very different from 
complementors that are focused to a specific platform, i.e. platform-focused complementors. 
Even though there are also some differences between platform-focused complementors, per-
haps due to ecosystem specific characteristics, such as ecosystem growth, the differences 
within the category are small compared to the differences across the two categories. Essen-
tially, the key resources and offerings of the complementors are aligned with their platform 
participation decision, warranting a categorization of the firms to platform independent com-
plementors and platform-focused complementors. 
The power relation of the complementors with platform leaders is generally unbalanced. 
Platform leaders set their prices and do not need to worry about any single complementor, 
independent of or focused on them. Neither independent nor focused complementors can 
influence the strategies of the platform leaders directly, but both have some indirect power 
via customers. The platform independent firms may have less direct power against platform 
leaders, but their position is still more favorable in terms of flexibility that enables them to 
exploit changes in the operating environment driven by technology development and 
changes in customer needs. Platform-focused complementors, even though not very easily 
admitting it, are quite deeply locked into their ecosystems, due to specialized alignment and 
financial benefits that depend on the level of focus. They approach changes in a quite adap-
tive manner, and therefore power seems to mediate the way firms can react to change. As 
flexibility affects the relationship and power between the complementors and platform lead-
ers, and key resources and offerings are either flexible or standardized as a result of align-
ment to the platform participation decision, the power relationship seems to be have an in-
terdependent relationship with the platform participation decision. Not only does the way to 
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approach participation affect power dynamics, but also the way companies align their re-
sources and offering to their participation decision affects the power platform leaders have 
on the complementors. 
The major drivers of changes in the operating environment are technology development, in 
general and in platforms, and changes in customer needs. These two themes seem to be in-
terdependent, and, mediated by power relations with platform leaders, they affect the direc-
tion of development of the firms. The current directions of the firms are fairly similar within 
the two categories, and different across. This indicates that platform participation is a deci-
sion with effects on not only the past and present, but also the future of the firms. 
To conclude, the platform decision is binary and mainly made based on the firm’s view on 
the tradeoff between market access and lock-in. The complementors are fundamentally 
aligned with the platform decision when it comes to their offering and key resources, which 
altogether affect and are affected by the power relationship with the platform leaders. Fur-
thermore, power and ultimately the platform participation decision have an effect on how 
firms react to change caused by technological development and changes in customer needs. 
Firms either mostly adapt to change, as is the case for platform-focused complementors, or 
adapt to and exploit the opportunities caused by changes, as is the case for platform inde-
pendent complementors. The emerging process model of complementor strategies is pre-
sented in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. Process model of complementor strategies 
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5. Discussion 
In this chapter, the findings of the inductive empirical case study are evaluated by relating 
them with existing ideas and theories from prior academic literature, as recommended for 
employing the methodology by Gioia et al. (2013). The section is structured in a manner 
where findings of prior literature are compared to the findings of the inductive study in an 
order following the structure of the Findings chapter.  
All in all, even though the research questions have not been studied directly before, many of 
the findings for each research question find parallels in prior theories and findings. Not only 
do these parallels and alignment of the findings to prior literature support the findings of this 
thesis, but drawing these parallels and relating the findings of this thesis to prior literature 
may also provide further insight to the prior theories and findings. 
5.1 Ecosystem participation decision 
In this section, the findings related to the first research question: “What decisions regarding 
ecosystem participation do complementors have, and what drives those decisions?” are eval-
uated by comparing them to prior academic literature. The discussion is divided under the 
two main sections of the relevant findings, namely “Tradeoff between market access and 
lock-in”, and “Binary platform participation decision”. 
5.1.1 Tradeoff between market access and lock-in 
When it comes to a tradeoff between market access and lock-in, prior academic literature 
has not widely highlighted it. Venkataraman et al. (2018), do, however, note that there is a 
tradeoff between specializing and therefore keeping coordination costs low and investments 
that enable multihoming. Furthermore, the logic behind, and drivers for, both focusing into 
one ecosystem, and to avoiding such a focus, and therefore participating in many ecosys-
tems, find support from prior literature. 
Prior literature has assessed platform participation as a decision for complementors. Most 
importantly Ceccagnoli et al. (2012) have showed that platform participation is beneficial 
for complementors, and the benefits increase if complementors have an ability to protect 
their appropriation ability. Dellerman et al. (2017) and Kude et al. (2012) provide a more 
detailed understanding on how exactly does platform participation aid complementors, 
where market access, or commercial and social capital, are a common benefit for the studies, 
supporting the finding of this thesis that market access may be the most important benefit 
for complementors. Technological capital, identified as a major benefit in prior studies (Del-
lermann et al., 2017; Kude et al., 2012), may not be as important as customer access, and it 
is also available to some degree for all complementors, whereas customer access requires 
more commitment and focus to a specific platform. 
The findings of Wareham et al. (2014) of the benefits of platform partnership being stratified 
in a sense where higher levels of partnership yield more benefits, supports the finding that 
complementors can only attain the benefit of market access if they commit significant efforts 
to a platform. This together with the suggestion of Jacobides et al. (2018) of platform leaders 
crafting rules to tie complementors in, supports the finding that the rules for benefits crafted 
by platform leaders may lock-in complementors to a specific platform, as they may find it 
hard to reach enough sales in multiple ecosystems to attain benefits in them. 
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The finding that independence is favored due to being able to serve a broader clientele is in 
line with the consensus of prior literature where a major, perhaps most commonly identified 
benefit of multihoming is the increase of market reach of complementors in terms of being 
able to serve a broader audience when multihoming (e.g. Cennamo et al., 2018). 
The notion of ecosystem focus dictating growth and profitability, or more specifically the 
finding that either growth, or popularity, of the ecosystem, or softness of competition in an 
ecosystem can be beneficial to complementors is generally supported by the findings of Cec-
cagnoli et al. (2012), as, even without constraints or conditions, they find that platform par-
ticipation is beneficial for complementors. More specifically, the tension of popularity, or 
dominance, of a platform and the degree of competition in the platform being somewhat 
contradictory, and both being attractive to complementors found by Venkatraman & Lee 
(2004), supports the notion that also less popular platforms may be attractive to some com-
plementors. 
5.1.2 Binary platform participation decision 
The decision of which platform to partner with has been explained by various ecosystem 
related characteristics in prior literature (Venkatraman & Lee, 2004). The findings of Ven-
katraman and Lee (2004) imply that inter-platform competitive factors and intra-platform 
competitive factors influence complementor decisions.  Prior literature has acknowledged a 
tension between platform dominance and competition within ecosystems (Venkatraman & 
Lee, 2004; Wareham et al., 2014). The competitive environment within the ecosystem does 
not, however, seem to be that relevant for the initial decision to join a platform, at least as 
much as platform dominance, a finding in line with the findings of Venkatraman & Lee 
(2004). In addition to platform, or ecosystem, characteristics, it seems that complementor 
firm internal factors may have been influential in ecosystem decisions. Three of the four 
platform focused firms participated in an ecosystem, which the founders had prior experi-
ence from. This aspect has not been highlighted in prior literature. 
More generally, the platform-focus decision or the decision to remain independent from plat-
forms are related to specialization and multihoming, two important themes in the ecosystem 
literature. As costs of specialization are not fully fungible (Jacobides et al., 2018), and the 
coordination costs increasing when multihoming (Venkataraman et al., 2018)  it may be too 
costly for complementors to specialize in multiple ecosystems, i.e. specialize and multihome 
at the same time. The notion of Venkataraman et al. (2018) that there is a tradeoff between 
specialization and multihoming importantly supports the major finding of this thesis, namely 
a binary pattern in platform participation. 
In addition to the tradeoff identified by Venkataraman et al. (2018), a binary pattern in the 
behavior of software firms has been anticipated by Lee et al. (1995) in the form of infor-
mation systems activities in either applying information systems to business needs, or inte-
grating the technological infrastructure of organizations. 
It should be noted that the interview question relating to the ecosystem strategy of the firms 
highlights the decision regarding partnerships. As such, it cannot be concluded that ecosys-
tem strategy would be primarily about partnership decisions. The interviewees did, however 
view the decision as fundamental, and as such the multihoming decision should perhaps be 
viewed more as strategic, as characterized by Venkataraman et al. (2018) in contrast to the 
characterization of Jacobides et al. (2018), who describe the decision tactical.  
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5.2 Drivers of success 
In this section, the findings related to the second research question: “What drives comple-
mentor success?” are evaluated by comparing them to prior academic literature. The discus-
sion is divided under the two main sections of the relevant findings, namely “Key resources 
aligned with platform participation”, and “Offering aligned with platform participation and 
key resources”. 
5.2.1 Key resources aligned with platform participation 
The findings of this thesis are in line with the finding of Venkataraman et al. (2018) that 
human capital plays an important factor in the ability to multihome. Interestingly, the find-
ings illustrate that having very capable employees, i.e. top talent, may be an important ena-
bler for multihoming, a finding perhaps shedding new light to the findings of Venkataraman 
et al. (2018), who suggest the importance of individual employees, but do not explore it 
further. 
Even though literature in the tackled domains does not seem to point directly to a conclusion 
that platform independence as a strategy is favored by top talent, some parallels can be found. 
One of the reasons for firms to engage in Open Source activities, listed by Bonaccorsi & 
Rossi (2006) is that they are motivated by being able to hire good IT specialists. Even though 
the specific mechanism is not identified, we can draw on motivations of the developers to 
engage in Open Source activities, and that developers attach a high value on learning, wish 
to be free from the power of platform leaders, and more generally value social aspects 
(Bonaccorsi & Rossi, 2006). Even though monetary rewards are important motivators for 
developers, extrinsic motivations include also learning and career benefits (Battistella & 
Nonino, 2012). These motivators are directly linked to findings of platform independent 
companies, who note that professionals’ autonomous technology choices, and their willing-
ness to develop themselves for their own professional benefit are aligned with the firm’s 
choice to remain platform independent, as they do not dictate what technologies employees 
should use, but enable and facilitate them in their areas of interest. 
The platform independent firms’ strategy of autonomy not only enables them to attract and 
keep top talent, but it may also enable them to tackle the problem identified by Venkataraman 
et al. (2018) of high coordination costs of having a diverse range of human capital, namely 
technical and functional, that is required to be able to multihome as a firm.  As platform 
independent firms do not have to actively steer talent, and as the employees autonomously 
and independently take care of their needs to develop skills, the coordination is handled via 
culture and mission, which results in perhaps less need for active coordination, and therefore 
lower costs. 
The ability and will to systematically develop employees skills in a chosen platform tech-
nology, employed by platform-focused complementors relates to the notion of Venkata-
raman et al. (2018) that firms need to be able to build capabilities that grasp all the elements 
of the platform, i.e. technology, functionality and industry context, and also to embed these 
elements in their organizational routine. Furthermore, as these firms do not multihome, the 
coordination costs to do so remain relatively low, a finding in line with the problem of high 
coordination costs that stem from multihoming (Venkataraman et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, as platform-focused firms are specialized in mainly one specific platform, they 
can align their firm fully to the platform. This alignment, in prior literature, can be related to 
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specialization, and superior performance configurations (Bresnahan & Greenstein, 1999; 
Cennamo et al., 2018; Jacobides et al., 2018; Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017; Teece, 1986, 2007). 
The benefit of experience in sustaining superior performance (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017) in 
the case of the interviewed firms materializes as replicable solutions and references from 
prior customer cases that help the firms to win customer cases and execute them profitably. 
The notion that the systematic capability development, and the key resources, i.e. replicable 
solutions, or IP, are tied to the platform of focus for platform-focused complementors relates 
to the notion that the benefits of experience that lead to firms having superior performance 
configurations are platform specific (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). The lock in to the specific 
ecosystem is explained in prior literature via the notion of not fully fungible investments, 
i.e. investments that are not transferable to other ecosystems (Jacobides et al., 2018). The 
lock in, not only being limited to specific platforms, but also to configurations or modes of 
operation in ecosystems, relates to the idea of a superior performance configuration not being 
limited to offering, but to tasks and organizations (Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). 
5.2.2 Offering aligned with platform participation and key resources 
The findings in the section covering the offerings of the two different types of complement-
ors fundamentally relate to the notion of complementarity. As both of the types of firms have 
offerings that in their ways add value jointly with the platform, their offerings seem to fulfill 
the criteria of a complement (Jacobides et al., 2018). For platform-focused firms, the com-
plementarity of the offering is the primary aim, as the firms offering is meant to add value 
to the platform. Informants in platform independent companies describe their offering as 
something that can never be offered by platforms, as by definition, the differentiating solu-
tions they offer, are such that the competitors of their customers do not have them.  
Packaged software, or enterprise software platforms, in their core, are not customized, and 
are meant to be widely distributed efficiently (Kittlaus & Clough, 2009). The very benefit 
for the platform leaders is that they can efficiently, without additional cost, sell their platform 
to increasing number of customers, i.e. the product is easily scalable (Kittlaus & Clough, 
2009). This is also related to the more general nature of the platform as a stable element, 
whereas complements can and should vary (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009). 
The informants in platform independent firms note that they build their offering on top of 
the platforms, and they must be able to get data in and out of the platform systems. Without 
this basic structure provided by platforms, the complementary offering of the platform inde-
pendent firm would have less or no value. This does not work the other way around, namely 
there is no necessity for customers to have a tailored solution from an independent comple-
mentor to enable them to utilize a platform, although it could also be argued that the plat-
forms are more valuable for the customers, when they can buy tailored differentiating solu-
tions on top of the platform. These findings relate to unidirectional complementarity as dis-
cussed by Jacobides et al. (2018).  
Furthermore, even though platform independent complementors do not solely offer their so-
lutions related to a specific platform, they must customize the solution to the platform, relat-
ing to the concept of unique or nongeneric complementarity (Jacobides et al., 2018). Even 
though they can work with various different platforms, they still need to know each one of 
them very well as indicated by the findings relating to not fully fungible investments into 
platform technologies discussed in prior literature (Jacobides et al., 2018). Furthermore, the 
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solutions platform independent firms provide for their customers must be tailored to the cus-
tomers own platforms, implying even more than “some degree of customization” (Jacobides 
et al., 2018).  
Unilateral nongeneric complementarity, and therefore specialization, instead of cospeciali-
zation (Jacobides et al., 2018) is more evident in the case of platform-focused complement-
ors. It seems that their offering is not required for the platforms to function, but their offer-
ings do need the platform (see corresponding example by Jacobides et al. (2018) in section 
2.1.1.ii) On the other hand, prior literature has noted that platforms do, however, need com-
plementors as a set of actors (Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; Jacobides et al., 2018). 
The avoidance of competition with platform leaders of platform independent firm relates to 
advice by Iansiti & Levien (2004) to players they call niche players. According to them, “[a] 
niche player aims to develop specialized capabilities that differentiate it from other compa-
nies in the network [or ecosystem]” (Iansiti & Levien, 2004, p. 9). Even though the differ-
entiation is more apparent in the case of platform independent firms, differentiation via a 
specialized offering is also very important for the platform-focused complementors. Namely, 
as firms that are focused on specific platforms aim to create added value to those platforms, 
they produce it in a way that the platform leader can or does not want to take over, relating 
to the notion of Schütz et al. (2013), as discussed in section 2.2.4.ii. 
The way platform-focused complementors provide value in ecosystems is essentially rooted 
in the dynamics of the packaged software industry. Prior literature has noted that comple-
mentors are especially focused to customizing products to specific customer needs, as pack-
aged software does not solve customer problems without customization to the business prob-
lem and integration to business processes (Kittlaus & Clough, 2009). Perhaps not surpris-
ingly, this is very clear to the platform focused complementor informants. They seem to 
understand their role, and quite generally understand that they must create added value in 
this specific way in order to sustain their business. 
The expansion of platform-focused complementors in providing services covering increas-
ing functionalities of platforms is related to the idea of platform complexity (Cennamo et al., 
2018; Kapoor & Agarwal, 2017). As noted earlier, increasing platform complexity has been 
found to increase the probability of sustaining superior performance of complementors, es-
pecially when the complementor is more experienced in the specific ecosystem (Kapoor & 
Agarwal, 2017). It does, however, also increase the degree of (co)specialization needed 
(Cennamo et al., 2018). Furthermore, specialization not only increases the value of joint use 
i.e. complementarity, but it also increases lock in (Teece, 2007). 
5.3 Future development 
In this section, the findings related to the third research question: “What drivers affect the 
future of ecosystems and complementors and how will the complementors respond to 
changes?” are evaluated by comparing them to prior academic literature. The discussion is 
divided under the three main sections of the relevant findings, namely “Technology devel-
opment and customer needs as drivers of change”, “Power depends on platform participation 
and affects options”, and “Software firms’ strategies adapt to and exploit changes”. 
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5.3.1 Technology development and customer needs as drivers of change 
The effect of transition of the platforms to cloud pointed out by the informants seems very 
much comparable to platform transitions studied by Kapoor & Agarwal (2017). Some prior 
superior performance configurations have definitely exited the stratum (Kapoor & Agarwal, 
2017) as license vendors are struggling to find a new place in the ecosystem. Those that have 
managed to sustain their performance have had to change their configurations, as technical 
services are increasingly being provided by the platforms. Complementors also need to con-
tinuously find new ways to add value, as the value from some of their services is being taken 
over by platforms, when they integrate these services to their own offering – a threat noted 
in prior literature (Dellermann et al., 2017; Iansiti & Levien, 2004) 
There is still need for complementors’ services, as customers need advisors in utilizing plat-
form technologies. Furthermore, as noted by Schütz et al. (2013), any non-scalable way to 
respond to individual customer needs will most likely not be an attractive option for platform 
leaders, as the partner model provides them with a share of the benefits without any of the 
costs. Prior literature has noted that even though platforms may have initially thought that 
they do not need service complementors in their cloud models, they have been forced to 
retreat to partner models, as adjustment to customer business is still needed, and cannot yet 
be carried out  by customers themselves (Schmidt & Braun, 2015). Therefore, there is still 
need for complementors in consulting customers in how to utilize platform technologies to 
get the most out of them. 
The changes are not, however only limited to platform technologies. Customers seem to have 
new needs that complementors are able to serve, and cannot be served directly by platform 
leaders. First, software without incorporation of business logic and integration to business 
processes is much less valuable to customers than software that does incorporate such logic 
and is integrated to the business processes. This is related to the commoditization of pro-
gramming that is amplified by the increasing availability of programming skills. Generally, 
a fusion of IT and business strategy is identified and discussed in information systems liter-
ature (Bharadwaj et al., 2013). 
5.3.2 Power depends on platform participation and affects options 
Power in ecosystems, or more specifically power between the complementors and platform 
leader from the point of view of the complementors, was a theme that had not been tackled 
in prior literature directly. In general, the findings show that complementors do not have 
much power against platform leaders. There is no indication that they would even consider 
the possibility to affect the strategies of platform leaders in a direct manner.  
Platform to platform competition seems to be an influential driver of platform leader actions. 
However, in contrast to prior research that identifies it as a driver for platform leaders to act 
in the interest of the whole system (Teece, 2018) it seems to also be a way for platform 
leaders to justify their competitive actions towards complementors. They may leverage plat-
form to platform competition as a method for soft power and alignment of interest, which 
relates to the theories of Yoffie & Kwak (2006). It also seems to be an effective way, as the 
informants accept that in order for the ecosystem be successful and healthy, it must provide 
an attractive business opportunity for the platform leader. 
The focus on complementor revenues brought in may not be a result of badly designed in-
centive structures in platform leader companies, i.e. failing to create such incentive models 
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for internal partner correspondents that reflect the high-level partner strategy. There is a pos-
sibility that it is actually a way to increase partner-to-partner competition, as prior relation-
ships with the platform leader, or prior accomplishments do not give any advantages to part-
ners. If so, such strategy is very much in line with the ideas of increasing mobility and com-
petition in the complementary components (Jacobides et al., 2006). 
The finding that a platform leader may drive models that are not as favorable to comple-
mentors or even customers relates to the threat of opportunistic behavior noted in prior lit-
erature (Dellermann et al., 2017). The notion of platform independent complementors being 
able to utilize any platform, and therefore not being affected as much by possibly harmful 
strategies and models of platform leaders is related to the notion of a threat of opportunistic 
behavior leading to multihoming (Dellermann et al., 2017). However, it seems to be more of 
a benefit from platform independence, than a reason for it, in contrast to the assessment of 
Dellerman et al. (2017). 
On the other hand, complementors have power on a collective level. Platform independent 
complementors specifically, in their own words, are credible advisors on platform and tech-
nology choices. Perhaps more importantly, and objectively, the fact that customers seek their 
advice on their platform and technology decisions grants the platform independent firms the 
power to affect customers’ decisions. This, together with the fact that platform independent 
firms may build on any platforms also relates to a position of guarantor of quality (Jacobides 
et al., 2006), as discussed in section 2.1.2.i. Even though platforms are not yet standardized, 
the increasing interfaces between them may facilitate development towards standardization, 
and support the position of platform independent complementors in the future. 
From the perspective of platform-focused complementors, the power to resist platform lead-
ers’ harmful strategies stemming from advising customers in their decisions within the limits 
of platform leader technologies, relates to a source of power identified in literature as down-
stream capabilities (Ceccagnoli et al., 2012; Huang et al., 2013). The findings of this thesis 
seem to provide a more specific understanding on how exactly the downstream capabilities 
aid complementors in defending themselves from expropriation. 
5.3.3 Software firms’ strategies adapt to and exploit changes 
The findings indicate that there has been a certain urgency for platform-focused comple-
mentors to adapt business models to platform leader strategic changes. As one important 
example of this, as noted in the findings section, the transition to cloud has rendered some 
prior businesses obsolete. License vendors business has weakened or completely vanished. 
The effects of cloud technology on platform-focused complementors business, especially the 
decline of license vendors, is very much in line with the suggestions of prior literature 
(Schütz et al., 2013). Increasing industry focus seems to be the direction of development for 
platform-focused complementors, as also anticipated by Schütz et al. (2013). 
The finding that platform leaders expand their business to areas complementors used to take 
care of implies that platform leaders may not only use soft power, in terms of explaining 
their actions via platform-to-platform competition, as noted in section 5.3.2. They also ex-
pand to areas previously served by complementors, a way to utilize hard power as discussed 
in prior literature by Yoffie & Kwak (2006). 
95 
 
The notion of platform-focused complementors not receiving much help from platform lead-
ers in the transition into new models is somewhat contradictory with the orchestrating func-
tion platform leaders have, described by prior literature (Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Rickmann 
et al., 2014). On the other hand, complementors having to decide on appropriate models for 
themselves corresponds to a lack of hierarchical governance and control, which is an im-
portant characteristic of ecosystems in contrast to e.g. a supply chain (Jacobides et al., 2018).  
The findings of this thesis somewhat contradict the findings of Kapoor & Agarwal (2017) 
of complexity increasing the likelihood of exit from a stratum of superior performance in 
platform transitions, as one would most likely call the platforms, in which the firms in the 
sample operate in, complex. It may be that platform transitions are not such a long jump, as 
described by Kapoor & Agarwal (2017) for the firms interviewed, perhaps as their configu-
rations are more adaptable to the new model. On the other hand, some firms not in the sample 
have faced problems in operating in the new model according to the interviews, due to not 
being successful in adapting to the transition.  
However, the findings of this thesis are in line with the findings of Kapoor & Agarwal (2017) 
in regards of experience being beneficial for the firms, as IP and replicability were important 
resources or assets for the platform focused complementors, and these resources or assets 
build on experience. Furthermore, it is easy believe that the more complex the platform is 
the more specialization is needed, as noted in prior literature by Cennamo et al.  (2018). 
The finding that it seems that the skills needed to succeed in the future for both of the two 
types of complementors studied are increasingly tied to the customers’ business domain is 
in line with the findings of Lee et al. (1995). Lee et al. (1995) note that technology manage-
ment skills that help linking technology with business and user needs are important. Further-
more, it seems that the two different patterns relating activities and skills, observed by Lee 
et al. (1995), may be observable on a firm level. 
The first pattern Lee et al. (1995) observe, as discussed earlier, is that the activity of effec-
tively applying information systems to meet business needs is related with in-depth business 
knowledge and excellent interpersonal skills. This pattern of development is observable in 
platform independent complementors, as the expansion in management consulting will prob-
ably increase those skills and knowledge. 
The second and different pattern observed by Lee et al. (1995), relates the activity of inte-
gration of the organization’s technological infrastructure to an absolute need in technical 
competence. As the technical competences are accompanied by technology management 
skills, common for both patterns (D. Lee et al., 1995), this pattern seems to be observable in 
platform-focused complementors. They indeed need to know their platforms of choice com-
prehensively, even though they do not need to know the intricate deep technological features. 
Furthermore, they are increasingly focus on the alignment of technology and business, which 
shows as an increasing focusing on certain industries. 
The finding that the need or wish to expand into consulting of platform independent compa-
nies does not only stem from ability to serve customers in new ways and grow, but also from 
being able to win interesting projects, and therefore retain top talent is interesting. It relates 
the multihoming strategy in a new way to human capital, in a way where multihoming is not 
only enabled by diverse human capital, but also that multihoming may enable attracting the 
needed human capital to multihome. Such a mechanism is not explicated by Venkataraman 
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et al. (2018), but they note the importance of path dependencies, i.e. that adapting to an 
environment to compete effectively may make it difficult to readjust the operations later on. 
In contrast to Venkataraman et al. (2018), who seem to see such a path dependency mainly 
as a threat, it may be that successful continuous alignment to a multihoming strategy also 
enables platform independent firms to sustain their competitive advantage.  
In essence, this holds true for both of the types of complementors. The participation decision 
has led them to align themselves in a certain way, and they may find it difficult to transfer 
across the categories, i.e. platform-focused complementors cannot easily become platform 
independent and vice versa, but on the other hand, via successful adaption, they also benefit 
from the way they have aligned to the participation decision. Their strategies in capability 
development, and the compatible key resources enable them to be competitive in the offering 
they provide, and the way they adapt to changes are a logical consequence of their prior 
decisions. 
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6. Conclusions 
This chapter concludes this thesis by highlighting the most important implications of the 
thesis to both practice and theory, and by assessing limitations and avenues for further re-
search. From the practical perspective, the focus is on implications to complementors, and 
especially those complementors that operate in contexts similar to the case companies. From 
the theoretical perspective, the focus is on what the findings of the research add to prior 
academic literature. The limitations and avenues for future research build mainly on the 
scope of the research, and on the limitations posed by the employed methodology. 
6.1 Practical implications 
This thesis, as one of the first studies focusing on complementors, provides insights into how 
to succeed in ecosystems for many firms in industries where platforms have emerged, or are 
beginning to emerge. As most firms ponder how to create platforms and leverage their own 
platforms, a primary insight is that firms can benefit from ecosystems even if they do not 
own a platform, by taking the role of a complementor. Complementors can benefit greatly 
from participating in platforms, if they understand that the way they approach platform par-
ticipation is a decision that may deeply affect their operations and options in the future. Not 
only are the findings relevant to firms that need to decide on whether to focus on one plat-
form, or to remain independent and contribute to multiple platforms, but they are also rele-
vant to firms that have already, knowingly or implicitly, made that decision earlier.  
Firms that are focused on one platform can utilize the following implications to understand 
the possible limitations of their options, find ways to both maximize the benefits of their 
current position, and perhaps mitigate the threats that they face. 
Even though some informants in the case companies labeled as platform-focused claim that 
they are not locked in their platform of choice, it seems that it would be costly and difficult 
for them to transfer to another platform. Not only are the capabilities of their employees 
mainly limited to the platform of their choice and it would require considerable investments 
in training to transfer those capabilities to other platforms, but the benefits that they currently 
receive from the platform of their choice also impose significant opportunity costs on to a 
potential transition. 
The best way to approach a multihoming platform strategy for platform-focused comple-
mentors would be to retain sales and capabilities in the platform of choice this far, and at the 
same time grow capabilities and sales in another, or multiple other, platform(s). As some of 
the case companies already have secondary platforms, it seems plausible that this may suc-
ceed. Such a strategy would, however, require considerable growth, especially in order to 
achieve financial benefits from another platform. Furthermore, as platform-focused comple-
mentors currently benefit from the homogenic capability pool as they can systematically 
develop capabilities, coordinating two or more platforms of focus simultaneously would lead 
to increased costs. Perhaps the best way to implement a strategy to focus on two or more 
platforms would be to separate different business units for the different platforms. 
Whether continuing with a single platform focus or aiming to add other platforms as focus 
areas, the platform-focused complementors should leverage their current strengths and keep 
developing them. The systematic capability development practices allow them to circumvent 
the problem in hiring new employees that are in high demand, i.e. aiming to attract top talent. 
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Together with replicable solutions, or processes, systematic capability development may 
also reduce the pressure for salary costs to increase, as the firms are less dependent on indi-
vidual experts. By keeping salary costs in check, platform-focused complementors can retain 
their ability to be competitive in terms of costs, and therefore remain both competitive in 
winning customer projects and profitable in executing them.  
Winning customer projects and executing them profitably is also supported by IP and repli-
cability of solutions. Platform-focused complementors should focus on generating IP by cod-
ifying and distributing the knowledge they learn and assets they generate during customer 
projects. They may wish to focus on certain industries in order to retain and increase their 
competitiveness within the customer segments of those industries.  
With or without industry focuses, platform-focused complementors need to be wary of plat-
forms taking over an increasing number of functionalities, and especially the fact that value 
of purely technological capabilities is rapidly decreasing and technological issues are in-
creasingly being taken over by platforms. Therefore, platform-focused complementors 
should accumulate knowledge and IP specifically in the business applications of platform 
technologies. 
Firms that are platform independent should understand and leverage the benefits of their 
independence. They seem to have an advantage in attracting top talent, and that advantage 
exceeds just being able to pay higher salaries. They should embrace their ability to provide 
employees with autonomy in making  technology choices, to enable learning and autono-
mous capability development in contrast to building systematic and mandatory capability 
development practices, and to keep in mind in their sales efforts that interesting projects are 
important to top talent. 
If they succeed in retaining their top talent and in enabling top talent to develop top capabil-
ities in multiple technologies, they can leverage their position as an impartial, and highly 
skilled and knowledgeable advisor to their customers. As technological choices regarding 
platforms become more strategic, customers will need advisors in navigating the increas-
ingly complex landscape. Even though by holding on to their top talent, platform independ-
ent complementors most likely retain their ability to win projects where differentiating soft-
ware needs to be created– a type of projects that will likely not be taken over easily by 
platforms – they may wish to exploit the business opportunities in professional services or 
advisory. In any case, they need to incorporate business understanding into their capabilities, 
as not only does strategic advisory in technology require incorporation of business logic, but 
so will creating differentiating software also, in an increasing manner. 
As expanding to advisory services requires new and different capabilities from the firms, 
platform independent complementors may wish to hire new employees that are more able 
and willing to take on roles that require business knowledge. Coordinating such a mixture 
of human capital may not be easy, but the success of some early movers shows that it is 
possible. It does, however, require careful organizational design and skillful communication 
by management. If the expansion is not managed carefully, especially taking into consider-
ation the wishes, worries and needs of the current technically talented employees, the expan-
sion can be risky for the firms. Platform independent complementors should first and fore-
most consider their strategic moves from the perspective of their top talent, as they are in 
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such a high demand that they can easily find jobs elsewhere, and as they are the firms’ most 
valuable resource. 
The threat of top talent desertion is especially crucial for platform independent complement-
ors if they consider changing their approach to be more focused on specific platforms. Firms 
considering such strategies should also keep in mind that even though a more focused plat-
form participation approach may become more attractive in the future, their models may not 
be suitable in competing directly with platform-focused complementors. Beginning to lev-
erage systematic and focused capability development and replicability in projects may be 
very detrimental to retaining top talent. Furthermore, even if platform independent compa-
nies would be willing to give up the competitive advantage that stems from top talent, they 
may find it hard to compete with costs, as platform-focused competitors can leverage repli-
cability more easily, as they are more aligned to systematic capability development and rep-
licable processes, and have accumulated experience in operating in that manner. 
6.2 Contributions to theory 
This thesis contributes to the nascent and limited understanding on complementors as actors 
in ecosystems. Via inductive sensemaking from interview data collected from real case com-
panies, the thesis not only provides answers to how complementors act in ecosystems, but 
also to why they do so. 
As the main theoretical contribution, the proposed two categories of complementors, namely 
platform-focused complementors and platform independent complementors, illustrate and 
highlight that complementors, even if similar in their operating segments, can differ funda-
mentally in their decisions regarding platform participation. The two types of behavior pat-
terns observed lead to being able to characterize some complementors as platform-focused 
or specializing complementors and others as independent or multihoming complementors. 
Contributing to prior studies on platform participation decisions, the thesis provides support 
for market access, and more specifically support in winning customer cases, as an important 
driver for platform participation. The thesis also suggests that being able to reach a wider 
customer base is an important benefit, and perhaps the most influential antecedent, of mul-
tihoming. 
The findings indicate that platform leaders award benefits to complementors, mainly in terms 
of leads and joint customer cases, based on sales generated to the platform. This type of 
crafting of rules induces specialization and therefore lock-in. The findings also suggest that 
specifically the market access benefits that help complementors win customer cases may be 
the benefit that differentiates platform-focused complementors from platform independent 
complementors in terms of benefits attained from partnerships. The benefit of market access 
also differentiates primary platforms from secondary platforms for those platform-focused 
complementors that also participate on a secondary platform. 
The findings imply that the platform participation decision may be more fundamental and 
strategic than some previous articles have assumed, as key resources and offerings of the 
complementors are aligned to the platform participation decision. Furthermore, the align-
ment that follows from the decision implies a tradeoff between specialization to a specific 
platform and multihoming, instead of regarding them as optional tactics for complementors 
at all times. 
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The way key resources, or sources of competitive advantage, differ across the two different 
types of complementors is an important finding, especially as it is linked to the way the 
complementors are organized. Platform-focused complementors build on replicability in so-
lutions and on a systematic approach to capability development, whereas platform independ-
ent complementors organize via autonomy of top talent in terms of how to solve and ap-
proach customer problems, and employ an enabling and facilitative approach in capability 
development.  
The important role of human capital, and its linkage to multihoming, noted earlier by Ven-
kataraman et al. (2018), is supported by the findings of this thesis. Importantly, an example 
of how firms have tackled the issue of coordination of different types of human capital via 
autonomy is provided. Furthermore, in the case of platform-focused firms, the findings sug-
gest that lower coordination costs are a benefit of specialization, enabled by focusing only 
on one platform. 
The finding that complementors can affect collectively and indirectly, to some extent, the 
actions of platform leaders via advising customers is interesting, as it provides insight into 
how exactly do complementors’ downstream capabilities help them defend their position in 
ecosystems, giving insight to the findings of Huang et al. (2013) and Ceccagnoli et al. (2012). 
The findings imply that multihoming does have an effect on power, especially in terms of 
power that platform leaders wield on complementors. The findings that platform leaders may 
drive new models or solutions, even in cases where those new models may not be optimal to 
complementors or customers, is an example of opportunistic behavior by platform leaders. 
Such a finding is interesting as earlier examples of opportunistic behavior have mostly been 
limited to integrating functions previously served by complementors – although such inte-
gration towards complementors’ business is also noted in the findings of this thesis and, 
therefore, prior theories are not contradicted, but augmented. 
The findings of this thesis support the need to incorporate business knowledge to software 
services identified in prior literature. Furthermore, it seems that both types of complementors 
identified share such need, therefore suggesting that it widely affects firms in the industry. 
Overall, the interdependent nature of platform participation decision and alignment to the 
decision, and the way the decision and alignment together affect the power relation between 
complementors and platform leaders, which altogether affect the ways complementors re-
spond to changes in the environment, proposes that complementor strategies are not only 
complex, but the strategy making process is also dynamic. The process model depicted in 
section 4.4, even though not likely to be complete, gives primary insights to understanding 
complementor strategies as an interesting category within ecosystem strategies. Whereas the 
two different types of complementors employ different strategies, they both take into con-
sideration similar problems, which seem to differ from the problems that are most important 
to platform leaders. 
  
101 
 
6.3 Limitations and avenues for further research 
The main limitations of the thesis stem from the scoping of the research and the methodology 
employed. The scope and methodology have an effect on the generalizability and validity of 
the findings. Considering the limitations, future research could both study the phenomenon 
in other contexts, e.g. in other industries or from the perspective of product complementors 
to explore what strategies complementors employ in other contexts, and how the strategies 
differ from the context of this study. Furthermore, future research may aim to validate the 
findings of this study via a different methodology employing a deductive approach. 
The scope of the thesis is motivated in section 1.3, and even though necessary in order to 
generate meaningful insights with limited resources, the scope also leads to some limitations 
in generalizability. Within the software industry, and for the complementors in it, the find-
ings may be valid only for business-to-business service complementors. Service and product 
complementors seem to differ in multiple dimensions, and therefore, product complementors 
may be able to employ different approaches to platform participation. It may be that product 
complementors are able to multihome more easily leading to and enabling different ways to 
align the firms successfully to platforms. Easier multihoming and a different approach to 
alignment may have effects on power dynamics, on drivers of change, and on the ways firms 
adapt to change. Offering services to business customers in contrast to consumers is also 
likely to affect the dynamics. Future research could aim to understand the strategies product 
complementors utilize, or to understand how complementors offering products or services 
to consumers strategize in ecosystems, and compare those strategies to the strategies pre-
sented in this thesis for service complementors targeting business customers. 
The findings of this thesis are more likely to apply generally to service complementors op-
erating in the enterprise software industry. However, the sample consists of case companies 
operating in mainly one geographic area, and, therefore, local characteristics of the operating 
environment may reduce the generalizability. Finland may be a less focal market for inter-
national platform leaders than some others, and the supply of capable employees may differ 
across geographical regions. Future research could focus on service complementors in other 
geographical regions in order to explore how different local dynamics affect ecosystem dy-
namics e.g. in the way platform leaders integrate towards consultation of important clients 
in larger markets. 
The findings of this thesis may or may not be generalizable across different industries as the 
scope of the research is limited to one industry. It is, however, likely that the thesis gives 
also insight to complementors in other industries, especially ones where platforms have 
emerged and where continuous development of specialized platform related capabilities is 
required in order for complementors to succeed. 
The methodology being inductive and the number of interviews being limited may pose lim-
itations on the validity of the findings. The purpose of the thesis has not been to confirm any 
prior hypotheses, and, therefore, the findings are propositive and implicatory in nature. Even 
though theoretical saturation to a pragmatic degree was reached, a claim of complete ex-
haustion of different categories of complementors cannot be made, thus meaning that the 
findings may not cover or apply to all companies even within the scope. 
However, as the research methodology and limitations of scope and validity are described 
transparently, and the research methodology has been rigorously followed, the findings are 
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credible. Furthermore, the limitations are typical to the methodology, which, when applied 
properly, has its own strengths, and thus employing such a methodology has earned its ac-
ceptance in the academic community. 
A deductive approach to further research could utilize the findings of this research to develop 
hypotheses testable with quantitative data. Such an approach could perhaps test whether the 
pattern of the two different approaches towards platform participation, i.e. platform-focus 
and platform independence can be proven quantitatively. It may not be easy to test such an 
assumption by datasets readily available, as platform-focused complementors may nomi-
nally participate on multiple platforms even though they practically focus on one. Perhaps 
obtaining partnership-data where different tiers of partnership can be observed may help in 
such a quantitative approach, or even better, getting access to revenues contributed to differ-
ent platforms on a company level may allow to tangibly assess the degree of focus. 
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Appendix I: Interview structure 
Interview structure (original) 
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Interview structure (translated) 
1. Please describe the strategy of your firm related to different platform ecosystems  
(does the firm belong to multiple 1.a. directly competing ecosystems, e.g. SAP and Oracle, 
and/or 1.b. ecosystems that do not compete directly e.g. SAP and Salesforce, or 2. is the firm 
focused on some specific ecosystem(s), or 3. some other strategy or a hybrid of the previous. 
+ why so?) 
a) How has the strategy developed in the recent years? 
b) What external and internal factors have guided the strategy and had an effect on it? (Plat-
form characteristics/features, platform leader actions, technology development, internal ca-
pabilities, entrants to the industry, regulation, customers, etc.) 
c) What benefits and costs are related to on one hand diversification and on the other hand 
focus to a specific platform? 
2. Please describe the offering of your firm and its extent in relation to different plat-
forms  
(different services and products, i.e. roles and positions in ecosystems) 
a) What kind of changes have there been in the service or product offerings in recent years? 
I.e. how has the role changed? (Broadening of offering or divestments in e.g. advisory ser-
vices or software products) 
b) Which external or internal drivers have affected the development of the offering? (Plat-
form characteristics, technology development, internal capabilities, entrants to the industry, 
regulation, customers, etc.) 
c) How would you describe the relation between the position of the firm in the ecosystem(s) 
and its strategy related to diversification between platforms or focus in a specific platform? 
3. Please describe the development of ecosystems in the software industry in recent 
years and your view on the future development 
a) How have the power relations changed when it comes to ecosystems and platforms? How 
do you believe the situation will develop? 
b) What have been the drivers of competitive advantage for players like your firm? What 
will drive competitive advantage in the future? 
c) How would you describe your firm’s share of the value created in terms of appropriation? 
What kind of changes have occurred? How will the situation develop in the future? 
